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Preface
This thesis was written by someone who has spent an inordinate amount of time in the Accident
and Emergency departments of hospitals in more than one of the jurisdictions covered by the
research. This is what academics might call primary or empirical research; I call it an extraodinary
run of bad luck. The only thing that all of these visits had in common was a recurrent thought
about communication between doctor and patient. Even on those visits on which I could be said to
have had the use of all my faculties, it was not always easy to understand the procedures
recommended. It struck me then that this communication will always be problematic because of a
disjuncture between what I might want to be told and what the attending doctor sees fit to tell me.
The other disjuncture is one between what the doctor says and what I understand.
I became fascinated by medical law generally through postgraduate studies in Comparative
Literature at Wits University, Johannesburg, South Africa; it was also there that I developed a
liking for deconstruction of legal texts. From there I embarked on a Master of Laws Degree at the
University of Edinburgh where I developed an interest in consent and what the law across the
common law world has to say about the consent of a competent adult patient.
There are many people who have given me their support through the process of writing
this thesis; they can be divided into two groups: those whose involvement in the work was direct,
and those whose involvement was less direct. Of the first group, a special vote of thanks for
academic and moral support goes to my supervisors, Professor Ken Mason and Professor Sandy
McCall Smith. Others who helped directly are Dr Graeme Laurie whose thoughts on what became
Chapter 6 were invaluable, and Alison Britton, who proof-read the entire work and provided a
shoulder and an ear as a friend and as a colleague.
Of those whose involvement was less direct, but whose support was invaluable, special
thanks must be extended to my family for their moral and material support throughout, and for
their constant support and communication; to friends and colleagues at the Universities of
Edinburgh and Glasgow whose office space and social time I shared (particularly, but not
exclusively, Dave Berry, Juliette Casey and Miriam Aziz). Additionally, many thanks to friends,
flatmates and ex-flatmates in several countries who were just there for me without even trying. I
hope that the work has an intrinsic value and will be of value to the corpus of knowledge out there.
xii
Whatever help was given and gratefully received, the work and the responsibility for it,







This thesis is concerned with the common law duty of the medical practitioner to disclose
information on the risks inherent in, and alternatives to, medical treatment to which broad
consent has been given. This, in brief, is what will be referred to as the 'informed consent
scenario'. The term 'medical practitioner' or 'doctor' will be used generically to include the
consultant surgeon and physician and the general practitioner,' even although the law considers
each practitioner in relation to his or her own speciality.2 The thesis will compare and contrast
the positions in the United States of America, England, Scotland, Canada, Australia and South
Africa.
Provision of information and communication between patient and practitioner will
emerge as fundamental. The plaintiff in disclosure cases will assert that the medical
practitioner negligently omitted to disclose a particular piece of information. This will be a
question of fact to be assessed by using the patient's notes and through the credibility of the
evidence given by the parties involved: the patient, the medical practitioner and expert
witnesses called for both sides.
To this extent, it is important to understand the relationship between doctor and
patient because they will later become defendant3 and plaintiff. This introduction is concerned
with outlining the scope of the thesis and setting out the comparative methodology to be
employed. It is also important at this stage to stress that the thesis is about legal regulation of
the practices of the medical profession; hence the power of sanction of the General Medical
Council - and analogous bodies in non-British jurisdictions - falls outwith its ambit.
'
In eighteenth century England there existed an important political and professional difference between
surgeon, physician and apothecary, but these categories may be subsumed under the 'practitioner' head.
2
Such that, for example, the standard expected of the competent surgeon is different from that expected of a
competent general practitioner and specific to the surgeon.
3
Although the employing Health Authority and not the medical practitioner will be the defendant, if vicarious
liability applies.
1
It is important also to understand how the law views the relationship between doctor
and patient because it is that relationship which itself gives rise to a duty of care. Chapter 1
will go on to describe the judicial doctrine of informed consent and to discuss its rationale and
certain aspects of its history. From there, one will be able to consider where, in law, the
doctrine of informed consent has been held to fit and to analyse why this should be as it is and
what policy implications have been brought to bear to make it so. Discussion will begin with
the legal position in Canada, because Canada was the first non-American Common Law
jurisdiction to adopt the doctrine of informed consent as articulated in some American states.
This is in marked contrast to British jurisdictions, which will be discussed next, followed by
Australia and South Africa, the most recent jurisdictions to apply the doctrine. Chapter 1 will
conclude with a discussion of those policy considerations which have moulded judicial attitudes
on the duty of care.
It will have been noted in Chapter 1 that a duty of care exists and that litigation takes
place according to the common law of negligence. Chapter 2 will consider the nature of the
doctor-patient relationship and will stress the different perspectives from which the parties
approach that relationship. It will also highlight the importance of communication in disclosure
cases. Having considered why disclosure cases are litigated in negligence and having assessed
the nature of the relationship between the parties which gives rise to a duty of care, Chapter 3
will involve a discussion of the standard of care that is demanded by courts. It will compare
and contrast the legal tests of each jurisdiction which will be brought to bear in the informed
consent scenario. Chapter 4 will compare and contrast the same jurisdictions, but this time in
respect of their different tests for causation. It will also include a more general discussion of
causation in the civil law, which has implications which are broader than those involved in the
informed consent scenario itself.
By that point it will have emerged that the evidence of experts and that given by lay
persons in such cases are weighted differently by the courts of different jurisdictions. Chapter
5 will therefore consider more fully the precise role of the expert in disclosure cases. When the
issue is viewed from that perspective, the differences between the jurisdictions are seen as more
than mere semantic constructions of judicial tests, but as differences which have practical
implications for the outcome of such cases.
2
That will be a fitting point at which to consider in greater depth the course the law
might take in the United Kingdom. The reason for this is that the other jurisdictions have
adopted or adapted the doctrine of informed consent, but the courts of the United Kingdom
have not. Chapter 6, therefore, comprises several arguments in respect of British judiciaries
which speak to the likely direction to be taken by British courts when considering cases brought
about within the informed consent scenario. The final chapter will draw together these and
other conclusions.
One might also consider the ethical forces behind professional conduct. This will set
up a platform from which to discuss the legal forces at work. To illustrate this, Chapter 2 will
consider certain elements of the doctor-patient relationship, in order to highlight some of the
complexities involved in the consultation which gives rise to litigation and in the litigation
itself. This will be done by using the Canadian case of Reibl v Hughes4 as an. This case will be
used because the Judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada includes a verbatim reporting of
the evidence given by plaintiff, defendant and experts. This ought to set the scene for a
discussion of the standard of care demanded by the law of the jurisdictions that are considered.
2. Comparative Law
Comparative Law refers to a method rather than a set of principles. When confronted with a
novel question, on which there is little or no authority, or on which precedent swings in the
opposite direction, a judge will often extrapolate from other cases heard in other jurisdictions
by comparison and analogy. This does not mean we have in law a global village. When
considering cases in the law of medical negligence and informed consent we are dealing with
foreign elements in domestic law as the judiciary is called upon to consider these other systems.
In his work on Comparative Law, Schlesinger5 argued that the legal world can be divided into
Civil Law, Common Law and the Soviet Orbit.6 The systems covered by this thesis are
Common Law systems.
4
(1980) 114DLR (3d) 1.
1
Schlesinger R B Comparative Law (2Ed.) 1960. Stevens & Sons Ltd. London. 190 et seq.
6
Following the end of the cold war, this legal family has changed only in name.
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In order for Comparative Law to be an appropriate and useful methodology, the
systems being compared must have elements in common. This is because comparison itself
does not occur at the level of system but at the level of legal principle. What is important when
pleading foreign law is the degree of similarity between systems being compared as well as the
degree of generic similarity which lies in the facts of the cases being considered analogous.7
These Common Law systems are, at least in part, the progeny of English law from the
colonial period. They developed as hybrids of English Common Law and indigenous
customary law; they are thus able to include elements necessary to cater for the novelty of new
countries during the colonial period in which legal institutions migrated with peoples and had to
adapt to the needs of emerging nations.
Common Law countries comprise a clear example of common historical development
as well as a fitting example of similar modes of thinking and adversarial legal style. The fact
that law evolves from decision to decision suggests that these countries have much in common.
Should independently developing Common Law countries adopt broadly similar positions with
regard to a particular legal matter, like the doctrine of informed consent, it can be argued that
they developed together on the basis of similar principles operative in analogous legal climates.
From there it is a short step to argue that because of that similar development, a court is
inclined, though not bound, to follow the analogous jurisdiction.
Because the systems under discussion are part of the Anglo-American legal family,8
decisions made are influential among the jurisdictions. For judiciaries, the matter of informed
consent (and other matters) becomes a matter of finding a 'line of best fit' for a novel judicial
dictum or test. Counsel, through pleadings, invites the court to adopt a legal principle or
argument (such as that of informed consent). For example, in Sidaway v Bethlem Royal
Hospital Governors,9 Lord Scarman discussed the appellant's submissions saying in conclusion,
'The appellant's second submission is that she has a cause of action which is
independent of negligence in the Bolam sense. The submission is based on her right to
decide for herself whether she should submit to the operation proposed. In effect she
invoked the transatlantic doctrine of informed consent.'
7 Cf. 1.1. on the 'generic informed consent scenario'.
8
Especially with regard to court structure and procedure.
9
[1984] AC 871, 883C-D.
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Lord Scarman went on to point out that this constituted a new ground in English law.
Similarly in South Africa in Castell v De Greef,10 paragraph 7A of the plaintiff's claim
was restated by Ackerman J as being separate to the claim for negligent performance of
surgery:
'Plaintiff further avers that defendant was under a duty to warn plaintiff, prior to
operating on plaintiff, of the material risks and complications which might flow from
such operation, and of any specific alternative procedures which might be followed in
order to minimise, reduce or exclude such risks of complications.'
Where a novel ground is averred, what is in issue is a foreign solution to a domestic
problem. This is arrived at by the court asking whether a principle of a foreign system can or
ought to fit within the given framework and law of the domestic system. This is because there
is a difference between pure comparison and the utilisation of the results of that comparison,"
which could amount to the adoption of foreign law. Courts may, of course, fall back on
jurisdictional independence and autonomy to justify not applying aspects of foreign law.
Foreign law appears to a domestic system as fact.12 The question facing the court is
twofold: whether this fact can be assimilated and whether it ought to be assimilated. The effect
of this fact scenario is that the foreign law is invoked in the pleadings by the party proposing to
rely on it. The party bearing the burden of proof must prove the foreign law as fact, and then
introduce evidence that that fact situation ought to fit within the domestic law. This will be a
question for both the court, particularly in informed consent cases where so much hinges on the
acceptance of the testimony of expert witnesses.
The principle of stare decisis remains intact,13 yet forms of argument are both adopted
and adapted to bring precedent in line with another jurisdiction because they are, in the medical
sphere, seen to have a basis in ethics14 and in policy. For example, when it comes to the
10 1994 (4) SA408, 413E-F.
11
R B Schliesinger. Ibid. 28.
12
Schliesinger. Ibid. 41. See also Markesenis The Gradual Convergence (1994).
13
Although consider the Practice Statement 1966 [1966] 1 WLR 1234 which held that the House of Lords is
not bound by its own decisions and hence can, its is argued, change their own law to bring it in line with
changed social conditions. Also consider the matter of changing ethical perceptions considered in 1.2.4.
14
English cases subsequent to Sidaway (Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority [1994] 5 Med LR 334 and
McAllister v Lewisham [1994] 5 Med LR 343 which were High Court decisions) can be seen to subtly alter
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informed consent doctrine, England15 and Scotland16 adopt a similar position which is different
from that adopted by Canada.17 The Australian position18 is different again from that in Canada
and was latterly adopted in part and adapted in South Africa.19
This century, law has become more and more involved in determining the decision¬
making powers of the medical profession20 because medical practice is out-pacing law and
because more is demanded from medicine.21 This means that the law has more to regulate.
Where Teff considers the 'increasing involvement of law with medicine', he considers
'involvement' to be the same as 'encroachment' or even 'engagement'22 in a context in which
court declarations of lawfulness are more commonly sought. This ought also to be seen against
the exponential growth of actions for negligence.23 With the law taking over to a certain extent,
Law becomes the 'symbolic representation of the limits of medicine's authority',24 beginning
with the law's categorisation of the nature of the relationship between doctor and patient - in
particular its determination that, in law, a duty of care is owed by the medical practitioner to the
patient.
Sidaway on informed consent, showing the beginnings of the 'slippery slope' which will be argued in Chapters
3 & 6 of this thesis.
15
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643 HL.
16
Moyes v Lothian Health Board 1990 SLT 444, [1990] 1 Med LR 463.
17 Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1.
18
Rogers v Whitaker [1993] 4 Med LR 79, [1992] ALJR 47.
19 Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408.
20
See Re S (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 806 and R v Cox 12 BMLR 38.
21
This is because the ability of medical science to diagnose far outpaces its ability to treat, particularly in the
field of human genetics.
22 Teff 16.
23 The Economist. August 19th 1995. '[P]ay-outs by hospitals have risen from nothing five years ago to £125 m
in 1994-95' with a further £1 billion 'in the pipeline.'




1.1. informed Consent in Theory
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the informed consent scenario as it occurs in the
jurisdictions covered by this thesis. This chapter will therefore outline briefly those generic
facts which may give rise to a legal claim under the informed consent head. It will go on to
outline the theory behind what has become a legal doctrine and then look at where the doctrine
fits in law. The reason for so doing is that, originally, such generic facts gave rise to an action
in battery in some American states. By the time the doctrine moved to Commonwealth
jurisdictions, it was already litigated under the negligence head. However, for policy reasons
courts still found it necessary to exclude assault and battery.
This chapter will first consider the Canadian position because Canada was the first
non-American jurisdiction to adopt the doctrine. By way of contrast and due to chronology,
British jurisdictions will then be considered, followed by Australia and then South Africa. The
doctrine was accepted in a modified form in Canada in Reibl v Hughes in 1980, rejected in
England in Sidaway in 1985 and in Scotland by Moyes v Lothian Health Board in 1990,
accepted in Australia in Rogers v Whitaker in 1993 and adapted in South Africa in Castell v
DeGreef in 1994. By way of conclusion, this chapter will consider other aspects of the law of
negligence which are pertinent to the informed consent scenario and then discuss those judicial
policy considerations which are brought to bear in the case law.
In the interest of focus, this thesis will be confined to situations in which a legally
competent patient has given general consent to a medical or surgical procedure; as a result of
that procedure, the patient will have suffered some form of legally recognised injury. Instances
involving plaintiffs who lacked competence to consent because of their age or mental capacity
will be excluded. In the cases being considered, the plaintiff's allegation would be that the
7
injury was in some way linked"5 to their uninformed consent to that procedure. The plaintiff
will be seeking restitution (that is non-punitive damages) as compensation for the injury
suffered.
The case law on the topic indicates that such actions lie in the law of torts and with the
exception of South Africa, in the tort of negligence. This has been the case for some
centuries,26 yet well into the present century arguments have persisted on the applicability of the
torts of assault and battery, as have arguments in which a contractual context has been
suggested. Each Commonwealth jurisdiction is specific because the law has developed
differently. Before considering these differences it is necessary to answer the question 'what, in
law, do we mean by informed consent?'
1.1.1. Information
Medical and surgical procedures constitute prima facie assaults in the civil law, unless
authorised by the patient's consent."7 Consent will probably not be given for an operation to be
performed improperly. Nevertheless, any surgery carries inherent risks irrespective of its
quality. Knowledge of risk is important if it could affect the decision whether and in which way
28
to receive treatment. In the event of such a risk eventuating, the pursuer may claim that his
consent was vitiated by the surgeon's failure to warn of that risk; he would allege that had the
information been given, consent to the operation would have been withheld. Any such claims
are now normally framed in negligence, a route which raises the question of the standard of care
and the wrongfulness of the omission.
The doctrine of informed consent originated in America. Its application seeks to
balance the practitioner's legal duty to provide information with the patient's right to make an
25 See Chapter 3 on causation.
26 In Sidaway Lord Diplock, considering the Bolam test (Cf. 3.2.2.1. & 4.2), noted that 'it may be of interest to
note that as long ago as 1767 in Slater v. Baker, 2 Wils. 359, a suggestion that where the injury was caused by
surgery the form of action lay in trespass vi et armis was rejected with scant sympathy by the Court of King's
Bench.'
27
The position is different in the criminal law in which evidence of 'evil intent' will be required by the court.
The medical practitioner acting in good faith will not fall foul of the criminal law, but may find that the civil
law provides the patient with a remedy.
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autonomous choice. Perhaps the most fitting definition of the doctrine is in Harnish v
Children's Hospital Medical Center.
'
... a physician owes to his patient the duty to disclose in a reasonable manner all
significant medical information that the physician possesses or reasonably should
possess that is material to an intelligent decision by the patient whether to undergo a
29
proposed procedure.'
Mr Justice Frankfurter had observed in Tiller v Atlantic Coastline Railway Co.30 that in
law a 'phrase begins life as a literary expression, its felicity leads to its lazy repetition, and
repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula' removed from its original context.31 The
doctrine of informed consent has, through repetition and elaboration in the last four decades,
evolved and expanded.32 As jurisdictions other than America adopt the doctrine, evolution in
America can be used either as a predictive mechanism in Commonwealth countries or as a basis
for the justification of 'slippery slope' fears.
The doctrine of informed consent will initially be examined from theoretical and
rhetorical points of view as background to considering its legal interpretations.33 This will
begin with an examination of the etymology34 of the words which make up the term, move
through its American development to examine its elements and then consider the legal positions
across the Commonwealth.35
~s
J R Matthews Quantification and the Questfor Medical Certainty. 1996. Princeton University Press.
29
Harnish v Children's Hospital Medical Center & others 387 Mass. 152; 439 N.E.2d 240, 155. See also
Williams v Menehan 379 P.2d 292 (1963).
30 3 1 8 US 54, 87 L Ed 610 (1943), 618, quoted by M D Kirby 'Informed Consent: What Does it Mean?' (1983)
9
Journal ofMedical Ethics 69.
31 Cited in Mason & McCall Smith. Law and Medical Ethics (5th edition) 278.
32 It has also been misunderstood, particularly by the medical community, as a catch-all phrase encompassing
all matters of medical information. Consider, for example, the subject matter of an article in the British
Medical Journal which ought properly to have been considered an issue of confidentiality (to which principle,
consent is an exception), rather than one of informed consent: Catherine A Hood, Tony Hope & Phillip Dove,
'Informed Consent in Medical Research - videos photographs and patient consent', BMJ No 7136, Volume
315, Education and Debate, Saturday 28 March 1998.
33
Parts of what follows (here and in Chapter 3) have been updated from an article published in the South
African Law Journal: See Earle, Murray 'Informed Consent: Is there Room For the Reasonable Patient in South
African Law?' (1995) 4 South African Law Journal 629 (Appendix A).
34 From Eric Partridge: Origins: a Short Etymological Dictionaiy of Modern English. 1958. Routledge &
Kegan Paul. London. 228-9,604-5.
35 In subsequent chapters.
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1.1.2. Etymology
Both the verb and the adjective inform are rooted in the Latin forma, meaning to give shape to
a[nother] person's thoughts. Consent derives from the Latin sensus meaning to be of an opinion
and hence to express that sentiment. It was then developed by the medieval French consintire.
From that, the verb to consent took on a connotation of collaboration, meaning to be of the same
opinion. In usage, consent is restricted to the giving of permission or the accepting of a
proposal and always implies the power not to consent.36 Informed consent can be said to consist
of causing someone to receive knowledge, which forms the basis for their decision to give
consent. In law it is a matter of the wrongfulness of omitting to do so.
The etymology suggests that the practitioner's art incorporates that of persuasion within
the partnership - to convince the patient in favour of a certain course of treatment even at the
expense of understanding. Etymology cannot explain the practices of the medical community,
but it is an interesting perspective from which to consider the doctor-patient relationship and the
communicative context in which consent is given and information supplied; this is a context in
which the dimension of power is constantly operative. The medical practitioner gives form to
his medical opinion, explaining jargon and technical terms. The patient uses this information to
form his part of an opinion which is (ideally) formed jointly with the practitioner. This is
different from agreeing with the practitioner's proposal and it is clear that this difference in
perception between patient and practitioner often becomes an issue in so-called informed
consent cases.
The duty of the practitioner is twofold: to inform and to obtain consent to the treatment
proposed. One must consider whether there is a difference between the information actually
given and the information required in law for an adequate understanding of the treatment
proposed. Where negligence is alleged in jurisdictions which have adopted the doctrine as
law,37 that negligence will be based on a difference between the information actually given to
In the case of adults. In the case of minors, the power to consent may not carry with it the power to refuse
treatment. See the Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1985] 3 All ER 402, [1986] AC 112 and the Age
of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991. This falls outwith the ambit of this thesis.
37 Or indeed in those which have adopted a subjective patient standard for causation. This will be discussed in
Chapter 4.
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the patient and the information which the patient alleges was required to render the consent
complete. The legal position is in constant flux, but central to the doctrine is the precept that,
'unless a doctor discloses to a patient certain types of information before undertaking a
... procedure, the patient may collect damages from the doctor if he or she is injured by
38
the procedure, even though the procedure itself was properly performed.'
This chapter will go on to explain that this will rest on the plaintiff-patient establishing the
elements of a claim under the laws of torts or delict.
1.1.3. Philosophical Origins and American Legal Development
In Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital, Kirby J said, 'Since Hippocrates and Plato, it has been
axiomatic that physicians must give no prescription until they have obtained the patient's
understanding and consent.'39 According to Hodgkins JA, the doctrine derived from the need,
in pre-anaesthetic medicine, to encourage the patient. In Kenny v Lockwoocl in Canada,40 he
quoted with approval Wilmot C J in Slater v Baker & Stapleton, who had said that 'it is
reasonable that a patient should be told what is about to be done to him that he may take
courage and so put himself in such a situation as to undergo the operation.'41 The rationale of
the rule remains primacy of patient autonomy. In that context this means the patient is able to
exercise the right to choose whether or not to undergo treatment at all and then to choose among
available treatment options.42
The term informed consent was first used in Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr. University
Board of Trustees43 in 1957 and Natanson v Kline44 was the first case in America to take the
matter in negligence rather than in trespass. The doctrine was initially a hybrid legal concept,
uniting the torts of negligence and battery, before becoming grounded in negligence. Natanson
38
Charles W Lidz et al. Informed Consent: a Study ofDecision Making in Psychiatry. 1984. The Guildford
Press. New York. 2.
39
[1990] 2 Med LR 103, 113 Col.i. Here Kirby J cited Plato, The Laws, Book IV at 720. Whether or not he
was citing Plato correctly or aptly does not alter the principle on which Kirby J was basing his judgement.
40
[1932] 1 DLR 507 (Ont. 1932).
41
Slater v Baker and Stapleton (1767) 2 Wils KB 359, 95 ER 860, Kenny v Lockwood [1932] 1 DLR 507, 518.
42
On the rights issue, see 6.3.1.
43
154 Cal. App. 2d 560; 317 P.2d 170 (Cal, 1957)
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v Kline affirmed the Salgo coinage in 1960 and expanded the ruling in Schloendorf v Society of
New York Hospitals45 to hold that self determination is a fundamental premise of Anglo-
American law and that substituted judgement, artifice or deception by a doctor are not always
permissible. It went on to rule in favour of an entitlement to 'full disclosure of risks, benefits
and alternative treatments ... both in therapy and in medical experimentation, except in
emergencies or in cases where the patient is incompetent.'46
In 1972, the court in Canterbury v Spence47 discussed the rules on informed consent in
terms of the patient's rights: the patient has the right to know of risks, benefits and alternatives
to the treatment proposed. In describing the extent of this right to know of certain 'material'
risks, it was held in Cobbs v Grant48 that 'a patient's interest in information does not extend to a
lengthy polysyllabic discourse on all possible complications' and that 'a mini-course in medical
science is not required.'49 This is a position with which Commonwealth jurisdictions concur.
Similarly, in Canterbury v Spence it was established that 'respect for the patient's right of self
determination on a particular therapy demands a standard set by law for a physician rather than
one which physicians may or may not impose on themselves.'50
In England the standard is a medical one,51 despite the fact that in his dissenting
judgement in Sidaway Lord Scarman stated that a doctor's duty to supply information on risks
and alternatives stems from the patient's right to that information.52 This is significant because
it is a dissenting judgement yet is cited by the British Medical Association as the basis for an
ideal mode of practice. It indicates a reasoning on which the professional standard can be put to
the use of the patient in the United Kingdom. With this comes a gravitation towards the
adoption of a form of the doctrine of informed consent.53
44
1 86 Kan 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960).
45 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
46 1 86 Kan 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); LEXIS.
47
464 F.2d 772 (1972).
48 502 P.2d 1,11 (Cal. 1972).
49




Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] AC 871, 888.
53 See 3.2.1., 5.4. and 6.3.
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Information on risks and alternatives is central to this inquiry because medical treatment
involves risk.54 Despite the fact that judges assert that they will not be dictated to by
statisticians,55 knowledge of numerical probabilities can be very important to the patient56 and
to the law. Because it is possible to calculate the prevalence of risks involved in medical
interventions, public awareness plays an important role, to the extent that a patient may be
expected to ask questions like 'what chance is there of something going wrong?'57 Yet in
England and Scotland it remains at the discretion of the practitioner whether to disclose these
risks if not asked. Withholding information because of the remoteness or triviality of the risk
places the practitioner in jeopardy of a particular patient asserting, with hindsight, that he would
have declined treatment had he been informed.
What the patient is told still depends largely on the consensus of the medical
community and the question of determining relevance remains one for the practitioner to take,
often at his peril. It is at that point that consensus of doctor and patient may break down and
persuasion must take over. Consensus may also break down after the fact where, for example,
the patient asserts with hindsight that, had he had the information which was lacking, he would
not have undergone the treatment and hence not have suffered the injury. This proof of
causation is a necessary element of a tort claim whether or not it is based on consent.
54
Sidaway considered the materiality of a risk of 1:100 and Rogers v Whitaker of 1:14,000.
55 In the criminal context, see Regina v Adams, The Times, 9 May 1996 on statistics. In that case it was decided
that juries are not to apply mathematical formulae. Lord Justice Rose held, 'Jurors evaluated evidence and
reached conclusions not by means of formulae, mathematical or otherwise, but by the joint application of their
individual common sense and knowledge of the world to the evidence before them.' This suggests that we
cannot take formulae and probabilities as particularly decisive.
56 See J Rosser Matthews Quantification and the Quest for Medical Certainty. 1996. Princeton University
Press.
57 F J Dodd et al, 'Consensus in Medical Communication' (1993) 37:4 Soc. Sci. Med. 565-569, 565.
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1.1.4. Assembly
As a doctrine, informed consent developed as a mechanism for extending the civil liability of
medical practitioners and for promoting patients' rights. This implied a redefinition of the
fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient/8 While the requirement of consent has a
long history, interest in its quality is as recent as four decades. In most American jurisdictions
it is the responsibility of the physician to give information, while to varying degrees in
Commonwealth jurisdictions the expectation is that the patient will request it. For example, in
the contract case of Eyre v Measday, Slade LJ considered patient expectations and the
remoteness of a sterilisation operation failing and said, 'I am afraid that, in my view, if they had
wanted a guarantee of the nature which they now assert, they should have specifically asked for
According to the informed consent doctrine, the omission to inform of material risks
prior to the procedure constitutes negligence. A risk is said to be material if 'a reasonable
person in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely
to attach significance to the risk in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed treatment.'00
In the opening chapters of their work on decision-making in psychiatry, Lidz et al01 divide
informed consent into certain basic elements, which must all be present in the doctor-patient
interaction. These are listed as information, competency, understanding, voluntariness and
decision:62 a patient must be legally competent to make a voluntary decision regarding treatment
on the basis of an understanding gained from information given by the medical practitioner.
The concept of interaction is central here; its quality determines the extent to which the
patient is able to assimilate and understand the medical information communicated. This
highlights a number of facets which are important to the legal inquiry: the patient's competence
58 Caroline L Kaufmann, 'Informed Consent and Patient Decision Making: Two Decades of Research' (1983)
17:21 Soc. Sci. Med. 1657-64, 1660.
59
[1986] 1 All ER 488, 495-496. It is acknowledged that this is a difficult case from the point of view that
many parts of the judgement were based on the first instance decision of Thake and another v Maurice [1984]
2 All ER 513 which was overturned by the Court of Appeal in Thake and another v Maurice [1986] 1 All ER
497. However, this does not alter the point being made here.
60
Canterbury v Spence 772.
61 Charles W Lidz et al Ibid.
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to understand, whether he ought to have understood, whether the doctor can reasonably expect
this patient to have understood and whether this patient actually understood. Answers to these
questions are material to whether there has been consent between the litigants.
An American test for competency may be found in Grannum v Berard.63 The Grannum
test for asserting or testing the competence of the patient is the same as that for capacity to
contract: did a person at the time of agreement have 'sufficient understanding of the nature,
terms and effect of the agreement'?64 This is not a test of the rationality of the decision actually
taken, but of the patient's capacity to comprehend the information. With this test a practitioner
may seek to justify having withheld information because the patient lacked the competence to
understand it. Alternatively, a patient may argue in favour of the communication of that
information on the ground that he possessed the necessary degree of competence.65
Since Roman law times,66 freedom of agreement has been important because it derives
from freedom of the will. In all legal agreements there is the need for unforced and informed
consent as a declaration of willingness. This gains enhanced importance in both invasive and
non-invasive medical procedures where the absence of information (whether through deliberate
or negligent omission) vitiates the will, and possibly the consent, of the patient, and could give
rise to a legal cause of action.
Commonwealth and American courts focus on patient autonomy, especially with
regard to refusal of treatment, yet they differ on how much information ought to be disclosed to
the patient. Most American jurisdictions require of a doctor responsible disclosure regarding
62 Charles W Lidz et al 3, 20-23.
63 Grannum v Berard 70 Wash. 2d 304, 307, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (1967). See Montange, Charles H. 'Informed
Consent and the Dying Patient.' (1974) 8 Yale Law Journal 1632.
04
Nieuw, A. D. 'Informed Consent.' Medicine and Law. (1993) 12: 125-130, 127. We see here the beginnings
of the contractual of the doctor-patient relationship, which will be considered in 1.2.2.3, 2.4.2. 3.7 & 5.4.4.
b3
There is a rebuttable presumption of competence: see, for example, F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189.
66
Honore, T. 'Hermogenianus on Privity and the Scope of the Law of Contract' (1991) Current Legal
Problems 135.
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the probable consequences and dangers falling within his knowledge.67 Consent based on such
disclosure will be said to have been informed.
The practitioner's duty is to reach and give a diagnosis and to discuss possible
treatment and the risks involved in that treatment. The patient's role is to use this information
within his own value system to make a choice. This does not hand the matter over to the patient
because the practitioner still holds the power of diagnosis and advice and because of the
argument that informed consent has a grounding in persuasion. However, given that the
practitioner has the opportunity to abrogate the power of decision to the patient, the practitioner
under time pressure68 has little time to argue and this does, in effect, hand the power over to the
patient. It remains a power grounded in knowledge and is, in the present argument, illusory
when the patient holds such power on the basis of an inadequate understanding of the medical
matter in question.
The hospital or consultation room is often perceived as a coercive environment. In this
context the patient seldom reflects adequately on the written consent which is considered
necessary.69 Seen this way, the art of persuasion exercised by the busy practitioner abrogating
illusory power to a patient within a coercive environment comes close to undue influence; it
cannot be seen as approaching the ideal of the understood consent of the autonomous patient.
Elaine Scarry wrote that legal consent has attached to it facets of contract, signature,
partnership, promise, waiver, warranty and elements of the relationship between the subject and
property.70 She considered consent in surgical operations in terms of consent to injury and
bodily violation, citing the much-quoted Judge Cardozo in Schloendorff,11 who considered that
'each adult of sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his body.'72
67
Williams v Menehan 379 P.2d 292 (1963).
68
Such as the houseman or the doctor in a busy practice
69
J R Matby & C J Eagle 'Informed Consent for Clinical Anaesthesia Research' in (1993) 40:9 Canadian
Journal ofAnaesthesia. 891-6, 891.
70
Elaine Scarry 'Consent and the Body' (1990) 4 New Literary History 867, also in Dickens B M Justice
Beyond Orwell. 1985. Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc. Montreal. 243.
71 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) at 97.
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An important facet is the disclosure of risks inherent in, and alternatives to, the
procedure proposed. This lends particular importance to the disclosure document. A fiduciary
relationship would give rise to disclosure requirements on the part of the practitioner and in
America both common and statutory law demand increasingly comprehensive disclosure. This
disclosure generally has no formal requirements, but while implied consent is accepted in
73
certain circumstances, implied disclosure is 'somewhat difficult to conceive'.
Even so, disclosure should ideally be both written and oral, with the document
following conversational disclosure of the treatment's reasoning, its methods and the risks and
alternatives attached to it. In the partnership model of doctor-patient interaction, this ideal has
become more developed; yet that ideal is still prone to be seen within the profession as a legal
instrument and as promoting mistrust. This, in turn, encourages defensive medicine.
Factors which determine the scope of the obligation to inform are pivotal, especially in
the expansion of the doctrine. The test for materiality is a subjective one because under the
doctrine of informed consent the amount and quality of disclosure required for understanding
varies with each individual set of circumstances. Disclosure ought to be made in a way which
the particular patient understands and is able to assimilate, such that any decision made on the
basis of the information given is autonomous and grounded in true self determination. This
argument expressly challenges that which holds disclosure to be a mere formality and those
which contend that an objective test for materiality is to be preferred.74
1.2. Liability in the Tort of Negligence
The Australian case Re Katherine Mary Golski73 was not an informed consent case yet was a
case of alleged medical negligence. Kelly J defined a cause of action as being,76
72
Also Canterbury v Spence.
73 F F W van Oosten 'Disclosure Documents and Informed Consent: the Pros and Cons.' (1993) 12 Medicine
and Law 651-656, 651.
74 See 3.3.
75
1987, Lexis. Federal Court of Australia, Australian Capital Territory District, 16 April 1987.
76
Citing the English cases of Read v Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128 per Lord Esher MR at 131 and Cooke v Gill
(1873) LR 8 CP 107 at 116, per Brett j.
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'every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order
to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of
evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be
proved.'
In England in Letcing v Cooper11 Lord Diplock defined a cause of action as 'simply a factual
situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy against
another person.' A consideration of the facta probanda of a case is useful to establish the
applicable cause of action in informed consent cases.
One should consider the doctrine in the context of the relationship between doctor and
patient as well as between plaintiff and defendant. A patient suffering injury following medical
treatment may have a legally recognised claim in damages against the person(s) responsible for
the injury. In order to understand that this claim lies in tort there are four possible causes of
action which need to be considered.78 They will be outlined here briefly before looking at each
jurisdiction individually.
An action based on breach of contract is uncommon yet not unknown. If it does occur,
it will be an action taken either in conjunction with or in the alternative to an action in
negligence. This is because the two actions serve different ends: the action based in contract for
recovery of patrimonial loss and the action based in delict or tort for the recovery of damages.
A second possibility is an action based on the breach of a fiduciary duty. Although
some jurisdictions characterise the doctor-patient relationship as a fiduciary one, such an action
is a more remote possibility. A fiduciary duty remains one which the law may suppose to have
arisen from the special relationship between the parties. This relationship requires the doctor to
disclose to the patient any conflicting interests as well as to act in the patient's interests.
In the third place, medical treatment involving physical contact with the patient and
without that patient's consent in any form constitutes an assault (technically a battery) for
77
[1965] 1 QB 232, 242-3.
78
See Thake and Another v Maurice [1986] QB 644, [1986] 1 All ER 497.
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which an action in trespass to the person may be brought by the patient.79 This would be elided
by consent of any sort if the action were framed in tort. Trespass had been the preferred option
in America in which lack of informed consent gave rise to such an action, thereby conflating the
torts of medical negligence and medical trespass. The action, after Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr
Board of Trustees and Natanson v Kline is now in negligence. It is suggested here that one of
the rationales for this separation is to expand the liability of medical practitioners in respect of
information disclosure. Whereas the category of assault was always able to cover incidents in
which no consent was obtained at all, a niche was sought which would cover instances in which
there ad been a general consent to the nature of the procedure, but that consent was given in the
absence of information on the very risk which eventuated and caused injury. This niche was to
be negligence.
It is argued that the main reason for supplying patients with information on their
condition, diagnosis, prognosis and treatment is respect for the patient's autonomy. With that
information, the patient is better able to make a balanced assessment of their own condition and
options. Given information on risks and alternatives, the patient is better able to exercise his or
her autonomy. It is argued that for this reason the medical practitioner has a duty to provide the
patient with that information. If that forms part of the standard of care in law, it follows
logically that the proper place for the action is in negligence.
Use of the category of battery in the context of medical treatment can also promote the
value of patient autonomy because it proscribes physical contact without consent - whether or
not in the context of medical treatment. There is a problem with this, however. If consent was
given to the general procedure, but was to be deemed completely ineffective because of lack of
a particular piece of information, that would render the medical practitioner liable in battery, to
which reasonable practice is no defence.80 It follows, therefore, that if courts were to adopt the
policy of expanding the liability of medical practitioners for omissions to inform patients, and if
79 Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432, [1981] 1 All ER 257, in which the concept of battery was considered as
available in the absence of general consent. With general consent present, the battery possibility no longer
exists. Bristow J held that the negligent failure to disclose inherent risks would not in itself vitiate consent.
This was followed in Hills v Potter [1983] 3 All ER 716, 728, [1984] 1 WLR 641, 653 (in which Hirst J agreed
that the proper cause of action is in negligence), and in Sidaway.
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that omission spoke to matters of consent, courts would also have to formulate policy to limit
liability in line with judicial policy.
Schultz argued that, 'there are many aspects of the medical care relationship which do
not fit comfortably within the battery model.'81 In particular, she considers that, 'Doctors lack
the antisocial motivation usually associated with intentional torts such as battery' and points out
that the in the doctor-patient relationship, the touching differs from the conventional battery
model insofar as some form of consent had already been given, albeit arguably defective
consent.82 She goes on to argue that if courts were to hold that the lack of information
invalidated the consent given, this would be 'unduly harsh' on members of the medical
profession. She cites case law throughout and there is an echo of this sentiment in Lord
Scarman's judgement in Sidaway, in which his lordship had said that 'it would be deplorable to
83base the law in medical cases of this kind on the torts of assault and battery.'
In addition, the policy adopted by the courts of all jurisdictions discussed here is one
which allows a greater breadth of defence to members of the medical profession. It allows
reasonable care to be an absolute defence in the case of British jurisdictions or to speak in
argument for the defence in the case of Canada, Australia and South Africa. This policy would
appear to be a cogent policy given the informed consent scenario. It is usually the case that
surgery or treatment was recommended and gave the best chance of recovery yet carried certain
low-probability risks which were not disclosed.
The legal wrong, therefore, is a non-physical one. It is true that harm is an essential
element of the delict or tort, and it is self-evident that without the treatment which carried the
risk which harmed the patient, that patient would not have suffered harm. However, the legal
wrong in such cases is an omission to inform, rather than physical contact with the patient.
Expressed semantically, the plaintiff asserts that had they had the information which was
so
On this point in relation to American decisions, see Marjorie Maguire Schultz. 'From Informed Consent to
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lacking, they would not have consented; the plaintiff does not argue that they did not consent.
Expressed this way, it would seem entirely inappropriate to consign the facts to an action which
requires that the plaintiff had not consented rather than that they would not have consented had
circumstances been different. As Schultz puts it, 'physical contact is too literal a demarcation
for what is a much broader, non-tangible interest in patient choice.'84
If the purpose of the provision of information is to protect autonomy, one would have
to ask whether the context of that protection involves the sort of physical contact that usually
gives rise to assault cases. The context is the doctor-patient relationship which, it is argued,
does not usually give rise to assault cases during the normal course of treatment. Therefore, the
provision of information should be seen in the context of a duty of care owed by a doctor to a
patient. That said, some form of physical touching is still necessary because without injury, no
issue of informed consent could arise in negligence either. It remains the case, however, that
the legal wrong is a non-event; it is the omission to provide information which is required by
the applicable standard of care.
Having rejected the category of assault, the remaining possibility is that the failure to
provide information concerning the nature and risks of the procedure constitutes negligence if
there is established in law that such a duty existed, that it was breached and that as a result the
plaintiff suffered injury.83 Having considered where liability might lie, it remains to consider
one of the jurisdictions covered by this thesis by way of example and as a starting point.
Canada has been chosen because the story is at its clearest there and because Canada was the
first Commonwealth jurisdiction to adopt the American doctrine. The timing is important here.
By the time the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the doctrine in 1980, the facts giving rise to
an action based on information disclosure had already relegated the action to the category of
negligence in the United States. As such the need to consider why the category of assault had
less applicability in consent cases was less pressing. This, however, did not prevent Canadian
84 Ibid. 229.
85 In Lanphier v Phipos (1838) 3 C & P 475, 479, Chief Justice Tindal instructed an English jury, 'Every
person who enters into a learned profession undertakes to bring to the exercise of it a reasonable degree of care
and skill. He does not undertake, if he is an attorney, that at all events you shall gain your case, nor does a
surgeon undertake to use the highest degree of skill. There may be persons who have higher education and
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courts from considering the matter, though it did, arguably, obviate the need to devote as much
attention to the rationale for the exclusion of assault.
1.2.1. The Canadian Story
Discussion might begin with the example of Canada for chronological reasons, and because this
thesis will argue in favour of the Canadian approach, before applauding some facets of the
British approach. It will also become apparent in subsequent chapters that English tests for
causation within the informed consent inquiry, approximate to the Canadian model.
It is useful to the present discussion to begin with the cases of Kenny v Lockwood*6
and Marshall v Curry'1 because those cases considered the law as it was in America in the
1930s. At that time Canadian and American law were very similar in this area. Courts were
concerned to distinguish between the tort of negligence and the torts of assault and of battery as
well to consider such matters as flowing from what the court considered to be the nature of the
physician-patient relationship.88
Central to the question quid juris is determining what might have rendered consent
invalid or incomplete. In Kenny v Lockwood one of the issues facing the court was that of fraud
and misrepresentation which were alleged to have vitiated the consent given to the surgical
operation. Hodgkins JA thought it unfortunate that such an argument had not been given up
because he found no evidence of fraud; the relationship set up between patient and surgeon gave
rise to a duty of care.89 It was held that, in cases such as this, actual deceitful fraud made
knowingly or recklessly and without belief in its truth had to be proven.90
greater advantages than he has, but he undertakes to bring a fair, reasonable and competent degree of skill, and
you will say whether in this case, the injury was occasioned by the want of such skill.'
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On this matter Kenny v Lockwood cited the English case of Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 942,
indicating a split allegiance between English precedent and American legal development.
89 509.
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This falls outwith the ambit of the present thesis in that, as indicated in the introduction to this chapter, we
are considering ill-informed consent which is in itself incomplete, rather than a total lack of consent or consent
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The court in Kenny went on to argue that it had 'to take the operation as having been
skillfully done' which 'makes it more than usually difficult to define the exact limits of the duty
which arises in such a situation.'91 The next half century of legal development was to carve a
legal niche for informed consent in Canada. Staying with the present case, it is noteworthy that
Hodgkins JA drew heavily and with approval on English and Scottish precedent. In particular
he cited Edgar v Lamont92 in which Lord Salvesen had noted that there existed a series of
English decisions,
'to establish the proposition that a patient is entitled to a direct action ex delicto against
a doctor for professional incompetence or negligence... . It seems to me that a clear
ground for action is that a doctor owes a duty to the patient, whoever has called him in
and whoever is liable for his bill, and it is for breach of that duty that he is liable.'93
The court was keen to distinguish such actions from actions which could be founded in
breach of contract by stating clearly that the action is based on the duty of care rather than on
the notion of contractual engagement or fee. The court did not determine which tort was more
applicable, although it did suggest that an action lay in negligence by holding that the
relationship gave rise to a duty of care.94
In Norberg v Wynrib95 the Canadian Supreme Court found a doctor who traded
prescriptions for sex liable in battery on the basis that consent was negated by the equitable
doctrine of unconscionable transactions. This had previously been confined to contracts
founded on unequal bargaining power, but following Norberg v Winrib, the basis became
fiduciary. McLachlin J said, 'I do not find that the doctrines of tort or contract capture the
essential nature of the wrong done .... Only the principles applicable to fiduciary relationships
and trust, not self-interest, was at the core of the fiduciary relationship 96
in the contractual context which would be vitiated through the fraudulent misrepresentations of fact made by
one of the contracting parties.
91 510.
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93 Cited in Kenny v Lockwood, 518.
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[1995] Med LR 385, in Australia in which Brennan J said, 'In the absence of special contract between a doctor
and a patient, the doctor undertakes by the contract between them to advise and treat the patient with
reasonable skill and care.'
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As an intentional tort, trespass to the person or battery is actionable per se.91 This
contrasts with an action in negligence in which proof of actual injury is a necessary element of
the claim.98 A further difference is that in battery cases, causation is easier to prove because
battery is an intentional tort. Conversely, in negligence the test is one of forseeablilty in
personal injury cases. The tort of assault is also actionable per se and is a crime: the same
principles which apply to battery apply to assault. The difference between the two torts is that
battery concerns actual force while assault includes 'both the threat and the application'.99
In Marshall v Curry100 the court considered assault and battery in the context of
consent; in that case the action was brought in the alternative. The plaintiff claimed that the
defendant committed battery by removing a testicle without his consent and while the plaintiff
was under anaesthetic. In the alternative, he alleged that the defendant was negligent in not
informing him that it might become necessary to remove a testicle while treating a hernia. A
third alternative alleged that removing the testicle under those circumstances constituted an
assault.101 The professional skill of the surgeon was unchallenged at trial and the action was
confined to one in assault.
The court found that there had been neither express nor implied consent to the removal
of a testicle but that a defence of necessity would succeed.102 The court considered the law in
America on this matter because of a lack of Canadian precedent.102 From those cases Chisholm
CJ found support for the principle that while surgical operations can be contracted for, in such
cases anaesthesia 'renders the patient unable to consent at the very time that the rule of common
law required that his consent be obtained ,..'.104 It was held that in such circumstances, the
97
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doctor was transformed into the patient's representative and the original contract, if it existed,
became irrelevant.
On the basis of the American cases and similar cases in the province of Quebec,
Chisholm CJ was able to hold that consent, which may be express or implied, had to be
obtained where possible and that this applied to both surgery and examination. Without such
consent the operation or examination was technically an assault.10:1 The difference between
assault and negligence was succinctly stated in Hershey v Peake and quoted by Chisholm CJ in
the present case:
'The distinction ordinarily between an unauthorised operation amounting to assault and
battery on the one hand, and negligence such as would constitute malpractice, on the
other, is that the former is intentional, while the latter is unintentional.'106
This position was reinforced in Murray v McMurchywl some sixteen years later. In that
case the surgeon tied the plaintiff's fallopian tubes without her consent during a caesarian
section operation on the ground that he had found tumours in her uterus. The defence of
emergency was invoked and the same American cases were cited. Macfarlane J said, 'The point
is whether such an emergency existed, whether it was necessary that the operation be done, not
whether it was convenient to perform it.'108 He held that while on the evidence the tumours
might constitute a hazard to the plaintiff's health and that this was a matter of quantum, it did
not justify a trespass. This indicates a gravitation towards the principle that, with the presence
of a general consent, litigation is to take place in negligence, while without that general consent,
litigation is to take place in assault, so increasing the liability of medical practitioners under the
consent head.109
However, he held that she was entitled to neither punitive nor vindictive damages, but
that she should be awarded what he called 'substantial damages'. This suggests that an action
in negligence might have been available, but that was not pleaded. In the context of informed
105 274.
106
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consent as outlined here, if the correct place for such actions is within the law of torts and the
duty of care, then it must lie in the tort of negligence and it should be pleaded as such by the
pursuer.
A quarter of a century after Murray v McMurchy, in Kelly v Hazlett110 one can see that
the drawing of a distinction between the two torts depends on the intention of the tortfeasor. In
Kelly the defender had performed an osteotomy without the plaintiff's consent and both
negligence and battery were pleaded. The grounds of the claim were considered under a
separate head. It was not suggested that the osteotomy had been negligently performed and
hence it was held that the resultant injury was 'unfortunate misadventure' rather than
negligence.1" Morden J summarised the law by saying,
'Broadly speaking, a battery is the intentional, unconsented to, touching of the person of
the plaintiff by the defendant, while negligence (in the context of a case such as this)
consists of the substandard execution of a duty of care by the doctor resulting in
damage.'11
Morden J noted that the matter of informed consent could arise on both types of case.113
Lack of proper information to the patient could vitiate consent and give rise to an action in
battery, while failure to ensure that the patient is properly advised could amount to
negligence.114 Morden J said that in Canada, most cases of this sort had been determined as
battery cases, but that in America the tendency had become to consider them as negligence
matters. He held the difference to be an important one because it would have bearing on the
onus of proof, on causation115 and on the importance of medical evidence. Citing Kenny v
Lockwood and Halushka v University of Saskatchewan et al,U6 he, too, held that such cases
stem from the relationship between the parties, which gives rise to a duty of care. Where a duty
of care is held to exist, the action is in negligence; it is the duty of care itself which moves the
action from one in assault or battery to one in negligence. This in itself speaks to the intention
110
(1977) 75 DLR (3d) 536.
'"At 555. This passage was to be quoted in Reibl v Hughes five years later.
112 Ibid.
113 This is curious in the light of the South African position, which considers the matter not as one of
negligence but as one of consent. See 1.2.2.4.
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115 See Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432, 442C-443C. Cf. Chapter 4 on causation and Chapter 5 on expert
evidence.
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of the wrongdoer and the judicial policy which recognises that the wrongful omission is
unintentional and therefore ought to be considered as negligence rather than as an assault.
By framing the issue relative to the surgeon's duty of care which arises from what the
courts characterise as the nature of the doctor-patient relationship, courts make a policy
decision to consign the matter to the tort of negligence. This is guided by the idea of restitutive
damages and an orientation towards the patient. Establishing that a duty of care exists in the
context of the need for information as the basis for valid consent,117 and then considering Lord
Nathan's Medical Negligence, Morden J went on to consider the extent of the physician's duty.
This is the critical point in the inquiry because it concerned the standard of care. It is beyond
dispute in the law of torts that proximity gives rise to a duty of care. The moot point is the
scope of that duty and, in our context and the context of judicial policy,118 whether it includes
information on risks and alternatives.119 For now, however, we are still considering the
appropriate position of informed consent within the civil law.
Having established that a duty of care existed, Morden J found himself using elements
of the law of torts to justify placing informed consent cases in the negligence pigeonhole. He
had said that a duty existed and had described its extent. In order to fit more properly into the
framework of the tort of negligence, it remained to establish that the duty was not fulfilled and
that lack of due care resulted in injury. In fact Morden J said,
'It seems to me to strike a reasonable balance in the complex of interests, rights and
duties subsisting in the patient-doctor relationship, as well as being consistent with basic
120
concepts of the law of torts.'
It is significant that he went on to exclude the tort of battery for policy reasons. He said
that battery should be confined to 'intentional deviation from practice' and that most cases such
as this are able to rely on the doctor's duty of care. Again, this is because battery is a matter of
intention whereas negligence and the duty of care - particularly in the realm of omission
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liability in the context of information disclosure - are matters of unintentional wrongs. It was
this case which laid the groundwork on which Hopp v Lepp121 and Reibl v Hughes122 were able
to build.
Although the court in Hopp v Lepp was able to be more assertive, it did not discuss this
matter fully. There the action was argued on the basis of assault and battery as well as
negligence resulting from the failure to disclose risks inherent in surgery. It differed from the
cases discussed above in that it did not concern proxy or implied consent to an alternative
procedure. Rather it was characterised as an informed consent case and as such is closer to the
scenario sketched at the beginning of this chapter. Laskin CJC said that he did not need to
consider the question whether the failure to disclose certain risks inherent in a medical
procedure was 'consistent with an allegation of assault and battery.'123 He noted that Morrow
JA in the court a quo had considered the issue in both battery and negligence, before going on
to analyse the latter by saying that 'the negligence here lay in unspoken words or in misleading
words when there was a duty to speak and to be properly responsive.'1"4 What is significant is
the move by the Canadian judiciary towards defining the scope of the two torts more precisely
while at the same time not committing itself fully.
The story so far is that it has been held, injudicial opinions, that the matter of informed
consent falls within the duty of care because of the nature of the relationship between doctor
and patient; in disclosure cases any negligence would be constituted by an omission to inform
when there was a duty to do so. Informed consent matters fall within the genus omission
liability and the problems associated with judicial policy to render certain omissions wrongful,
persist.
Laskin CJC said that he preferred to leave the issue of the relationship between battery
and negligence to another time. This time for the court, and in fact for Chief Justice Laskin,
followed hard upon Hopp v Lepp. In the same year in Reibl v Hughes he pointed out that the
121
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courts' tendency in situations of non- or insufficient disclosure125 of inherent risks is to consider
negligence rather than battery (except in circumstances of fraud or misrepresentation).126
Considering the difference between the two torts, the court again cited with approval Kenny v
Hazlett and Halushka v University ofSaskatchewan.
When considering Halushka, the court in Kenny had suggested that they should
consider first the nature of the risk and then look at where the action lies.127 Laskin CJC then
held that the distinction was both difficult to apply and incompatible with the elements of the
cause of action in battery.'128 This is because injury following alleged lack of informed consent
is unintentional. In a policy-guided decision, Laskin CJC said,
in my opinion, actions for battery in respect of surgical or other medical treatment
should be confined to cases where surgery or treatment has been performed or given to
which there has been no consent at all or where, emergency situations aside, surgery or
129
treatment has been performed or given beyond that to which there was consent.'
Explaining this opinion, he went on to say that consent in such situations is not vitiated. Rather
it is incomplete and 'arises as the breach of an anterior duty of care, comparable in legal
obligation to the duty of care in carrying out the particular treatment to which the party has
consented. It is not a test of the validity of the consent.'
This stance has remained unaltered to the present day. In the 1986 product liability
case of Buchan v Ortho Pharmaceutical (Canada) Ltd130 the court held that the rationale
underlying such cases was the relationship of proximity and the responsibility and duty created
by that relationship. By 1992 in Lenis v deVilliersxn such actions had begun to be framed in
negligence alone, following the landmark ruling in Reibl v Hughes.
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The court in Lenis v deVilliers held that it was necessary to distinguish between cases in
which the negligence consisted in failure to warn of material risks and cases in which the
alleged negligence consisted in the carrying out of the medical procedure in question: for this
the court cited Karsanjii v Roque.132 Once it had been established that the appropriate form of
action is in the tort of negligence, it is necessary to be even more specific as to what act, or in
such cases what omission, amounts to negligence.'33
Most recently the court in Arndt v Smith134 did not need to consider the foundation of
the action because it was pleaded ab initio in negligence. The questions before the court on the
facts in issue were: was there a duty of care which would require the doctor to inform a
pregnant woman of all material risks to an unborn foetus as a result of the mother's infection
with chicken pox, did the doctor fail to discharge this duty of care and was there a causal link
between that failure and the resultant injury? It is because of the arguments on the law of torts
and the tort of negligence that the pleadings were able to be drawn up unreflectively in this way.
If a plea is framed in negligence and a plaintiff succeeds in proving the requisite essential
elements as required by the law of torts, so succeeding in the action, there can be no dispute
about the proper place for the action in law.
1.2.2. The Picture Elsewhere
1.2.2.1. England
The action in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee135 was framed in negligence
from the start and thereafter the inquiry of the court followed the path of that tort by considering
whether the doctor was under a duty to warn. Early in his judgement, McNair J outlined what
the court meant by negligence in the context of special skill saying that it was well established
law that the requisite standard of competence was that of the ordinary man skilled in that
particular art.136 In this case it was found that he was not under a duty137 to inform because the
132
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defendant had been acting in accordance with a respectable body of medical opinion which
considered that in these circumstances there was no such duty.
McNair J referred with approval to Hunter v Hanley,138 the benchmark Scottish case on
this topic in which it was said that 'one man is clearly not negligent merely because his
conclusion differs from that of other professional men...'.139 Considering the civil liability of a
medical practitioner, he considered Halsbury's Laws of England on negligence.140 That these
cases were framed in negligence arises from the pleadings. Thereafter the burden is on the
plaintiff to prove the elements of an action in the tort or delict of negligence. Yet at times other
forms of action have been considered.
Considering other personal injury torts, recent case law in England has considered
assault and battery as well as negligence arising from the same act. The court in Appleton and
Others v Garret141 noted that it was not in dispute that a surgeon operating without consent
commits an assault. The judgement referred to Chatterton v Gerson and Another 4" in which
Bristow J summed up the position succinctly when he said,
'I think justice requires that in order to vitiate the reality of consent there must be a
greater failure of communication between doctor and patient than that involved in a
breach of duty if the claim is based on negligence.'143
The rationale behind this decision was dissected by Feng144 in which he observes, as was noted
earlier in this chapter,145 that the torts of negligence and of trespass serve different functions.
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He observed that it had been the practice in America and Canada to consider the informed
consent scenario as rendering consent ineffective and hence as giving rise to an action in
battery. Feng goes on to argue that the Sidaway case, while remaining protective of members of
the medical profession, actually expanded the liability of doctors by leaving the category of
assault as it is and adding to the consent genus the requirement of information disclosure. This
means that not only are doctors liable under assault for touching the patient with no consent at
all, but they could be liable in negligence in instances of imperfect consent.
In declining the invitation to adopt the doctrine of informed consent, the court in
Sidaway was, however, considering the doctrine in its 'original form.'146 As such, the court
was, according to Feng, considering a lack of full disclosure as giving rise to an action in
assault because that very lack vitiates the general consent given. The court held, however, that
consent is vitiated only if there is an omission to inform about the nature of the proposed
treatment rather than an omission to inform of inherent risks in that treatment. In the latter
case, the action would be in negligence because the information relates not to the nature of the
treatment, but to the risks inherent in it, which is a collateral matter. In the case of Chatterton,
the court held that the general consent provided a 'complete answer' to the trespass claim. The
caveat to this, as has been held in all jurisdictions, is consent gained under circumstances of
fraud or misrepresentation.147 The difference between the two actions is one of the difference
in the form of the information omitted. 'If the failure of information is to the nature of the
treatment it relates to consent in trespass, and if it pertains to risks involved in treatment it is
negligence.'148 This is a distinction which has its roots in the criminal law.
Of importance in the doctor-patient relationship, is the need for fraud or
misrepresentation to give rise to an action in assault. This is important in view of what was
argued above on the nature of that relationship and the fact that the exchange between doctor
and patient is not one which is associated with an assault case.149 The doctor-patient
144





See, for example, Freeman v Home Office [1983] 3 All ER 1036 and Hills v Porfe/fl983] 3 All ER716.
148 Ibid. 153.
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relationship is one of trust and dependence and, because the assault action is more severe than
the negligence action from a consequential point of view, courts have required additional
elements to consign the facts to an action in trespass. These additional elements are fraud or
misrepresentation, which imply some form of deceit and render the wrong that much more
reprehensible. It is arguable, therefore, that courts are unable to shake the image of the medical
practitioner as benevolent and caring, such that to convict one of trespass, some form of avarice
needs to be proven.
It remains the case, however, that the category of trespass is available in those
circumstances as well as in circumstances in which there was no consent at all to the procedure
performed. From this a continuum can be constructed: the more probable the risk, the more
likely it is that litigation may take place in trespass because with more probable risks, there is a
greater chance that the information pertains to the nature of the treatment more than it does to
'collateral matters' such as inherent risks.150 There is some support for this in Canada in Kelly v
Hazlett in which Morden J said, 'The more probable the risk the more it could be said to be an
integral feature of the nature and character of the operation.'151
It is perhaps for reasons such as this that the action would be in trespass, if the court
were to hold that the information omitted was integral to the treatment. This is, therefore, a
matter of numbers and of probability. The non-disclosure would have to be a serious one
involving a high risk factor in order to give rise to an action in trespass. This is perhaps correct
because the wrong is that much more serious and, logically, ought to give rise to a more serious
legal action.
This rationale has had support through the case law. It is instructive, given the above
arguments, to consider the case law chronologically. All cases involved low risks, which
eventuated; the omissions could therefore be said to be less serious. None involved fraud or
misrepresentation and all occurred within the doctor-patient relationship. Therefore, the above
arguments on the context of that relationship mitigating against the use of battery hold good in
150
This is an argument which is advanced by Feng. Ibid.
151
(1976) 75 DLR (3d) 556, 559, as cited in Feng. Ibid. 157. footnote 28.
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these instances. Perhaps most significantly, however, in all instances the omission was
unintentional and, as such, it is entirely fitting that the action be one in negligence rather than
assault.
In the sterilisation case of T v T152 it was held that the surgeon operating without any
consent at all commits battery against his patient153 but that imperfect consent could amount to
negligence. Much of this had been settled in Hills v Potter,154 There Woolf J drew on
Chatterton v Gerson155 when he said, 'As to the claim for assault and battery, the plaintiffs
undoubted consent to the operation which was in fact performed negatives any possibility of
liability under this head.'156
The ground had been prepared well before Sidaway157 - an action framed in negligence.
The case law from around that time makes it clear that an action in negligence was, and
continues to be, the dominant cause of action and that this negligence would necessarily involve
a departure from general and approved medical practice.158 Lord Scarman said,
'There is a further question of law as to the nature of the cause of action. Is it a cause of
action in negligence, i.e. a breach of the duty of care, or is it based on a specific duty to
inform the patient which arises not from any failure on the part of the doctor to exercise the
159
due care and skill of his profession but directly from the patients right to know?'
13Z
[1988] Fam. 52, [1988] 1 All ER 613.
153
According to Attorney General's Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] QB 715 (CA), [1981] 2 All ER 1057, one
cannot consent to battery (see also R v Brown (Anthony) [1993] 2 All ER 75, [1993] 2 WLR 556 (HL). This
was upheld in Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172, [1984] 3 All ER 374 and by the European Court of
Human Rights. Here, however, we are considering ill-informed consent rather than general non-consent,
although the categories do, at times, overlap.
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[1983] 3 All ER 716.
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[1981] 1 All ER 257, [1981] QB 432.
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[1983] 3 All ER 716, 728e-f.
157
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643 HL, [1984] 2 WLR 778; [1984] AC
871.
158 Clark v MacLennan [1983] 1 All ER 416.
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[1984] AC 871, 877. This was part of Lord Scarman's dissenting judgement, which will receive fuller
treatment in Chapter 3. On rights and a critique of Lord Scarman's approach, see 5.3.1.1. Here Lord
Scarman's argument is interesting insofar as Lord Scarman was framing the question as a rhetorical one which
he went on to answer in favour of the basis of the doctor's duty flowing from the patient's right to know. The
important point here is that the action concerns a relationship inter partes which gives rise to certain duties.
Whether these duties exist (as well their extent) depends on the jurisdiction. This, too, will be more fully
considered in the next chapter and particularly in 6.3.1.1.
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Having considered Chatterton v Gerson and Hills v Potter, Lord Scarman concurred on this
issue by saying that 'it would be deplorable to base the law in medical cases of this kind on the
torts of assault and battery.'160
Basing this opinion on case law tends, however, to obscure the extent to which this
decision is guided by the policy of protecting the medical practitioner by ensuring that the
burden of proof lies with the plaintiff.161 Later in his judgement Lord Scarman said that if in
English law there is a duty to warn of risk, then failure so to do would constitute a breach of the
duty of care and would be actionable in negligence. He went on to argue that in applying the
Bolam principle, the court would conclude that there was no such duty recognised and hence no
case to answer in the law of negligence. However, we see later that he said,
'I conclude, therefore, there is room in our law for a legal duty to warn of the risks inherent
in the treatment proposed, and that, if such a duty be held to exist, its proper place is as an
aspect of the duty of care owed by the doctor to his patient.'162
According to Lord Diplock in the same case, '[t]he relevant form of action has been
based in negligence, i.e. in assumpsit, alone.'163 It is interesting in terms of the contractual
context in which this is viewed in South African law164 that although Lord Diplock stated
unequivocally that the relevant cause of action lay in the tort of negligence, his use of the term
assumpsit indicates that, historically at least, remedy lay in restitution which is different from
either contract or tort. This would thus appear to be a curious comment considering that
assumpsit had its origins in the law of torts, yet from the seventeenth century has been used as a
contractual remedy.165 For present purposes what is interesting about the Writ ofAssumpsit is
that the obligation of a party is itself founded on consent.166 Assumpsit is also consistent with
the principle that the purpose of the law of torts is to place the plaintiff in the position in which
he would have been had the wrong not been done and can now be seen as analogous to
[1984] AC 871, 883.
161 In this chapter, see 1.4. on the burden of proof and 16. on policy.
162
[1984] AC 871, 886C.
163
[1985] 1 All ER 871, 894C.
164
Discussed in 1.2.2.4. below.
165
In the nineteenth century common law the forms of action were split into contract and tort actions. See
Halsbury's Laws ofEngland, Vol.9 para 636.
166
See Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol.9 para 632.
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restitution in equity or in law; hence a subjective standard is applicable.167 The analogy is seen
to run deeper still when one considers the equity principle as operative in fiduciary
relationships.168
The entrenchment of this position became clear in Thake v Maurice.169 In that case it
was averred that the defendant had contracted to render the plaintiff totally sterile through a
vasectomy operation. It was held that the defendant carried out the operation in accordance
with his duty of reasonable skill and care. Neill LJ held that both litigating parties expected that
the operation would result in sterility but that such an expectation did not extend to a guarantee
of sterility. He held,
'Furthermore, I do not consider that a reasonable person would have expected a
reasonable medical man to be intending to give a guarantee. Medicine, though a highly
skilled profession, is not, and is not generally regarded as being, an exact science. The
reasonable man would have expected the defendant to exercise all the proper skill and
care of a surgeon in that speciality; he would not in my view have expected the
170
defendant to give a guarantee of 100% success.'
The claim had been pleaded in both contract and in tort. Because the claim in contract failed,
the matter was litigated in negligence simpliciter111 rather than contractual negligence. This
case was later supported by Eyre v Measday,172 However, patients treated under the National
167 On the subjective standard and slippery slope arguments, see 5.4.4., 6.3. & 6.4.
i6S See Halsbury's Laws ofEngland Vol. 9, para. 631 and the Introduction to this thesis on the fiduciary nature
of the doctor-patient relationship.
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What is meant by simpliciter, in the context of this thesis, is negligence based on performance of medical
procedures or in diagnosis rather than negligence based on information disclosure.
'7i
In Eyre v Measday [1986] 1 All ER 488, Slade LJ considered actions in contract and agreed with the court
in Thake v Maurice. He narrowed it down to two questions: was this a contract by which the defender
contracted to render the plaintiff totally sterile and, if not, did the contract contain an express or implied
warranty to this effect? Considering that the contract was constituted by both the signed consent form and the
consultation between plaintiff and defender he said, 'It is also common ground, I think, that, in order to
ascertain what was the nature and what were the terms of the contract, this court has to apply an objective
rather than a subjective test [which] depends on what the court objectively considers that the words used by the
respective parties must be reasonably taken to have meant.' (492j-493a) Slade LJ found that the contract was
one to perform a laparoscopic sterilisation. On this clause the defender had performed. However, the nature of
the procedure was such that no such guarantee of success could possibly be given. Even though Slade LJ held
that the contract did include an implied warranty of that nature, 'that inference did not entitle the plaintiff to
succeed' (495) because, objectively assessed, no surgeon acting with reasonable care could give such a
guarantee.
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Health Service in the United Kingdom will not have a contract with the Health Authority and
hence will not be able to sue in contract.
More recent case law has supported this now-settled position. McAllister v
Lewisham73 was an action brought in negligence on the basis of the doctor's failure in his duty
of information. This duty was tested against a professional standard. A similar situation was
presented to the court in Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority}1A There, too, the elements
of the claim were those of a claim based on the tort of negligence. Similarly, Newell and
Newell v Goldenberg115 and Lybert v Warrington Health Authority176 were informed consent
cases framed in the tort of negligence which required the plaintiff to prove that on the basis of
the standard of the reasonable practitioner there existed a duty to provide the desired
information on which consent was based, that the defender failed to fulfil this duty and that this
negligent failure caused or materially contributed to the injury suffered by the plaintiff.
1.2.2.2. Scotland
The test in Hunter v Hanley has been discussed in the English context because it is one which
was taken up in order to formulate the Bolam test. On the quid juris question, the position in
Scotland is similar to that in England. In Jones v Lanarkshire Health Board177 the difference
between contract and negligence was considered crucial when it comes to informed consent.
Lord Prosser said,
'[he did] ... not consider this one of those cases where one is merely altering the legal
label on what is essentially the same subject matter. A case can be wholly new in law,
even upon identical facts, and in my view the facts of the present case have to be looked
at in a wholly new light given the change to a case founded in delict.'
There can be little doubt that the action lies in delict. This was the basis for the actions in
Moyes v Lothian Health Board178 and Goorkani v Tayside Health Board '1'' But as this thesis
"J
[1994] 5 Med LR 343.
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[1994] 5 Med LR 334.
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[1995] 6 Med LR 371.
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[1996] 7 Med LR 71.
177 1990 SLT 19.
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[1990] 1 Med LR 463.
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will go on to argue in the light of the South African law, within the law of delict an action might
lie in respect of consent and a wrongful omission to warn, rather than in negligence.180
1.2.2.3. Australia
The English and Australian cases based on limitation of actions make it clear that negligence
based on a lack of informed consent is distinct from negligence based on professional
performance or technical skill.181 Although not a case of alleged medical negligence, Dornan v
J W Ellis & Co. Ltd}82 is a basis from which to argue that introducing further particulars of
claim to the original writ does not constitute a fresh cause of action. Rather, the new particulars
'merely [invite] a different approach to the same facts.'183 It is a question of the court
determining whether an amendment is a new cause of action or a new particular.184
The Dornan case was cited in Australia in Re Katherine Mary Golski as a basis from
which to argue that a new cause in law can be pleaded using the same set of facts. There Kelly
185
J, citing Windeyer J in Anchor Products Limited v Hedges, said,
'The cause of action was negligence. The particulars of the acts or omissions which
were relied on as constituting the negligence alleged could, at the discretion of the trial
judge, be expanded by amendment to meet matters that emerged in the course of the
trial.'
Still citing Windeyer J, he held that the function of these particulars in an action for negligence
was 'not to define the cause of action, which is negligence, but to show what acts or omissions
will be put forward as constituting it.'186
UJ
[1991] 3 Med LR33.
180 Cf. Chapters 3 and 6.
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This crops up in such cases because of statutory time bars on civil tort actions which cause plaintiffs to




184 591. Cf. the Scottish position in Jones v Lanarkshire Health Board 1990 SLT 19, 23 as discussed in 1.2.2.1.
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(1966) 115 CLR 493, 499.
186
Kelly J went on to hold, 'In my opinion, a plaintiff should not be allowed to introduce new claims by
amendment which in substance amount to the bringing of a new action for claims already barred by statute.
However, where the proposed amendments do not change the cause of action but do no more than particularize
the facts by which the respondent proposes to sustain it even though the facts sought to be brought forward
under the amendment are quite different from those originally alleged, amendment will be allowed.'
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As long as the plaintiff relies on the same set of factual circumstances, that plaintiffwill
be given leave to amend their particulars of claim. This can include situations where, for
example, a plaintiff in an action for negligent treatment may want to include a claim for
negligence flowing from a lack of fully informed consent.
The first Australian 'informed consent' case with which we are concerned is F v /?187
which showed a move away from a professional standard. The case was framed in negligence
and it is clear from the above discussion and the Australian case law that this is the correct
position there too. King CJ said,
'The ultimate question, however, is not whether the defender's conduct accords with the
practices of his profession or some part of it, but whether it conforms to the standard of
188
reasonable care demanded by the law.'
This is wording clearly taken from the tort of negligence; but what of other torts?
Vaughan v Baileym was an interrogatory and discovery hearing on an allegation that
the defender failed to obtain valid and properly informed consent to the treatments used. In the
alternative it was alleged that the consent given was in effect null. The interest of the case lies
in the distinction between negligence and battery because if the court found that the consent
was absent, the action would lie in battery, whereas if they found it to be merely inadequate, the
action would lie in negligence. In the event the court considered the matter in negligence, as
did the court in Cover v State ofSouth Australia.190
The judgement in Re (Catherine Mary Golski191 touched on the trespass action by
drawing on Sidaway, noting that there Lord Scarman192 had said that an action for that tort was
not available because Mrs Sidaway had consented. The court in Gover agreed that any form of
187
(1983) 33 SASR 189.
188 194.
189
CLD 17011 of 1980, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Common Law Division, 1984 NSW,
LEXIS 2418; BC8400252, 27 September, 1984.
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(1985) 39 SASR 343.
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1987, Lexis. Federal Court of Australia, Australian Capital Territory District, 16 April 1987.
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consent elides the possibility of an action in assault but that imperfect consent could found an
action in negligence. Kelly J insisted that damage was the gist of an action in negligence. In
law, the type of action to be brought follows the particulars of the claim. A potential plaintiff
would proceed from the existence of damage and go on to consider the existence of other
elements such as duty of care, its breach and causation; at which point it will be apparent to the
plaintiff where the action might lie.
The court in Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital193 argued the matter of informed consent
in negligence. At an instructive point in the judgement, Kirby J held that he need not consider
the claim in assault or in contract194 because as regards the former there was consent, though
imperfect; as regards the latter, the matter was not argued.
Considering the tort of assault, the court in Marion's Case195 agreed that 'the law treats
as unlawful, both criminally and civilly, conduct which constitutes an assault on or a trespass to
the person' and went on to note the exceptions to the defence of consent.196 The court then
spoke specifically of medical treatment saying that, '[t]he factor necessary to render such
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Secretary, Department ofHealth and Community Services, J.W.B. and S.M.B. (Marion's Case) F.C. 92/010,
High Court of Australia, (1992) 175 CLR 218.
195 The court drew on various examples, which are worth citing here for the sake of completeness. It noted that
a person in the Northern Territory cannot render a killing lawful by consenting to be killed and that at common
law a comparable qualification exists with respect to assault. (Citing A-G Reference (No.6 of 1980) [1981] QB
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injuries during sadomasochistic sexual practices.
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As we have seen, and according to Daniels v Burfield, the negligence action is based on
things said and not said198 which are argued to have materially contributed to some harm to the
plaintiff. That case supported F v R in the framing of the action. Similarly, Young v Northern
Territory199 started out as a negligence claim, yet in the alternative the court was obliged to
consider breach of contract. Again, this depended on the manner in which the pursuer brought
the claim. The claimant alleged that the defenders were negligent and/or in breach of their
contract in that they failed to properly advise the plaintiff and to inform themselves of the
plaintiffs past history. The case was adjudicated in negligence and did not involve any
contractual inquiry. This is an understandable development in a case in which allegations are
made in the alternative: the court held that it was unnecessary to consider breach of contract in
the light of their findings for the defender on the basis of negligence.
Rogers v Whitaker200 remains the leading case in Australia and has recently been
supported by the decision in Chappel v Hart.201 Proceedings were commenced for negligence,
because by 1993 it had been established where the action lay. Consequently the case is
important mainly for its analysis and testing of the standard of care and the alleged breach of
that duty by the defender. Rogers v Whitaker, like the latter English and Canadian cases
discussed, was able to consider the claim within the parameters of the tort of negligence. The
same position faced the court in Hart v Chappel202 in the Supreme Court of New South Wales
and on appeal in the High Court of Australia. Hayne J., dissenting, argued that Mrs Hart failed
on causation in her negligence action, but because she had pleaded her case in both negligence
and contract, he argued that her claim in the latter succeeded and entitled her to nominal
damages, but no more. This indicates another difference between the two actions; the measure
of damages is that much greater if the claim is in negligence. (For example, had Mrs Donoghue
pleaded her case in contract, she would have received only the value of a replacement bottle of
ginger beer in damages.)
Daniels v Burfield (1991) AUST SASC 1769, 1771 et seq.
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Jeanette Evelyn Young v Northern Territory ofAustralia, Albery Raymond Anderson and Lorraine Evans,
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The court in Breen v Williams203 discussed the patient's rights (as submitted by counsel
for the plaintiff), as based variously on contract, property and fiduciary duty. With regard to
contractual obligations giving rise to an action, Brennan CJ said,
'In the absence of special contract between a doctor and a patient, the doctor undertakes
by the contract between them to advise and treat the patient with reasonable skill and
care. The consideration for the undertaking may be either a payment, or promise of
payment, of reward or submission by the patient, or an undertaking by the patient to
submit, to the treatment proposed. A duty, similar to the duty binding on the doctor by
contract, is imposed on the doctor by the law of torts. The advice and treatment required
to fulfil either duty depends on the history and condition of the patient, the facilities
available and all the other circumstances of the case.'
This suggests that the Australian position is unusual. Indeed, contrary to the Canadian
position, Brennan CJ held that an action may also lie in contract.204 The learned judge did,
however, hold under the same point that,
'A similar duty may be imposed on the doctor by the law of torts but, in particular
situations, for example, some emergency treatments, the relationship between doctor and
patient may not give rise to a duty that extends so far. It is not necessary now to
consider that problem.'
The case of the plaintiff, however, rested on the serving of her 'best interests' as an implied
term of the contract. On this the judge had the following to say:
'There are good reasons why Australian courts do not imply a "best interests" term, as a
matter of law, into all doctor-patient contractual relationships. First, "[wjhere a term is
implied into a contract it will usually embody a contractual promise and therefore create
a legal duty."205 Such a duty would be inconsistent with the existing contractual and
tortious duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in the provision of professional advice
and treatment. The existence of a tortious duty of care militates against "the implication
of ... a general contractual duty of care",206 particularly where "the incidents of an
independent general contractual duty of care would differ from those of an independent
/UJ
[1995] Med LR 385.
'"4
He said, 'information with respect to a patient's history, condition or treatment obtained by a doctor in the
course or for the purpose of giving advice or treatment to the patient must be disclosed by the doctor to the
patient or the patient's nominee on request when (1) refusal to make the disclosure requested might prejudice
the general health of the patient, (2) the request for disclosure is reasonable having regard to all the
circumstances and (3) reasonable reward for the service of disclosure is tendered or assured.'
205 Here citing Carter and Harland, Contract Law in Australia, 3rd ed. (1996). 204.
206 Here citing Hawkins (1988) 164 CLR 539, 582-583.
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tortious duty".207 Second, the meaning and application of an implied term must be
reasonably certain.'208
The Australian picture which emerges is substantially the same as that in both Canada
and England: the relevant cause of action lies in the tort of negligence unless there was no
consent to the procedure, and that the law of contract is not useful because of a clash with the
law of torts. It is clear, however, that the issues all boil down to a relationship between the
litigating parties which is sufficiently close to found a duty of care, the breach of which is
alleged to have caused the plaintiff some harm, but that this duty is forged in a contractual
context.
1.2.2.4. South Africa
The position in South Africa is similar to one already sketched, with some key differences
already alluded to. Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal209 was an action brought on the
ground of the delict of assault. The court pointed out that English law, which deals with assault
under the broad heading of trespass to the person, was dissimilar to South African law in which
the action is dealt with under the actio iniuriarum. In Esterhuizen an employee of the defendant
hospital authority treated the plaintiff with powerful X-rays without her consent knowing that
they could cause disfigurement and possible necrosis.
In South African law, as in Scots law, assault constitutes an iniuria. The court pointed
out that this means that, 'the act of intentionally and unlawfully applying force to the person of
another' constitutes an assault"10 and hence there is no onus on the plaintiff to prove that the act
was committed without consent.
Hawkins (1988) 164 CLR 539, 584.
208 c
Citing, by way of example, Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] AC 108, and Codelfa Construction Pty
Ltd v State Rail Authority ofNSW (1982) 149 CLR 337.
209 1957 (3) SA 710 (T).
210 711.
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Consent constitutes a defence to an assault charge,2" which means that the onus is on
the defendant to prove consent on a balance of probabilities, so rebutting the prima facie case of
the plaintiff. Prima facie, there cannot be consent to surgery unless the risks are explained and
speaking of consent in that context presumes the possibility of the volenti defence. Bekker J
found that even if the plaintiff had borne the onus of proving that she had not consented, that
onus had been discharged. He held that no matter how laudable the motives of the practitioner,
if he administers inherently dangerous treatment to the patient without that patient's consent,
'he does so at his own peril.'212 Accordingly, judgement was given in favour of the plaintiff.
The position with regard to an absence of consent would appear clear. The position is less
stable in respect of allegedly ill-informed or inadequate consent.
From early this century actions involving the consent of the plaintiff-patient have been
framed in negligence. As early as 1925, Lymbery v Jejferies2n was framed in negligence and so
obliged the court to consider the matter in terms of the essentials of that action. The case
remains one of the earliest in which the consent of the plaintiff was a consideration because the
primary allegations were that she had not been informed that she could become sterile following
X-ray treatment; nor had she been informed that the treatment was dangerous.214 Because the
action was framed in negligence, the court was obliged first to consider whether in the
circumstances a duty of information existed at all. But these were early days yet for informed
consent. It was held that the facts could not support the allegation that the plaintiff had not been
informed about the possibility of sterility and that, with regard to informing the plaintiff that the
treatment was dangerous, there was no such duty on the defender in the circumstances.
The consideration which arose in Lymbery v Jefferies in 1925 arose again half a century
later in the Cape Provincial Division in Richter and Another v Estate Hammann.215 In an
amendment to the particulars of claim it was alleged that the defendant was negligent in not
211
Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 1957 (3) SA710 (T)
212 721.
213 1925 AD 236.
214
Other allegations were that the defender was negligent in sending the plaintiff to an unqualified radiologist
and that following her complaints concerning the treatment, the defender negligently told her to continue with
it.
215
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warning the plaintiff of a remote possibility of complications, as well as in the administration of
the treatment which he had advised. The court held that under these circumstances the defender
was not under such a duty.
Similarly, Blyth v van den Heever2Xb was an action brought in negligence on the basis of
a failure to diagnose and take proper action in respect of post operative sepsis and ischemia217
and, had the diagnosis been correctly made, damage would not have been suffered. Of note
here is that the case had to do with liability for an omission and that the same test was put
forward for both diagnosis and treatment.218
The court in Collins v Administrator, Transvaal219 held that in a delictual action framed
in negligence, damages were to be compensatory rather than punitive; this distinguished civil
from criminal law. Remaining on the topic of the context of informed consent, the relationship
between contract and delict is one which emerges as an interesting facet of the South African
law. This is especially so considering Lord Templeman's comment in Sidaway'20 that the
doctor, 'obedient to the high standards set by the medical profession impliedly contracts to act
at all times in the best interests of the patient'. In this way he positioned the relationship
between the parties in a contractual context in England.221
As early as 1924 in Van Wyk v Lewis,2" Innes CJ held that the action was based in
negligence rather than contract, yet he argued that 'the line of division where negligence is
alleged is not always easy to draw; for negligence underlies the field of both contract and tort.'
This is particularly interesting when one takes into account the contractual context considered
in Castell v De Greef23 seven decades later.
210 1980 (1)SA 192.
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In the years between the two cases, the courts considered the matter in Correira v
Berwind224 in which it was argued by the defendant surgeon that the plaintiffs claim, based on
contract, had prescribed. There the court held that the legal relationship between doctor and
patient can give rise to both contractual and delictual liabilities. The court also found that
delictual liabilities exist independent of any contractual provisions. Mfalila J quoted Lord
225
Nathan's classic text, Medical Negligence:
'In the great majority of cases the duty owed by a medical man or a medical institution
towards the patient is the same whether there exists a contract between them or not."*26
227
'The fact that the relationship between doctor and patient is usually one of contract'
has no bearing on the existence of delictual liability; but it remains an interesting context in
which to consider the non-litigious interaction between the parties. This is interesting because
of the academic argument that a breach of contract should properly be classified as a form of
delict.2"8 Mfalila J held that both actions can proceed from the same set of facts.
It remains a question of determining the wrong from which the damage arose in order to
determine the cause of action to be instituted.229 The facts of Van Wyk v Lewis satisfied the
requirements of both a contractual and a delictual action because delictual liability exists
independent of contract. However, in Lillicrap, Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Brothers
(SA)(Pty) Ltd,230 Grosskopf AJA brought policy into the equation by saying,
'
... I do not consider that policy considerations require that delictual liability be
imposed for negligent breach of contract of professional employment of the sort with
which we are here concerned.'
223 1994 (4) SA 408.
224




227 Ibid. 63. Emphasis in original.
228 See Lillicrap, Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA)(Pty) Ltd 1985 (1) SA 475 (A), 496.
"9
Correira v Berwind 1985 (4) SA 60, 65.
230 1985 (1) SA 475, 501G-H.
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It would appear that the 'existence of a concurrent contractual liability is no bar to an action in
delict, provided that the requirements of delictual liability are also satisfied.'"31
As in Sidaway, the court in Castell v De Greef3' placed the relationship - as opposed to
the legal action - between doctor and patient in the contractual context.233 We will see in the
next chapter that this case marked the introduction to South African law of a patient-oriented
approach to the duty of care. Castell was an action framed in negligence. Nonetheless,
Ackerman J, drawing from Rogers v Whitaker's critique of the American judiciary's use of
terminology such as 'the patient's right of self-determination' and 'informed consent' said,
'In any event, [the Australian criticism] does not seem to me to be appropriate in South
African law, where the issue is treated not as one of negligence, arising from the breach of a
duty of care, but as one of consent to the injury involved and the voluntary assumption of an
unintended risk. In the South African context the doctor's duty to disclose a material risk
must be seen in the contractual setting of an unimpeachable consent to the operation and its
, ,234sequelae.
Ackerman J pointed out that the criticism in Rogers v Whitaker of the expression
'informed consent' was on the basis that '... consent is relevant to actions framed in trespass,
rather than negligence ,'235 Mason CJ in Rogers v Whitaker went on to endorse the Common
Law position by framing the issue in negligence. Ackerman J then reiterated that South African
law takes a different position because of the availability of the volenti defence; he went on to
hold that while the position formulated in Rogers v Whitaker was a correct one, it ought to be
'adapted to the needs of South African jurisprudence.'236
This puts a new complexion on the issue insofar as it may be related to the iniuria of
assault. The court argued that the defence of volenti nonfit iniuria was available and that this
removed the case from the confines of the delict of negligence. With the operation of the
231
Boberg PQR. The Law of Delict. 1984. Juta. Johannesburg. Opening chapter on 'Nature and Basis of
Delictual Liability', pi.
232 1994 (4) SA 408.
233 This was to have a bearing on causation. See Ch. 4, specifically on the use of the defence of volenti noil fit
iniuria in 4.7.




volenti defence, consent is kept broadly within those confines,237 yet the element of
wrongfulness is established by the facts of the case. In effect, the court was judging the facts
relative to culpa rather than more narrowly and in terms of negligence. Wrongfulness, in those
terms, could be constituted by negligence, assault or, as Ackerman J held, by failure to procure
an informed consent as assessed relative to the defence of volenti nonfit iniuria.
Friedman v Glicksman~38 was a wrongful birth and wrongful life action, which
discussed the delictual claim of a mother for the wrongful birth of her daughter. The court
established that the nature of the doctor-patient relationship means that the harm to the plaintiff
was foreseeable and that this constituted the necessary fault element in the law of delict.
Considering causation, the court held,
'The claim is based upon the fact that, but for the defender's negligent advice [that the
child was not going to be born abnormal or disabled], the plaintiff would have had her
pregnancy terminated. Thus the defender is responsible and caused the child, with her
239
disabilities, to be born.'
On the face of things Friedman could be seen as having gone against the ruling in Castell v
DeGreef, but volenti was not pleaded in defence. It would seem, then, that a case will be
considered within the scope of the law of negligence, unless volenti is pleaded. Be that as it
may, the most up to date decision on the issue of informed consent remains Castell v DeGreef.
1.2.3. Not SoDistinct a Tort of Negligence
The picture which is emerging is a 'collage of negligence', with different jurisdictions using
negligence tests in different ways. English and Scottish courts use the same test to establish
whether there has been negligence (the test in Hunter v Hanley) or to exculpate from negligence
(the Bolam test) in respect of treatment and in respect of the duty of information. Courts in
Australia and Canada, on the other hand, separate the test for the duty of care in negligence
237
because any judgement will be expressed in negligence terms
238 1996 (1) SA 1135.
239 1139B-C.
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simpliciter from that for negligence in respect of the duty of information."40 The policy of the
South African Judiciary was to employ different tests by removing consent matters from
negligence and to test them simply as wrongfulness cases. This means that while these matters
are litigated broadly in negligence, the principles and tests associated with that tort are not
uniformly employed.
1.3. The Court as Arbiter
It is important that the court is the final arbiter of the standard of care and the matter of its
breach. This is because any legal test which empowered any one particular party would be open
to abuse. It is true to say that different parties are given differently weighted power in any legal
test, but if the court declares itself to be the final arbiter on the admissibility and weight of
evidence, this can lead to a fairer result. It is because of this principle, for example, that the
Bolam test could be used to the effect that it was used in the Bolitho case."41 In that case, the
court had to determine the hypothetical causation using the Bolam test. In that way, the House
of Lords was making use of judicial tests to determine the outcome of case, rather than merely
accepting at face value the views of experts or defendant.
It had been held in Siclaway the courts would not defer to the views of experts but will
assess their evidence according to the applicable judicial tests. Lord Browne-Wilkinson had
outlined the Bolam test and referred to its use in Maynard v West Midlands AHA242 and Wilsher
v Essex AHA and went on to hold, that 'the court has to be satisfied that the exponents of the
body of opinion relied upon can demonstrate that such opinion has a logical basis.'243 This is
more important in the context of information disclosure than it is in the context of negligence
simpliciter because there is more room for disagreement among professionals in respect of what
they, in their opinion, would have told a particular patient, than there is room for disagreement
241
[1997] 4 All ER 771. This case will be discussed inter alia in 4.3. It is particularly relevant to the issue of
the court as arbiter over the matter and as asserting its own authority over the case rather than deferring to the
opinions of expert witnesses.
242
See also the judgement of Donaldson MR in Sidaway (CA) (WLR, 792) in which his Lordship had
considered the need for a medical practice to be 'rightly' adopted.
243
[1997] 4 All ER 771, 778f.
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on the appropriate treatment or diagnosis. This is the case because the requisite standard of
information disclosure can depend on the patient's desire for knowledge, while negligence
simpliciter has more to do with medical science."44
This method of assessment of expert evidence is arguably a control device over
evidence which is provided by medical experts and the medical profession generally. This is a
further instance of judicial policy. The Court declares itself to be the final arbiter of the
professional standard, of what constitutes reasonableness and of the acceptance of expert
evidence. This is because ideal practice should, as the court put it, be 'rightly' adopted by the
profession."45 This attitude reflects a difference from the time last century when cases were
heard by a jury.246
Entrenching this in Roe v Minister of Health,247 Lord Denning MR indicated that there
are some practices of the medical profession that the court might hold to be negligent. Similarly
Wessels JA, in demonstrating the similarity of South African to English law while using
American cases in Van Wyk v Lewis, considered reasonableness to be a decision for the court.
He said,
'The Court can only refuse to admit such a universal practice if in its opinion it is so
unreasonable and so dangerous that it would be contrary to public policy to admit it. In
determining whether such a practice is reasonable or not the Court must take into
consideration the advance in medical science and modern practice.' "48
What constitutes reasonableness, universal practice, modern practice and public policy are all
subject to the opinion of the court. This means that no matter what the court's test for either
causation or for whether the duty of care exists and was breached in the circumstances, the
244 Cf. Chapter 5.
245 See Donaldson MR in Sidaway (WLR, 792) and Hirst J in Hills v Potter [1983] 3 All ER 716, 728. See
also Norrie K McK 'Standards of Disclosure' 1984 SLT 237. Cf. Chapter 5 on the expert. See also comment
by Margaret Puxon QC following De Freitas v O'Brien [1995] 6 Med LR 108, 116.
246
Lanphier v Phipos (1830) 8 Car & P 475; Rich v Pierpont (1862) 3 F & F 35.
247
[1954] 2 All ER 131.
248 1 924 AD 438, 460. Own emphasis.
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court itself remains the arbiter; rather like making only those rules which one can oneself
keep.249
There is an argument that it is paternalistic of the law to involve itself in the way it does
with medicine - that is by reserving the right to decide. In Sidaway, for example, the House of
Lords adopted a paternalistic and medically oriented approach and aligned informed consent
with professional duty; yet it did not leave the issue in the hands of the medical profession
250alone." That case concerned a patient who was not told of a one per cent chance that spinal
damage might result from an operation on her neck. The House of Lords confirmed that the
Bolam test applies to disclosure of inherent risks, yet ruled that medical opinion was not
decisive."5'
More recently and more to the point, Chief Justice Mason in Rogers v Whitaker quoted,
with approval, Laskin CJC in Reibl v Hughes on the supremacy of the law.25" He also quoted
King CJ in F v R as having said,
'"The ultimate question, however, is not whether the defendant's conduct accords with the
practices of his profession or some part of it, but whether it conforms to the standard of
reasonable care demanded by the law. That is a question for the court and the duty of
253
deciding it cannot be delegated to any profession or group in the community.'"
Following this there can be little dispute over the court's assertion of its own competence;
a competence which is self-valedictory and which will serve as an insurance policy against
being unable to make policy-guided decisions while interrogating other facets of the legal
inquiry into informed consent and medical negligence.
249 In Hucks v Cole ((1968) Times, 9 May; [1993] 4 Med LR 393, 379, Col. 2), Lord Justice Sachs said, 'When
the evidence shows that a lacuna in professional practice exists by which risks of grave danger are knowingly
taken, then, however small the risks, the courts must anxiously examine that lacuna - particularly if the risks
can be easily and inexpensively avoided.'
250
Bolam, it should be noted, was only a decision of first instance and what has become the Bolam test was
part of the summing up to a lay jury. Goldrein considers it too archaic to be applicable in tort cases four
decades after the decision: Iain S Goldrein 'Bolam - Problems Arising Out of "Ancestor" Worship' (1994)




In which Chief Justice Mason had said, 'To allow expert medical evidence to determine what risks are
material and, hence, should be disclosed ... is to hand over to the medical profession the entire scope of the
duty of disclosure, including the question of whether there has been a breach of that duty.'
"'">3
Rogers v Whitaker [1993] 4 Med LR 79, 82, Col. ii.
1.4. The Burden of proof254
By adhering to the policy considered earlier in this chapter to remain within the tort of
negligence, the burden of proof remains on the plaintiff, so protecting the practitioner by giving
him the benefit of the doubt to start with."53 In Daniels v Burfield, Bollen J dispensed with this
matter quickly by stating simply,
'The answer whether [due care was exercised] or not will depend on an examination of
the facts or suggested facts. The onus of proof lies on the plaintiff. It is the "civil"
,256
onus.
The onus of proof is on the plaintiff and the standard of proof is on balance of
probabilities. This onus of proof shifts onto the doctor if he negligently failed to take a
257
precaution and the condition that the precaution was designed to circumvent eventuates.
Because damage is a necessary element of the claim and because it is the plaintiff who brings
the case and makes the allegation of negligence, the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff to
show that had she been warned of the risk which eventuated, she would not have undergone the
treatment and therefore would not have suffered the injury of which she complains.
Considering the onus in negligence claims, Innes CJ in Van Wyk v Lewis said, 'The
question of onus is of capital importance. The general rule is that he who asserts must prove. A
plaintiff therefore who relies on negligence must prove it.'258 This onus may differ in assault
and battery cases. According to Marion's Case in Australia, in battery cases the onus is on the
defendant to prove that the pursuer consented.259 This is because physical contact or the threat
of contact is prima facie unlawful. However, considering trespass to the person, Freeman v
Home Office260 held that the onus is on the plaintiff to prove that he did not consent.
254 See Jones MA 'Medical Negligence - the Burden of Proof (1984) 134 NLJ 7.
255 Hills v Potter [1983] 3 All ER 716, [1984] 1 WLR 130.
256 1991 AUST SASC LEXIS 1769.
257 Clark v MacLennan [1983] 1 All ER 416.
258 1924 AD 438, 444.
259
Marion's Case, (1992) 175 CLR 218, 233 et seq.
260
[1984] 1 All ER 1036, [1984] 2 WLR 802 (per McCowan J at 537-7 and per Sir John Donaldson at 557
[QB] respectively).
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Although there appears to be a lack of consensus in the Commonwealth, what this does
show is a difference in the patient- or physician-orientation of the courts in Australia and
England. There is uniformity across the Commonwealth, however, on the fact that the onus in
negligence cases lies with the plaintiff and that this gives the practitioner something of a head
start.
Different to the question of onus is the question of responsibility. While the injured
party bears the onus of proof, legal responsibility is not necessarily borne by the individual
medical practitioner due to vicarious liability. Where vicarious liability is imposed, the person
directly responsible for the injury - in this instance the practitioner who omitted to give
information on which consent was based - is not the named defendant.
The issue of vicarious liability and how it affects medical practitioners is an important
one because it, too, is imposed for policy reasons. The court in Launchbury v Morgans261
argued that vicarious liability is imposed for the protection of the plaintiff in order to provide
the victim of an unintentional tort with someone who has the means to pay compensation.
Additionally, it is psychologically easier to sue hospital authorities because of the perception of
the hospital as institution.262 This is especially so because the money paid in damages will not
come from the pocket of the practitioner involved in allegedly negligent treatment.
According to the rules of vicarious liability, to establish whether an employer is
vicariously liable to an injured person it is necessary to establish that the wrong was committed
by a person who was an employee and who was acting in the course of his or her employment.
This is the position in all jurisdictions discussed here.263
201
[1973] AC 127 (HL).
26i
It may be psychologically easier, but it is incorrectly seen as such. This is incorrect because of the money
paid by medical practitioners in insurance premiums.
"6j In Australia, the decision in Ellis v Walsend District Hospital ([1990] 2 Med LR 103, 109 et seq. and 126 et
seq. on applicable categories and definitions) provided a summary of Australian, Canadian and English legal
development on the matter to find that once it is established that the surgeon or doctor involved was acting in
the capacity of servant of the hospital or health authority, the authority is vicariously liable for the torts of that
servant. That hospitals are vicariously liable for the delicts of their servants is a position taken in South Africa
53
1.5. DEFENCES
Other than the complete defences of emergency, necessity and therapeutic privilege,"64 defences
open to the doctor on charges of negligence relate simply to the facts and to the rebuttal of
evidence led by the pursuer who bears the burden of proof.265 A defender will be successful in
their defence by asserting, on balance of probabilities, a deficiency in any of the facta probanda
of a negligence suit. For example, a defender would seek to lead evidence that the relationship
between the parties was not close enough to found a duty of care. Failing that, the defender
would lead evidence that although a duty of care existed between defender and pursuer, the
defender was not in breach of that duty, and hence not negligent. In the last instance, and
failing the first two lines of defence, the defender might seek to prove that the injury was not
factually or legally caused by his negligent failure to inform the patient on the medical
procedure to be followed. In South Africa, the defence of volenti nonfit iniuria is available.266
In many cases, however, the defender need not assert anything because of where the
burden of proof is positioned. Thus the pursuer's failure to prove the necessary elements of a
claim in negligence would mean that their case would fail and no defence would be necessary in
a situation in which the only burden is that of evidentiary rebuttal. However, following the
plaintiffs case, the defender will bear not an evidentiary burden, but a persuasive or tactical
burden.267
1.6. Policy Considerations and the Duty of Care
The relationship described in this chapter and in Chapter 2 gives rise to a duty of care; be it
based on a fiduciary duty or on a relationship of proximity, and as long as the volenti defence
in Lymbery v Jefferies 1925 AD 236, S v Kramer and Another 1987 (1) SA 887 and Pringle v Administrator,
Transvaal. 1990 (2) SA 379.
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Though it is difficult to imagine the first two of these three defences arising in disclosure cases, because the
very notion that it was either necessary or a matter of urgency to omit to disclose information on a material risk
is paradoxical and non-sensical.
265 It is not necessary to discuss each rebuttal in a section such as this because they will be discussed
throughout this thesis.
266
As discussed in 3.3.3., 4.7., 5.4.3. and 6.4.2.
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does not apply or is not proven. The policy implications in the act of holding that a duty of care
exists, may be interrogated by considering whether, within that duty of care, there is a duty of
disclosure. In Australia and in Canada the duty of care is seen as different from the ordinary
duty of care, while in England it is seen as part of the duty of care in medical practice. This
will be discussed more fully in Chapter 3, but for present purposes those policy considerations
in the general framing of the duty of care are worth a mention.
In Common Law countries, law is made by Parliament and applied and adopted by the
judiciary. Judges are unwilling to be seen to be adopting a legislative role - or so the rhetoric of
the judiciary would have us believe. In reality, the hands of judges are not as tied as we are
encouraged to suppose; it is the judge who is able to determine in many instances the direction
which society is to take. This is done through the enunciation of a new rule or legal test (often
to replace an older rule on the matter) or the elaboration of an old rule to cover novel
V , • 268situations.
The task of the judge is to determine whether a new rule is necessary and whether its
adoption will fit within existing legal and social parameters. Holding that a duty of care exists
in the context of the doctor-patient relationship is uncontroversial because of the case law
which has elaborated that precept on the basis of 'community values' or the 'legal convictions
of society' which the judiciary will interpret and define more precisely. This trend is not
universal and, as this thesis will argue, it is more in evidence in South Africa, for example, than
it is in British jurisdictions.269 Ronald Dworkin argued that judges should be confined, in their
law-making function, to questions about rights - that is the judge's evaluation of social values
and of fairness.270 The ultimate question here would be: does the plaintiff, in the context of
~61 For the differences between these burdens, consider Parr v HMA 1991 SCCR 180 and Mochan v Herron
1972 SLT 218 in the criminal law context.
268
Consider, in the criminal context, Khaliq v HMA 1983 SCCR 483 which (in the opinion of some academic
writers) allowed Scots law to create new crimes, or (in the opinion of others) to adapt the existing common law
to bring it in line with current or novel situations.
269
Consider, in particular, 6.3.2.
270 John Bell. Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions. 1983. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 81.
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informed consent, have the right to recovery based on the duty of care which this court holds to
exist?271
This assessment by the judiciary is dependent on information available to the court at
the time and is a very narrow and directed task because it is specific to the case before the
court. John Bell outlined several factors which will be taken into account.272 The court would
have recourse to current social attitudes as they are practicably operable in the light of
constitutional limitations already in place, and with a view to fairness, in balancing individual
and community rights. As Bell put it,
'Apart from what can be gleaned from statutes and previous cases, discussion of social
conditions and social attitudes takes place for the most part on the basis of unsupported
assertions of social fact and projections of future benefits or disasters which would
follow the adoption of a new rule, which rest on the judge's appreciation of human
nature.'273
What this amounts to is an excuse which is dressed up as reasoning for adopting, or not, a new
dictum such as informed consent in Britain."74 Viewed less cynically, it is a way of saying that
fears of the slippery slope will often justify not adopting a particular legal test."72
Lord Pearce in Hedley Byrne v Heller276 said, '[h]ow wide the sphere of the duty of
care in negligence is to be laid depends ultimately on the court's assessment of the demands of
society for the protection of carelessness of others.' In disclosure cases, the court's policy of
establishing the scope of the duty of care is crucial because it is the cornerstone on which the
rest of the case will stand or fall. The Canadian position, for example, has construed the nature
of the relationship between doctor and patient quite specifically as fiduciary while English
courts have said that the duty of care exists, but that its definition is to be decided case by case
271 Cf. Chapter 6, particularly 6.3.1.
272
Ibid. 69-76. These factors are outlined as encompassing social, administrative, constitutional and economic
factors and those based on fairness.
273 Ibid. 67.
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It is also the basis for slippery slope arguments and fears, which will be considered throughout this thesis,
but particularly in 6.3.
275 Cf. 6.2. on some American extremes of the doctrine of informed consent, which could constitute a reason
not to adopt the doctrine.
276
[1964] AC 465, 536. This case is considered analogous on this point because it considered information and
liability for misinformation in the context of negligence, albeit in respect of an economic tort.
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on the basis of proximity and by analogy with previous cases. We will see in the following
chapters how this will affect the route taken by the courts in essentially very similar cases.
Policy, it should be noted, is employed after principle. This is evident from the
nervous shock case of McLoughlin v O'Brian211 in which Lord Scarman argued that the court
decides the matter on the basis of existing principle but where principle gives no satisfactory
278 • • 279
answer (or where required), recourse is had to policy. However, the other Law Lords
considered policy directly when they considered the possibility of a proliferation of claims of
this sort coming to the attention of the court.280 They left the test of the duty of care to be
assessed relative to reasonable foresight and on a case by case basis. In this way they did not
limit the scope in advance.
Within negligence (or by escaping from that delict in the case of South Africa) the
policy-making role of the judiciary is prominent as policy arguments are raised by counsel and
considered as such by judges. Because fault is an essential element of the claim, judicial policy
will guide the future conduct of members of society, such as doctors. In considering medical
negligence cases, the court looks at its own perception of the needs of society and balances that
against 'slippery slope' or 'floodgates' arguments which may assert that were a certain rule to
be adopted, the courts would face too many similar claims - or that the trend of claims would
take a particular direction.281 However, were the floodgates to be opened, that would point to a
legislative role not having been fulfilled.282 Other considerations against adopting a particular
new rule are economic: the cost to the community of increased litigation and, in this case, to the
283medical profession of increased insurance premiums."
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[1982] 2 WLR 982, 998.
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It should be noted that subsequent to the judgement in McLoughlin, the House of Lords in Caparo
Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 held that reasonable foresight was insufficient to give rise to a duty of
care alone, but that a relationship of proximity between the parties was necessary. The Caparo position has
been upheld in the medical context in by the Court of Appeal Osmond v Fergusson [1993] 3 All ER 334 as
well as by the court in Palmer v Tees Health Authority 45 BMLR 88.
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As was the case, for example, in the nervous shock cases brought following the Hillsborough disaster:
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1991] 4 All ER 907 and Frost v Chief Constable of the South
Yorkshire Police [1997] 1 All ER 540.
281 Cf. 6.2.
282 Bell. Ibid. 71.
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The judge as the 'well-informed citizen' is in a position of great power in assessing the
duty of care and hence the tort of negligence. If no duty of care is found to exist, the plaintiffs
case will fail. However, if a duty of care exists, there may also exist in the law of torts a prima
facie case for the plaintiff based on reasonable forseeability. Strong policy arguments will need
to prevail in order to rebut that prima facie case. At that stage the court will make policy
decisions to restrict the class of plaintiffs to whom such claims will be available or to limit the
number of possible plaintiffs.
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Chapter 2
Doctor, Patient, Illness and Law
2.1. Introduction
Having considered the fact that the informed consent scenario is litigated in negligence, it has
been concluded that a duty of care between patient and medical practitioner has arisen. This
chapter will briefly consider some of the governing principles which are brought to bear in that
relationship. It will consider the differing perspectives from which the litigating parties view
that relationship. This well serve as a background from which to consider the policy
considerations which the judiciaries bring to bear on disclosure cases so that, in Chapter 3, it
will be possible to consider the judicial tests for standard of care within the duty of care. This
chapter sketches the positions taken by the protagonists as background to that discussion and
concludes with a discussion of judicial policy.
2.2. Ethics, Etiquette and Law
In the present context what is meant by ethics is a body of rules and principles, codified1 or
otherwise, which concerns the behaviour of professionals when dealing with and treating others
in the latter's capacity as patient. Etiquette, on the other hand, denotes those codes of
behaviour which are internal to the profession and which concern conduct among members of
the profession. When it comes to the law, any de facto ethical situation needs to be raised to
the de jure to legitimise a professional ethics in the eyes of the law.
In the context of consent based on information, the BMA has an idealistic view of the
doctor-patent relationship, holding that such relations should be based on partnership.2 It
recognises the problems encountered in communication between the two. It sees consent to the
initial examination as a trigger to discussion, within and regarding the therapeutic context.
1
Such as the Hippocratic Oath, restated in the Declaration of Geneva; the International Code of Medical Ethics
based on the Geneva Convention; the Declaration of Helsinki regarding new and experimental treatments and
the publications and guidelines of each of Britain's Health Authority Ethics Committees.
2 British Medical Association. Medical Ethics Today: its Practice and Philosophy. 1993. Ch.l.
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Interestingly, the BMA sees this two-way process as allocating rights to the patient as well as to
the doctor and it sees consent as an issue which 'binds legal and ethical considerations'.3
The BMA draws members' attention to a passage in the 1981 Declaration of Lisbon,
which reads: 'the patient has the right to accept or refuse treatment after receiving adequate
information'. It then points out that the ethical demand of this precept ought to be to supply as
much information as the patient needs or desires. The BMA drew on Lord Scarman's
dissenting opinion in Sidaway4 in which he set out the admittedly ideal 'prudent patient' test
regarding information as that which 'allows the patient to make a rational decision.'5
This is curious precisely because it was a dissenting opinion. If the ideal of the
profession's trade union is not the law, this says much about what the law should be and the
direction in which we might see the law to be moving within the paradigm of the doctor and
patient as litigants. It also speaks volumes about how the medical profession sees the ideal
legal position.6 While the patient's views are to be taken into account to a greater degree, the
amount of information required is decided by the doctor, whose duty should require him to
consider views of the subjective patient. This suggests a difference between the thinking of
lawyers and that of doctors; this difference is important at many stages in the litigation process
and so worthy of some consideration.
Professional ethics and law do not necessarily adopt the same stance on every matter.
The most recent edition of Good Medical Practice purports to recognise that 'doctors have
wider professional and ethical responsibilities than the law requires them to have.'7 This thesis
does not propose to delve deeply into the jurisprudential debate on the differences and
similarities between law and ethics. Suffice to say that at times medical law may pre-empt
ethical conduct and affect medical practice. Information disclosure cases serve as examples of
this because the medical community is inclined to avoid legal liability by bringing their conduct
in line with courts' decisions on the matter. The conduct of doctors is regulated and governed
3 British Medical Association. 3.
4
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] AC 871, 876 et seq., [1985] 1 All ER 643, 645 et seq.
5 British Medical Association 10-11.
6 Which is not as much in the interests of the profession as the present English and Scottish positions. Cf.
Ch.32.
7
Sir Donald Irvine, president of the GMC, quoted by Linda Beecham in British Medical Journal 1998; 316:
1553 (23 May).
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by the mechanisms of law and ethics. When the two are at odds, and someone is harmed, cases
may come before the courts. This argument emphasises the importance of the forms of legal
testing used in all cases and the weight given by courts to the practices of the medical
community, particularly, in this context, in respect of tests for medical negligence.
Two types of medical negligence need to be separated: negligence based on the
treatment received or withheld, from negligence based on a wrongful omission to inform a
patient of risks inherent in, and alternatives to, the proposed treatment.8 Foremost in the
equation a doctor ought to know what he is talking about and particularly what he is doing. Yet
in the medical profession it is increasingly important to relate to consumers as well as to be
technically and intellectually competent.
The law has various ways of looking at the medical practitioner according to the
position in which the law holds him: as defendant to an action, as an expert medical witness in
a similar or unrelated action or as an object to be regulated by legislature and judiciary.
Most instances of medical negligence fall completely within the civil law arena - the
neighbourhood principle in which negligence9 involves a duty owed and the breach of that duty
which causes injury for which the tortfeasor pays damages. At this point in the discussion it is
sufficient to note that the standard of care in the law of torts or delict will be governed by the
applicable raised professional standard of care, which might reasonably be expected of
someone with similar professed qualifications and attributes. The medical profession will be
separate from other occupations and professions because it comprises different knowledges,
functions and forms of control. But some common legal rules are still applicable, such as those
which govern professional liability generally.10
s
What this thesis has described as the 'informed consent scenario' (Cf. 1.1.) which is generic and typical of
most cases discussed here.
9
A tort or delict. This aspect will be more comprehensively covered in Chapter 3 when the discussion turns to
specific liability and responsibilities. Suffice to note here that informed consent is not always a simple matter
of the tort or delict of negligence, as the South African example will illustrate.
10
See Jackson and Powell.
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Law increasingly involves itself in determining the activities of medical practitioners,
especially their decision-making powers." Teff suggests that law is the only discipline that
makes use of bipolar argument to determine facts,12 so showing itself to be different from either
scientific or medical thinking. This aspect of legal thinking differs from medical thinking and
may alienate practitioners in the courtroom.13 In the final analysis, the lawmaker holds the
royal flush; yet as we shall see, the extent to which courts are content to leave anything up to
medicine varies across the jurisdictions. It is for this reason that a comparative methodology is
considered a fitting one.
2.3. Medical thinking
Medical thinking is not a linear process and is unlike thinking styles in either the pure sciences
or the humanities. Two argued assumptions are made here: that diseases as such do not exist
and that medicine is not a pure science; hence that medical thinking is different from legal or
lay thinking.
Even although a disease condition does exist, diseases per se do not exist in a state of
nature. As technology exposes them to scrutiny, they are seen to evolve14 and change form and
manifestation. Names and manifestations of diseases are man-made. As diseases they are
didactic constructions of biomedicine for use among practitioners. By the term disease we
mean a name that encompasses signs, symptoms and conditions as well as a dynamic condition
specific to the patient. When talking about the risks involved in the treatment of a specific
disease condition, the multiple variables in the equation need to be reduced by considering
those variables as specific to the particular patient.15
11
Teff, H Reasonable Care: legal perspectives on the Doctor-Patient Relationship. 1994. Oxford University
Press. Oxford. 3. See also Re S (Adult: refusal of treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 806, in which a caesarean section
was performed contrary to the patient's wishes and religious convictions. This was an unfortunate case on a
position which is no longer the law in England, as the Court of Appeal confirmed in St George's Healthcare
NHS Trust v S, The Times, 8 May 1998.
12 Teff 10-12.
13 Ct". Chapter 5 on the expert.
14
Zajicek, G. 'Normative Medicine' (1995) 45 Medical Hypotheses 331-334, 331. In the context of psychiatric
illness, see also Thomas Szasz 'Diagnoses are not Diseases' (1991) 338 Lancet 1574.
15 This forms an initial argument for patient-centric legal tests based on the modus operandi of the doctor; what
is described here as the generic informed consent scenario.
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This underlines the importance of communication and of nomenclature when dealing
with a patient. The lay person cannot see medical issues in the same way as can the
endogenous practitioner or, as Cohen and Schnelle put it, 'he looks, but he does not see.'16 This
is because of the specific thought style of the thought-collective of practitioners.17
Medicine is largely dependent on accurate communication both between doctor and
patient and among medical colleagues, because perceiving will always be a directed activity.
Fleck argued that language goes beyond communicability; he said, 'that which I express is
always different from that which I think. In the same way, that which is understood is always
different from what I have said.'18 Science has the task of simplifying and generalising to
achieve comprehension.19 This is of crucial importance when it comes to communication of
those medical facts which form the basis of the information required for true consent and any
sine qua non legal test.20 It is also important when it comes to the plaintiff reporting to a court
what was said in the exchange between doctor and patient - which forms the subject of a legal
dispute involving consent and information on risks and alternatives.
What is required is the extraction of meaning from the information present. In the
context of the clinical encounter, the term information must be extended to include the results
of intuition and experience; the intention being to turn 'informed consent' into 'understood
consent'.
16
R S Cohen & T Schnelle (Eds.). Cognition and Fact: Materials on Ludwig Heck. xxi.
17
A term coined by Ludwig Fleck.
18 Cohen & Schnelle xxviii. See also Dieter Wittich 'On Ludwig Heck's Use of Social Categories in
Knowledge' in Cohen & Schnelle 317 et seq.
19 Communication and understanding will prove pivotal in the informed consent case. The medical practitioner
has the task of translating and communicating medical information which forms the basis of the patient's
decision whether or not to undergo the treatment proposed. The patient must then communicate this choice to
the doctor. This is not usually a problematic stage of the process unless, for example, the patient is aphasic
(though not sufficiently so as to be regarded mentally incompetent and, hence, excluded from consideration by
this thesis) and has a condition common among aphasics in which 'yes' and 'no' answers are at times reversed.
In such a circumstance, a speech therapist would be needed to serve as an interface between doctor and patient.
This is an extreme example of an everyday situation not unknown to the NHS. In the context of language
translation, it has been recognised that inadequate resources have been 'devoted to communication and
information services' and that this leads to a 'much impaired service for patients from minority ethnic groups.'
Watt I S, Howell D & Lo L, 'The health care experience and health behaviour of the Chinese: a survey based in
Hull.' (1993) 15 Journal ofPublic Health Medicine 129-136 cited in British Medical Journal (Editorial) 1998;
316: 1476-1480 (16 May).
20 Cf. Chapter 4 on Causation and Chapter 3 on The Consensual Patient.
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2.4. Patient Thinking
Patient thinking refers to the patient's attitude or state of mind: that of a person of inferior
medical knowledge and skill to the practitioner who acts in a system of health care
characterised by bureaucracy. One of the demands of the Patients' Movement has been that of
control of treatment.21 This occurs inter alia at the point of consent. The patient's case is that
the profession expects consent to be granted unquestioningly and on the advice of the doctor
because it is more a clerical task than an ethical demand. The argument would go on to assert
that with a particular piece of information, consent would have been refused.22
These demands have been attacked by professional bodies on the grounds that patients
do not want the responsibility, that they do not understand the medicine involved and that
explaining would take too much time. These criticisms and their answers are additional factors
highlighting the importance of communication between doctor and patient of risks, alternatives
and recommendations prior to both consent and to treatment.
It is in this context - differences between legal, lay and medical thinking - that one can
look more critically at the story that gave rise to the case of Reibl v Hughes23 in Canada. As
already mentioned, Canada was the first common law jurisdiction outside of America to take
the doctrine on board. In the report of the case, Reibl v Hughes contained excerpts of the
dialogue between legal counsel and both plaintiff and defendant. That dialogue highlights the
importance of accurate communication between patient and medical practitioner.
Reibl v Hughes concerned the alleged omission by a neurosurgeon, to warn his patient
that surgery to remedy an occluded artery could, in ten per cent of cases, result in a stroke,
regardless of the competence of the surgical technique. Ironically, Mr Reibl had been advised
that surgery was indicated to prevent a stroke in later life. Of importance is that it was not
alleged that the surgery had been performed negligently. The pleadings alleged that negligence
comprised the failure to inform of the risk which eventuated. This comprised an ideal platform
21
Watkins, S. Medicine and Labour. 1987. Lawrence and Wishart. London. 160-161.
22 Cf. Chapter 4 on causation, especially on legal or hypothetical causation and on hindsight.
23
(1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1.
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for the Court to employ a different test for disclosure cases from that employed in negligence
simpliciter cases, which it did, so marking a contrast with British jurisdictions.
Several elements both complicated matters for the court and serve to illustrate the
difficulties encountered in disclosure cases. These difficulties have to do with the respective
memories of the litigating parties. Communication between doctor and patient usually involves
using lay terms to describe symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis. Mr Reibl's case was further
complicated by the fact that he was of Hungarian extraction and did not speak or understand
English very well. This in itself meant that what the surgeon had said to Mr Reibl was not
necessarily that which was understood by Mr Reibl.
The case serves as an example of failure of communication between doctor and patient.
In evidence, Mr Reibl said that he did not know what a stroke was; it had been explained to him
in terms of falling on his nose. Any explanations given to Mr Reibl were not understood as
explanations of the risk of stroke inherent in the recommended surgery. Instead, they were
understood as warnings against leaving the condition untreated. This meant that Mr Reibl did
not benefit from information which would have changed his decision on whether to undergo
surgery at that time. Indeed, he gave evidence to the effect that had he known of the ten per
cent risk of stroke, he would not have had the treatment at that time because he was very close
to retiring on full pension.
Whether communication between doctor and patient comprises a legally adequate
warning is the question for the court which will be discussed in this thesis. Courts in each
jurisdiction will have to ask whether the standard of care met with the standard set by judicial
tests in negligence or indeed tests for whether there had been an informed consent.
This thesis will be comparing the approaches of several common law jurisdictions in
broadly similar circumstances, though not in respect of different mother tongues. The case
highlights many of the issues with which this thesis is concerned. Though cases heard in other
jurisdictions have involved a lesser need for linguistic translation, they have involved the need
for translation from medical discourse into lay terms. In many of the cases which will be
discussed, Counsel will have called upon the court to adopt the approach of another analogous
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jurisdiction. The jurisdictions generally compared by judiciaries are those which are included
in this thesis.
2.5 The Law and the Rules
The law has various ways of looking at the medical practitioner according to the position in
which the law holds him: as defendant to an action, as an expert medical witness in a similar or
unrelated action or as an object to be regulated by legislature and judiciary. There are
differences between legal regulation and quasi-legal regulation by the legally enabled GMC.
However, both sets of regulations comprise a concrete body of rules, a mechanism to check
adherence and the power to impose some form of sanction on offenders; so both are consistent
with Durkheim's formulation that legitimate sanction is the primary index of regulation.
The General Medical Council can maintain an effective sanction by removing or
threatening to remove a practitioner's name from the register.24 This is by virtue of the 1983
Act rather than by virtue of keeping the register; the act delegates the power of sanction to a
legally enabled authority. The two have analogous systems of contesting and arguing the matter
in the form of tribunal or court proceedings, which involve witnesses and representation. These
forms may be considered under the genus regulation but will be looked at severally in order to
isolate the form of legal regulation with which this thesis will go on to deal.
Tensions arise in medical practice from a demand for occupational skills from a
heterogeneous consumer group which is both dependant and exploitable. This is because of the
monopoly of knowledge held by doctors and the demand for care expressed by patient-
consumers. These conditions developed in England in the second half of the nineteenth century
in association with an increase in the market power of the middle class.23 As this middle class
began to sponsor more recruits to the profession, the producer-consumer relationship became a
more fiduciary one, initiated by the ailing client and terminated by the healing professional. At
this point a modern ethics arose, which was derived from beliefs internal to the association.
24
As they are empowered to do by the Medical Act 1983.
25 Johnson 52.
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This association had the twin collegiate functions of defining standards of conduct and of
developing homogeneity in practice.
An altruistic professional identity is required in the perception of both the professional
person and the public. Durkheim argued that no social activity can do without moral discipline
and in the cohesive group context this often takes the form of a code, which has the function of
protecting collective interests.26 Such codified conduct is ostensibly more about expertise than
about commercial interest, yet it remains tainted by the latter. Such guidelines serve as
cohesive agents; the necessity for this cohesion is proportional to the size of the group.27
The General Medical Council is responsible to the Privy Council for the registration of
28
practitioners who are defined as those who appear as such in the register of the GMC. There
have been various Medical Acts in England,29 but the most important in this context is the 1983
act, which concerns the composition and functions of the GMC. It consolidates and in part
repeals the others such that it is currently the most important. In the context of a National
Health Service and state control, if a practitioner is not on the Register, he or she cannot
practice with the NHS.30 In terms of education, the GMC undertakes inspection of curricula
and recognition of qualifications according to requirements, which are contained in the Medical
Act 1983.31
The GMC was formerly not concerned with medical negligence per se unless standards
fell low enough to bring the profession into disrepute,32 in which case the conduct in question
would have to be considered 'disgraceful or dishonourable by a doctor's professional brethren
26 Durkheim 14-15.
27 In medicine this amounts to a caring profession caring for a profession and has the function of confronting
the individual doctor with aims which are not necessarily his own.
28
Jackson, Rupert M. & Powell, John L. Jackson and Powell on Professional Negligence (3ed). London.
Sweet & Maxwell. 1992. 447. However, in England it is not necessary to be qualified with, educated by or
registered with GMC to practice - unlike analogous restrictions placed on dentists and vets.
29
1950, 1978, 1983.
30 This also applies, by reciprocal arrangements, to practitioners from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and
South Africa practising in the United Kingdom, so accepting qualifications in those states as analogous.
31 See Hall, O. 'The Internal Organisation of the Medical Profession' (1946) 22 Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science.
32 Gee, D J & Mason, J K The Courts and The Doctor. 1990. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 174.
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of good repute and competency'.33 This indicates that the professional standard is both a legal
and a professional one.34 Now, however, the GMC has an explicit concern with medical
negligence as stipulated in the Medical Professional Performance Act 1995.
The disciplinary ambit of the GMC on serious professional misconduct is both
punitive and intended to protect the public. Sanctions available to the GMC are very real to the
practitioner because imposition could end a career.35 The GMC does not list the main
categories of Professional Misconduct36 but they remain theoretically limitless. The Ethical
Committee of the British Medical Association also has an interest in codifying,37 publicising
and enforcing ethical considerations but it remains a trade union responsible for the interests of
its members and as such can neither enforce ethical codes nor expel members.
It would appear, therefore, that the medical profession in Great Britain has the
statutory authority to regulate itself. It will become apparent in Chapter 3 that this self
regulation has judicial sanction to some extent through the power and authority of the Bolam
test. This judicial test for negligence assesses the practitioner's conduct relative to the conduct
of other similarly qualified medical practitioners, as attested to in the evidence.38 This thesis
will go on to note that other jurisdictions covered use a Bolam-style test in respect of
negligence simpliciter, but a different test in respect of disclosure cases. British judiciaries, on
the other hand, use the same test in both types of case. It will be argued, therefore, that Britain
is the most paternalistic of the jurisdictions under discussion and that this paternalism is due to
the fact that the medical profession has been able to regulate itself. The one caveat to this
argument is that British courts retain the authority to assess the evidence given in terms of
reasonableness.36 This thesis will then go on to argue that British judicial tests allow more
scope for self-regulation than do tests in other jurisdictions.
33 GMC. Professional Conduct and Discipline: Fitness to Practice. 1987. Paragraph 6.
34 In informed consent cases in Britain. Cf. Chapter 4.
35 Sanctions may involve removal from the register, postponement of registration or probationary registration.
j6 Professional misconduct can be considered as that which amounts to abuses of the physician's privileges and
training. See J K Mason 'Legal Aspects of Medical Practice' in Forensic Medicine for Lawyers. 436.
37 For example, BMA. Medical Ethics Today. 1993.
38 Cf. 5.3.3. which will consider the British medical profession as something of a 'mutual protection society.'
,9 Cf. 3.2.1., 3.3.4., 3.3.5., 4.3., 4.4. and, most importantly, 5.4.4. This re-emphasised in the conclusion to this
thesis in 7.2.5. and 7.3.
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2.6. Judicial Reflections on theDoctor-Patient Relationship
Sidaway40 and indeed all other cases of this type, simply accepted the relationship between
doctor and patient as sufficiently proximate to found a duty of care.41 English and Scottish42
courts do not dispute whether a duty of care exists;43 but they do test the standard of care within
that general duty differently to other jurisdictions. Conversely, in Canada in Arndt v Smith44 the
British Columbia Court of Appeal pointed out that in Hopp v Lepp43 Laskin CJC had adopted a
different test for informed consent from that taken up in Sidaway. This was based on the
'[adoption of] a test based on a different view of the relationship of doctor and patient'. It is
this relationship of unequal power and knowledge that gives rise to a common law duty of care
or indeed to fiduciary duties in Canada.
Whereas Lord Scarman based this relationship on the doctor's duty of care giving rise
to corresponding patient rights, Appeal Judge Lambert in Arndt v Smith noted that in Hopp v
Lepp Laskin CJC had relied on Kenny v Lockwood46 and Halushka v University of
Saskatchewan.41 In Arndt v Smith it was held that 'disclosure obligations of a doctor to a patient
were considered to flow from a fiduciary relationship between the doctor and the patient.'48
40
Sidaway v Betlilem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 643 (HL), 649 where Lord Scarman outlined
the Bolam test. Cf. Chapters 1 and 2.
41 Cf. 2.3. and Chapters 1 and 3 generally on the standard of care.
42 Consider Gordon v Wilson 1992 SLT 849, Moyes v Lothian Health Board 1990 SLT 444, Jones v
Lanarkshire Health Board 1990 SLT 19.
43
However, courts have had to consider he matter of a duty of care in the medical context. In Goodwill v
British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996] 2 All ER 161 it was held that a surgeon has no duty of care to an
unspecified woman who may, at some time in the future, rely on his expertise. This case concerned pregnancy
following failed vasectomy done before the man and woman had met. For a comprehensive, if non-medical,
discussion by the House of Lords on the duty of care in the English law of torts from the case law on the
subject, consider, inter alia, Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, Dorset Yacht Co. v Home Office [1970]
AC 1004 and Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman and Others [1990] 2 AC 605.
44
[1995] 7 Med LR 108, 113 and 116 (col. ii).
45
(1986) 112 DLR (3d) 67, [1980] 2 SCR 192, 210.
46
[1932] 1 DLR 507 (Ont. CA).
47
(1965) 53 DLR (2d) 436.
48 Arndt v Smith [1995] 7 Med LR 108, 113 (col. ii). On the fiduciary nature of the relationship between doctor
and patient, consider Mclnerney v MacDonald [1992] 2 SCR 138; Norberg v Wynrib [1992] 2 SCR 226;
Goodman Estate v Geffen [1991] 2 SCR 353 (at 370 on categories of influence of a doctor on a patient). On
causation principles and their application in fiduciary relationships see Kenny v Lockwood [1932] 1 DLR 507
and Halushka v University ofSaskatchewan 53 DLR (2d) 436.
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It was held that in the area of communication of risks, a relationship is fiduciary where
it 'has the characteristics of such a relationship: reliance, vulnerability, and trust, on the part of
the patient, and skill, responsibility, and power on the part of the doctor.'49 Lambert JA then
said,
'The conclusion which seems to me to follow from those two points is that the duty of
disclosure of material risks or of special or unusual risks is not like an ordinary duty of
care in negligence, because it is not set by the standard of the reasonable medical
practitioner, but is more similar to a fiduciary duty of disclosure, where the standard is
set by utmost good faith in the discharge of an obligation by a person in the position of
power and control to a person who is vulnerable, in a position of dependency, and is
known by the doctor to be in a position of reliance.'
This is so because of the court's recognition that the verbal exchange between doctor and
patient in this fiduciary relationship hinges entirely on the quality of communication, as
demonstrated in the case of Reibl v Hughes.
Having found that the basis of the relationship between what become the litigating
parties is fiduciary in nature, the court has a specific legal and procedural mechanism with
which to found liability.50 This could have an effect on the test for causation insofar as the
same principles applicable to causation in a fiduciary relationship will be applicable when
considering informed consent.51 On communication, the decision in Hopp v Lepp set the
standard in Canada and rests its reasoning on the fiduciary nature of the relationship.52
These cases were something of an advance on Reibl v Hughes in which Chief Justice
Laskin had said merely that it was,
'undoubted that the relationship between surgeon and patient gives rise to a duty of the
surgeon to make disclosure to the patient of what I would call all material risks attending
the surgery which is recommended.'53
49
Ibid. 116 (Col. ii).
50 The same is true of a duty of care in negligence in which precedent will determine what tests are to be
applied once it has been found that one party owed the other a duty of care.
51 Ibid. 116 (Col. i). See also categories of influence discussed by Madam Justice Wilson in Goodman Estate v
Geffen [1991] 2 SCR 353. Cf. Chapter 4 on Causation.
52
Citing Kenny v Lockwood, Halushka v University ofSaskatchewan, Mclnerney v MacDonald and Norberg v
Winrib.
53
(1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1,5.
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He then debated materiality and the scope of that duty of care according to tort principles.
Where the advance came was is in the court's ability to consider the scope of that duty relative
to a relationship, which the court itself held to be fiduciary.54 These cases set out the basic
principles on which the legal responsibility for failure to warn a patient of material risks lies. It
is a matter of policy to characterise the relationship in that way, so making it easier for the court
to move in the direction in which this thesis will show it to have moved.
Australian courts also considered whether the relationship is a fiduciary one. In Rogers
v Whitaker the court held that there was, in the context of the relationship between doctor and
patient, a duty to warn of inherent dangers in the proposed treatment and that there was no
'dispute as to the existence of a duty of care on the part of the appellant to the respondent'.55
The court did this on the basis of proximity and the law of torts. The court went on to consider
the scope of that duty, without specifically placing it in the context of equity as a fiduciary
duty. Breen v Williams,56 however, did consider the nature of the relationship. The case
involved access to medical records. It was submitted that this right was based variously on
contract, property and a fiduciary duty. It was held, on appeal, that none of these bases gave
any support to the appellant's claim for access to medical records.
Brennan CJ, in arguing the point, noted that fiduciary duties arise either from agency57
or from 'a relationship of ascendancy or influence by one party over another, or dependence or
trust on the part of that other',38 but that these categories may overlap.59 He went on to say, 'It
is erroneous to regard the duty owed by a fiduciary to his beneficiary as attaching to every
aspect of the fiduciary's conduct, however irrelevant that conduct may be to the agency or
relationship that is the source of fiduciary duty.' Considering what he termed 'the nature of the
doctor-patient relationship', he held that it,
'is one where the doctor acquires an ascendancy over the patient and the patient is in a
position of reposing trust in the doctor. Such a relationship casts upon the doctor the
onus of proving that any gift received from the patient was given free from the influence
34 This will be considered in Chapters 3 and 6.
55
[1993] 4 Med LR 79, [1992] ALJR 47.
56
See [1995] 6 Med LR 385, 399 col. (i) et seq. For the judgement of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
The patient was not allowed access to her medical records based on contract, human rights, fiduciary duty or
equity. In addition, her appeal was dismissed by the High Court of Australia F.C. 96/025. LEXIS.
57
Drawing on Birtchnell v Equity Trustees, Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1929) 42 CLR 384, 408- 409.
58
Drawing on Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 134-135.
59
Considering by way of example United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 1, 12-
13.
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which the relationship produces.60 But in this case the doctor has received no gift; he
has taken no step to procure an advantage for himself. Nor has he taken any advantage
of his ascendancy over his patient or of her trust in him.'61
In Canada, the Supreme Court in Mclnerney v MacDonald62 had held that the fiduciary
duty gives rise to a duty to produce medical records on demand. Brennan CJ noted that the
notion of the fiduciary duty in Canada was quite different from that in the United Kingdom63
and in Australia. This decision of the Australian High Court shows two things. Firstly, it
demonstrates a greater proximity of Australian civil law to English law than that of Canadian to
English law. Secondly, it casts the Canadian dicta articulated relative to the fiduciary duty in
Arndt v Smith and Hopp v Lepp in a starkly policy-guided light. Characterising the relationship
as a fiduciary one is the first step to reforming the law in a direction which the judiciary
considered desirable.
The South African position is broadly similar to that in England on this point although
Castell v DeGreef4 did remove the matter from the realm of negligence by distinguishing the
South African position from that in England and Australia. The Supreme Court held that in
such matters the defence of volenti nonfit iniuria was available which, if proven, 'would justify
an otherwise wrongful delictual act.' This is available in the law of delict in South Africa and,
volenti being proven, the defender will be held to have fulfilled the duty of care.
This methodology changed the law in South Africa on the ground of policy by
removing the issue from the confines of negligence and allowing the court to establish consent
criteria through the volenti mechanism.65 Because this case removed the matter from the
context of negligence, the issue of a proximate or even a fiduciary relationship founding a duty
of care did not arise. This is because information given is a question of fact and evidence.
However, Ackerman J did say that 'on either approach the same, or virtually identical, matters
of legal policy are involved'.66 He drew on the Australian case of F v R67 in which it was
60
Again from Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113, 134.
61 LEXIS report, point 15 of the High Court of Australia judgement per Brennan CJ.
62
(1992) 93 DLR (4th) 415, 424.
63
R v Mid-Glamorgan FHSA; Ex parte Martin, [1995] 1 WLR 110.
64
1994 (4) SA 408, 420H read with 423C-D.
65
1.2.2.4. considers the removal of informed consent matters from negligence in South Africa.
66 423C-D.
67
(1983) 33 SASR 189.
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observed that the scope of the doctor's duty involved two values which may conflict: the duty
of the doctor and the right of the patient.
However the relationship between doctor and patient is judicially viewed, the
jurisdictions have several points in common. All view the relationship as an unequal one; all
consider that the doctor has a duty to give information to the patient on that patient's condition
and treatment and all implicitly recognise that the accuracy of communication becomes the
point of dispute between the litigating parties. It follows, therefore, that accurate
communication is central to redressing the imbalances within the doctor-patient relationship. It
is perhaps for this reason that the issue of informed consent has been dominated by rights
discourse.68
2.7. Conclusion: Professional Responsibility
This chapter has set out to investigate the different perspectives from which doctor and patient
will approach the consultation. By implication, accurate communication between the parties
will have emerged as being of central importance. Having situated informed consent cases for
the most part in negligence, and having considered some of the communication difficulties
which are faced in the doctor-patient relationship which gives rise to a duty of care, it will be
possible in the next chapter, to use the framework of the law of torts or delict to consider the
professional responsibility of doctors and the standard of care.
This is another of the points at which legal policy is made through judicial definitions
of the scope of the duty of care.69 Now that it has been established it is possible to focus on the
following question: in the context of the informed consent scenario sketched at the beginning of
this Chapter, and with regard to the facts of the case before the court, what is the scope of the
duty of care owed by the medical practitioner to the patient? This is the fundamental question
of the standard of care.
68 Cf. 6.3.1.
69 As seen in the Introduction to this thesis in which the nature of the doctor-patient relationship (in the eyes of
the court) was discussed and as will be seen in the next chapter on the consensual patient.
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As the next chapter will go on to explain, this standard was set out in the case law in
each jurisdiction under discussion. In England, the case of Bolam v Friern Hospital
Management Committee70 was upheld by Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors71 as
setting out the standard of care in respect of negligence simpliciter as well as negligence based
on the omission to disclose a particular piece of information. The Bolam standard was itself a
rewording of the test set out in Hunter v Hanley12 in Scotland. Bolam and in Hunter v Hanley
were adopted together as expressive of the standard of care in medical negligence in the case of
Moyes v Lothian Health Board.12 At this stage two elements are important: the first is that the
same standard is to be used in respect of negligence simpliciter as should be employed in
respect of information disclosure. The second is that the standard itself is such that the medical
practitioner's conduct is assessed relative to his or her peers.
It is this standard that marks British judicial tests as different from those employed
elsewhere. In Canada, for example, the standard of care in respect of information disclosure is
that set out in Reibl v Hughes1'' while the standard of care in respect of negligence simpliciter
remains analogous to that set out in Bolam. The standard of care in respect of cases which have
to do with information disclosure is based on the information that the reasonable person in the
particular patient's position would require. It a matter of considering the case from an
'apparent subjective' or 'modified objective' point of view. A similar position is in evidence in
Australia. There the method of assessment of information disclosure which was adopted by the
court in Rogers v Whitaker73 was based on what the reasonable patient in this patient's position
would require or the information that could be reasonably be expected of the medical
practitioner. In the South African case of Castell v De Greef,16 the court used the test which
had been expressed in Rogers v Whitaker. What is noteworthy is that these latter three cases
employed a different test for the standard of care in negligence simpliciter from that employed
in negligence based on information disclosure.77 These cases, and those which preceded and
70
[1957] 2 All ER 118, 121.
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[1985] 1 All ER 643 HL.
72 1955 SC 200, 1955 SLT 213.
73 1990 SLT 444, [1990] 1 Med LR 463.
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(1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1.
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[1993] 4 Med LR 79.
76 1994 (4) SA 408.
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Cf. 3.2. on the fact that British jurisdictions employ the same test for both categories of negligence.
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followed them, will be discussed more fully in the next chapter which will examine the
standard of care in greater detail.
That an act or omission is wrongful presupposes a correct form of behaviour. Once the
fact of the doctor-patient relationship has been established, the court determines whether the
conduct of the defender fell short of the requisite standard of care. Here, as with the causation
inquiry, there is a two-stage test. This comprises the assessment of the duty of care and then of
the matter of its breach. It is at this point that there is a divergence of approaches in the
jurisdictions under discussion. Only after this inquiry has yielded a result to the effect that
there was a duty of care and that that duty was breached by the defendant's conduct, will it be
relevant or necessary to establish a causal link between this negligence and the plaintiffs
injury.78 In all of these matters the court will remain the final arbiter of whether the requisite
standard has been met, whatever the jurisdiction. This means that while the evidence of experts
will be important to the court in assessing the facts, that evidence will be weighted by the court
in different ways depending on the jurisdiction.79 This is a matter of judicial policy, but
regardless of the policy formulated, it is for the court to apply that policy through their own
assessment of the evidence before them.
Having found that a duty of care exists between the medical practitioner and the
patient, it is now possible to consider the scope of that duty of care in the context of negligence
and, more specifically, in the context of those negligence cases which are based on an omission
to disclose information, and hence on a lack of informed consent.
It has been argued on the basis of judicial assessment of the matter that the proper place
for informed consent litigation remains with the tort or delict of negligence. This applies with
the exception of cases of fraud or misrepresentation and, of course, the South African position.
78
MacFarlane P. Health Law - Commentary and Materials. The Federation Press, NSW, 1993:86. It would be
rare in cases of medical negligence based on alleged lack of informed consent to come across a resultant injury
which was unforseeable. Were that to be the case, however, it would be considered an 'act of God' which, in
the law of torts, is a plea of innocence on the ground that the injury was beyond the control of the defender.
This is more a denial of liability than a defence and only operates where res ipsa loquitur has been pleaded.
However, because this is no longer likely to be the case (claiming inevitable accident as a defence or as a
rebuttal of the of the presumption of negligence presupposed in res ipsa loquitur) it is considered that acts of
God are not material to informed consent.
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Citing Sidaway, Markesenis & Deacon have said that it could be argued that, 'the differences
between battery and negligence ... have led to the policy decision to restrict the use of the tort of
battery to the most opprobrious interferences with one's body, even though these policy reasons
are rarely admitted in the open.'80 A similar policy argument can be made on the court's
exclusion of the tort of battery in Reibl v Hughes.
With the claim based in negligence, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish
the facta probanda of such an action. It has also been argued that three steps in judicial policy¬
making have been in evidence so far. The first was seen in the Introduction, in which the nature
of the doctor patient relationship is judicially determined. That determination forms a
cornerstone on which to build the nature of the duty of care in any negligence action. The
simple act of holding that a duty of care exists allows the case to proceed to the next element of
proof. To hold otherwise would render the matter stillborn.81
The second step involves the use of the delict or tort of negligence which ensures that
the burden of proof remains on the pursuer82 - as opposed to using the torts of assault and
battery, the criminal law or breach of a fiduciary relationship. This ensures that there is some
equilibrium maintained and that the court has many opportunities in the legal process to keep its
finger on the pulse and to influence the direction of the case through the acceptance or rejection
of expert evidence.83 Judicial determination and weighting of evidence in terms of its
persuasiveness is a policy-guided activity and places the court as arbiter in a very powerful
though unenviable position to mediate between parties' interests and to determine outcomes on
the basis of precedence, policy and persuasion.
The third step might be described as the insurance policy which insures the policy¬
making power of the court. This step comprises the court setting itself up as arbiter in a move
79
This will be more fully discussed in Chapter 4.
80
247, citing Sidaway [1984] 1 All ER 1018, 1026 and Chatterton v Gerson [1981] 1 QB 432 per Bristow J.
81
As happened in a case in which it was held that no duty of care was owed by a doctor to a job applicant.
See Clare Dyer, 'Doctor owed no duty of care to job applicant', British Medical Journal 1998; 316: 1037 (4
April).
82 With the possible exception of instances in which res ipsa loquitur is applicable.
83 Cf. Chapter 6.
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which will serve to insulate the other, chronologically appearing, policy moves which will be
encountered in subsequent chapters. The court as arbiter of medical and lay evidence will
emerge as particularly important in respect of British jurisdictions.84 The next obviously policy-
guided step, for example, is the court's decision on whether a duty of care exists in the
circumstances of a particular case and indeed what standard should be achieved by the exercise
of that duty.




3.1 Duty and Information: Informed Consent Doctrine
3.1.1. Context
Once it is established that a duty of care both exists and encompasses the provision to the patient
of information on risks and alternatives to the proposed treatment, the question before the court
is how much and what sort of information is required? This is a question of the scope of the
duty of care. The last chapter touched on the matter of the standard of care as an important
device in the limiting of liability. This chapter will discuss judicial tests for the standard of that
care.
It is clear at this stage that the doctor-patient relationship gives rise to a duty of care and
that injury allegedly attributable to lack of information is argued in negligence.1 Disclosure
cases have to do with the communication of information and, hence, whether that information
was material to the decision of a plaintiff-patient to undergo treatment. How courts define and
apply tests for materiality is pivotal to the inquiry and dovetails with the inquiry into legal
causation.2 As in the previous chapter, one might begin with Canada, while at the same time
bearing in mind that it is the exception that proves the rule that 'proximity' is a limiting device
in the law of torts.3
The doctor-patient relationship is considered fiduciary in Canada. This casts the scope
of information required in terms of trust or confidence; it is a matter of particular concern when
1
With the exception of South Africa where the volenti defence removes the matter from the confines of
negligence (even though judgement will ultimately be expressed in negligence terms). This is discussed in the
current chapter as well as in Chapter 4 on Causation.
2
This is because the sine qua non test for legal causation has to do with the perception - of patient or
practitioner - of the materiality of the risk which eventuated and caused injury.
Canadian courts still use proximity, but consider the proximity between doctor and patient to give rise to a
fiduciary duty.
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the relationship between the parties has the potential for undue influence.4 Because of the
expertise and superior knowledge of the medical practitioner, such a relationship was held to
exist between doctor and patient in Arndt v Smith? Lambert JA categorised informed consent
cases as those based on a fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient. He drew on
Halushkci v University of Saskatchewan6 and Kenny v Lockwood 7 to make that assertion. He
went on to draw the conclusion that,
'
... the duty of disclosure of material risks or of special or unusual risks is not like an
ordinary duty of care in negligence, because it is not set by the standard of a reasonable
medical practitioner, but is more similar to a fiduciary duty of disclosure, where the
standard is set by utmost good faith in the discharge of an obligation by a person in the
position of power and control to a person who is vulnerable, in a position of
dependency, and is known by the doctor to be in a position of reliance.'8
This judgement placed the informed consent scenario in the context of power and information -
power over information and communication of information. It also elaborated upon the policy
device of 'proximity'.
In Reibl v Hughes the Supreme Court of Canada had noted that, 'the relationship
between surgeon an patient gives rise to a duty of the surgeon to make disclosure to the patient
of what I would call all material risks attending the surgery that is recommended.'9 The court
based its rationale on proximity without needing to specify the constitution of that proximity.
Arndt v Smith presented a new gloss on the informed consent issue because the vast
majority of cases being considered here, including those which were heard in Canada before
Arndt v Smith, were argued as 'proximity' cases. As such it is deemed by the law of torts that
the relationship between doctor and patient is sufficiently proximate to found a duty of care of a
raised standard. The question before the courts concerns the precise content of the duty of care
in respect of information disclosure.
The Australian courts, on the other hand, have considered the relationship not as
4
Such as mother and daughter in Lanarkshire Loans Ltd v Black [1934] 1 KB 380, or a member of a religious
order and their superior in Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145.
5
[1996] 7 Med LR 108, 113-114.
6
[1965] 53 DLR (2d) 436.
7
[1932] 1 DLR 507 (Ont. CJ).
8 Arndt v Smith [1995] 7 Med LR 108, 113.
9
Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1, 5.
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fiduciary, but rather as proximate enough to found a duty of care."' In Rogers v Whitaker Mason
CJ said, 'The law imposes on a medical practitioner a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care
in the provision of professional advice and treatment.'11 The court in Australia considered the
fiduciary relationship in relation to the scope of the duty of care in Hospital Products Ltd v
United States Surgical CorporationMason J, as he then was, said, 'it is now acknowledged
generally that the scope of the fiduciary duty must be moulded according to the nature of the
relationship and the facts of the case.'
3.1.2. Content
A patient's consent to a procedure is necessary for the medical practitioner's actions to be legal,
but different jurisdictions interpret the so-called 'transatlantic doctrine of informed consent'
differently. As describing the standard of care, the doctrine has been held in cases such as
Rogers v Whitaker in Australia13 and Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital in England14 to be
meaningless or at least inapplicable. At the same time the term is used by courts to uphold the
ethical principle of self-determination which underlies the legal principle of consent to medical
treatment. The doctrine came from America and has been accepted to a degree in South Africa,
Canada and Australia, though not in either England or Scotland.
At the outset it must be stressed that the doctrine of informed consent is an American
jurisprudential concept. Thus, while other jurisdictions may not adopt it per se, they may adapt
it or indeed reject it. Even so, rejection of the doctrine does not in itself mean that courts in a
particular jurisdiction are abandoning the consent principles embodied by the doctrine; it does
not mean that there is, therefore, no judicial policy on matters of medical negligence which are
based on information and consent. What can be said is that those jurisdictions which accept the
doctrine may be said to have adopted a policy favourable to the patient while others tend to
favour the medical practitioner.
10
Breen v Williams [1995] Med LR 385.
"
Rogers v Whitaker [1994] 4 Med LR 79, 80.
12
(1984) 156 CLR 41, 73 per Gibbs CJ, and 102.
13
Rogers v Whitaker (1992)109 ALR 625, 633, [1993] 4 Med LR 79, 83 in which Mason, CJ said that 'nothing
is to be gained by reiterating... the oft-used and somewhat amorphous phrase "informed consent".' Objection
was to the terms or doctrine rather than to its principles, which were adopted in this case.
14
Sidaway v Board ofGovernors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and others [1984] 1 QB 493 [1984] 1 1018 CA,
[1985] AC 871, [1985] 2 WLR 480 (HL), [1985] 1 All ER 643.
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This position is in flux insofar as one can detect in medical practice a move away from
the prior, tacit or general consent described by Classic Liberalism to a more specific consent for
each procedure as part of a duty of information.15 Indeed, Lord Caplan said in Moyes v Lothian
Health Board,16
'The risks inherent in a particular operation or procedure, the manner in which the
operation may affect or damage a particular patient, the medical need for the operation
and the ability of the patient to absorb information about his situation without adding
damage to his health, are all matters where the doctor, with his own clinical experience
and the benefit of the experience of other practitioners, is best able to form a judgement
as to what the patient can safely be told in the exercise of medical care.'
Consent to medical interventions entails a voluntary decision made by a competent
person on the basis of adequate information. The question of adequacy of information given is
moot in any jurisdiction and has to do with what sort of test is used by the court as well as with
the court's definition of materiality.17 If consent cannot be completely valid in the absence of
18information which is adequate to found understanding on the part of the patient, then the term
'informed consent' would appear redundant or self-justifying. The rationale here is that while
consent will remain compulsory for medical procedures, it cannot be true consent if it is not
informed.19 This rationale is less apposite when one considers that informed consent is a
doctrine rather than merely a descriptive tautology.
This duty to inform is subject to certain exceptions20 such as 'necessity',21 which is
always open to the practitioner and is assessed in England and Wales according to the Bolam
15 This is in part due to the increasing complexity of medical procedures.
16




Other forms of consent are possible, such as implied, tacit or prior-general consent. Implied consent, too,
requires full prior knowledge and covers circumstances of 'necessity'. See Syvil Lloyd-Morris, 'The Age of
Consent' (1991)141 New Law Journal 426.
19
With the exception of children and the mentally incompetent; categories excluded from this thesis.
20
Examples are emergency, the only course open (to which the patient could answer that he or she would have
wanted a second opinion), or that there is no chance of harm (this is unlikely to be the case factually but a
practitioner should be obliged either to refer the patient for a second opinion or simply to say that there is no
risk).
21
Generally, the requirements for a defence of necessity to succeed are that the patient is unconscious, has not
previously expressed any objection to the form of treatment proposed and that what is done could not
reasonably be delayed.
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test and in Scotland according to Hunter v Hanley12 - tests which favour the practices of the
medical profession over the desires of the patient. Although the point was not argued in Hunter,
it is also subject to 'therapeutic privilege'.23
The test for necessity needs to be objective and based on the standards of the medical
community because it is only that community which can answer the question of necessity as a
matter of medical fact.24 Naturally, the spectre of defensive medicine raises its head at this point
insofar as doctors would at times rather leave a patient untreated than treat that patient at the risk
of litigation in which the only available defence might be that of necessity.
In Re T,25 Lord Donaldson stated that 'the law requires that an adult patient who is
mentally and physically capable of exercising a choice must consent if medical treatment of him
is to be lawful.' Possibilities such as tortious liability are excluded as a result of a valid consent
having been given. The two component parts of the informed consent issue were succinctly
stated by Hoyt JA in the Canadian case of Kueper v McMullin:'6 was the risk one which ought to
have been disclosed to the patient and, if so, would a reasonable person, after having been fully
informed of the risk, have consented to the procedure? These questions relate to the materiality
of the information to the patient and to legal causation. "7
In Daniels v Burfield 28 in Australia, the plaintiff alleged that prior to the operation the
defendant 'failed to obtain the plaintiffs informed consent to if. The plaintiff's plea was that
he would not have had surgery had he been informed of the risk involved. However, he failed to
22 Cf. 3.2.
23 This is used as a counter-argument in cases in which failure to disclose is alleged, but it is constantly eroded
by the courts because it was not designed to be raised after the event or during litigation to excuse an oversight.
Rather, its purpose is to excuse the practitioner in cases where, objectively assessed, disclosure would have
been deleterious to the emotional state of the patient. It has been argued that a medical practitioner has a right
of non-disclosure vis-a-vis the patient which is based on the amount of knowledge and understanding about the
general nature of the procedure which the patient is capable of gaining. Accordingly, doctors need not warn of
everyday risks attendant to surgical procedures (at the one end of the scale) or (at the other) of procedures
which the particular patient is incapable of understanding. This is also tested objectively in Canada: see
Dickens B M Justice Beyond Orwell. 1985. Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc. Montreal. 259.
24
This means that at this stage of the inquiry, all jurisdictions effectively adopt a Bolam style test for necessity.
25
(adult)(refusal of treatment) [1992] 4 Med LR 649, [1992] 3 Med LR 306.
26
(1987) 30 DLR (4th) 408, 412.
"7
This depends on the type of testing used. The first question depends on the court's standards on disclosure,
the scope of the duty of care and on the test for materiality (See 3.3. below). The second question concerns
causation (see Chapter 4).
28 AUST SASC 1769.
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discharge the burden of proof of causation and his claim accordingly failed. Similarly, in
Kitchen v McMullin19 in Canada, the trial judge concluded that in this case even if the risk were
to have been disclosed, the plaintiff would still have given his consent because surgery was
necessary.
3.1.3. The Standard of CareWithin the Commonwealth
The standard of the legal duty of care vis-a-vis information in the United Kingdom is
based almost exclusively on medical opinion. It has been rejected in Canada, Australia and
South Africa and is in flux in the United Kingdom.30
Because informed consent criteria are imposed by the courts rather than by the
professional community, this imposition is often seen as an attack on doctors. Yet in the United
Kingdom the medical profession imposes these criteria on itself in the form of guidelines and
advice from professional associations other than the GMC.31 One of the far-reaching
implications for the autonomy of the medical profession is that health authorities can be subject
to judicial review and sanction with respect to the quality of doctor-patient communication.32
Commonwealth jurisdictions define informed consent the same way in which it was
defined in America.33 In Reibl v Hughes in Canada, Laskin CJC discussed the doctrine in terms
of liability for battery or in negligence, quoting the trial judge as saying that,
'the issue of "informed consent" can arise in both battery and negligence cases: with
respect to the former a lack of proper information communicated by the doctor to the
patient can vitiate an apparent consent, while with respect to the latter, failure to see that
the patient is properly advised can amount... to an act of negligence.'34
Laskin CJC went on to draw on Scloendorffv Society ofNew York Hospital35 and on Canterbury
29
(1990) 62 DLR (4th) 481, 490.
30 In Sidaway, only Lord Diplock accepted the Bolam principle without modification. All the other Law Lords,
while accepting it in principle, preferred a more patient-oriented test. See Chapter 6 on the Bolam standard
(particularly 6.3.2).
Issued by medical protection organisations and statutory bodies.
32
Kaufmann, Caroline L. 'Informed Consent and Patient Decision Making: Two Decades of Research' (1983)
17:21 Soc. Sci. Med. 1657-64, 1661.
33 Differences among jurisdictions emerge when it comes to the doctrine's application and adoption and
particularly the test for legal causation (Ch.4).
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v Spence36 so defining the doctrine as he used it.
Canterbury v Spence and Reibl v Hughes were both distinguished in Siclaway. Lord
Scarman noted that the appellant was 'in effect [invoking] the transatlantic doctrine of informed
consent',37 later noting that '[i]n Canada, in Reibl v Hughes ... Laskin CJC expressed broad
approval of the doctrine of informed consent as enunciated in Canterbury v Spence ... though it
would seem that approval of the doctrine was not necessary to a decision in that case.'38 More
to the point, Lord Diplock said,
'The juristic basis of the proposed situation which originates in certain state court
jurisdictions in the United States of America and has found some favour in modified
form by the Supreme Court of Canada appears to me, with great respect, to be contrary
to English law. Its foundation is the doctrine of "informed consent" which was
originally based on the assumption ... in Canterbury v Spence.'39
In Australia in Rogers v Whitaker40 the court considered Reibl v Hughes and Canterbury
v Spence; indeed Mason CJ noted that Lord Scarman had referred to the latter case in Sidaway.41
Similarly, in South Africa in Castell v DeGreef4' at first instance Scott J, drawing on Reibl v
Hughes and Canterbury v Spence said, '[Counsel for the plaintiff] invites me to adopt, if not in
its entirety, certain aspects of "informed consent".' However, he went on to note that '[t]he
House of Lords in the Sidaway case (Lord Scarman dissenting) declined to adopt the doctrine
and instead reaffirmed the "Bolam" test. In my view there can be no justification for adopting it
in our law.'43
Gradual acceptance of the doctrine in parts of the Commonwealth has latterly ushered in








Ibid., 894. Emphasis added. In support, Lord Bridge said (at 898), '... the decision mainly relied on to
establish a criterion of the doctor's duty to disclose the risks inherent in a proposed treatment which is
prescribed by the law and can be applied independently of any medical opinion or practice is that of ...
Canterbury v Spence.'
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(1992)109 ALR 625, 633, [1993] 4 Med LR 79.
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[1993] 4 Med LR 79, 82.
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(1993) 3 SA 501,518.
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This was, however, prior to Ackerman J's Appeal decision which overturned this part the decision of Scott J
in the court a quo and adapted the doctrine to the needs of South African law. Cf. 3.2.2.3. & 6.4.3.
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an informed consent is that true consent depends on an understood44 choice on the part of the
patient. The effect is to move away from the ambit of assault and to extend negligence principles
to include situations in which due care was exercised in the clinical procedure adopted, but in
which a medically acknowledged risk of harm eventuated. A plaintiff would succeed in a
negligence action by proving that the duty of care demanded the provision of information on a
particular risk, and that he would not have undergone the treatment which harmed him had he
known of and understood that risk.
The standard of the medical profession vis-a-vis the duty of information has been
rejected in Canada, as well as in Australia where 'the High Court of Australia clearly and
explicitly chose the patient-oriented "American" rule ..A43 The medical professional standard is
gradually able to support the plaintiffs case in England46 yet the doctrine continues to expand in
America and evolve in the Commonwealth in favour of the prudent or subjective patient.
McLean47 and Mason & McCall Smith48 doubt that the prudent patient test will come to the
United Kingdom 'in the foreseeable future', even though expansion still appears to be in that
general direction in England. This thesis argues in favour of the opposing position. If a patient
is to be warned of 'material risks', at this stage of the judicial inquiry matters boil down to what
sort of test is adopted for 'materiality'.
3.2. Differences between Britain and other Jurisdictions
It has already been stated that Courts in Britain use the tests set out in Bolam and in Hunter v
Hanley. The Bolam principle, as outlined with approval in Sidaway, 'may be formulated as a
rule that a doctor is not negligent if he acts in accordance with a practice adopted at the time as
proper by a responsible body of respectable medical opinion'.49 In Sidaway,50 Lord Diplock
noted,
'The Bolam test is far from new, its value is that it brings up to date and re-expresses in
the light of modern conditions in which the art of modern medicine is now practiced, an
ancient rule of common law. The original rule can be traced to the maxim spondet
44
See Lybert v Warrington Health Authority [1996] 7 Med LR 71 CA.
43
Don Chalmers & Robert Schwartz 'Rogers v Wliitaker and Informed Consent in Australia: a Fair Dinkum
Duty of Disclosure.' (1993) 1 Medical Law Review 139, 144-45.
46 Cf. 3.3.4., 5.4.4. & 6.3.
47
McLean, Sheila A M A Patient's Right to Know: Information Disclosure, the Doctor and the Law. 1989.
48
Mason & McCall Smith Law and Medical Ethics (4ed) 246-247.
49
McNair J in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, 586-7.
50
[1985] 1 AC 871, 892.
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peritiam artis et imperitia culpae admuneratur. It goes back to the origin of assumpsit;
it applied to all artificers and was firmly founded in "case" (moderniter negligence)
although it may be of interest to note that as long ago as 1767 in Slater v. Baker, 2 Wils.
359, a suggestion that where the injury was caused by surgery the form of action lay in
trespass vi et armis was rejected with scant sympathy by the Court of King's Bench.'51
The original Bolam test is different in a subtle but important way from that set out in
Scotland in Hunter v Hartley. It is worth reiterating that in that case Lord President Clyde said,
'To establish liability by a doctor where deviation from normal practice is alleged, three
facts require to be established. First of all it must be proved that there is a usual and
normal practice. Secondly it must be proved that the defender has not adopted that
practice, and thirdly (and this is of crucial importance) it must be established that the
course the doctor adopted is one which no professional man of ordinary skill would
have taken if he had been acting with ordinary care ...\52
The crucial difference lies in the emphasised portion of this quotation.5' In England in order to
escape liability in negligence, it must be established that a responsible body of medical
practitioners would have adopted the practice actually adopted. On the face of it the test in
Scotland is a stricter one which favours the practitioner more than the English test favours the
practitioner. To prove liability in negligence, it must be established that no practitioner of
ordinary skill would have adopted the procedure actually adopted.
Again on the face of it, the Scottish test remained unchanged in Moyes v Lothian
Health Board in which Lord Caplan argued that the confirmation of the Bolam test in Sidaway
did not alter the test in Hunter v Hartley. This said, there seemed to be a coming-together of the
two jurisdictions in Moyes in which Lord Caplan considered, with approval, the judgement of
Lord Bridge Sidaway.
31
That the court is able to trace the Bolam principle back to the maxim spondet peritiam artis et imperitia
culpae admuneratur ('he is responsible for skill in his profession and want of such skill is regarded as a fault')
suggests a combination of skilful performance and disclosure requirements - a combination which is denied.
But the essential ethical and policy point concerns reliance. The patient is entitled to be able to rely on the
doctor. The question remains: in defining the scope of the doctor's duty of care, does the patient not expect
that he will have been warned of all material risks? Having defined what is expected, the doctor will be liable
for any deficiency in living up to expectations. This is why this definition of the scope of the duty of care is the
central ethical consideration in any negligence action based on consent and why this inquiry can be included
under the 'policy' head.
32
Hunter v Hartley 1955 SLT 213, 217; emphasis added. This important quote is being reiterated here for the
sake of clarity and relevance.
53
This point is made in a contributed article, 'Hunter v Hartley 35 Years On' 1990 Scots Law Times 325. Cf.
6.3.1 in which it will be argued that the effect of these linguistically different tests is virtually the same.
Indeed, that is a stance argued in a response to the above article and on the basis of Moyes v Lothian Health
Board and Goorkani v Tayside Health Board: Dermot K. Feenan 'Medical Negligence: Hunter v Hanley 35
years on: a reply' 1991 Scots Law Times 321.
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'My understanding is that in Sidaway, Lord Bridge did not dispute that in questions of
medical practice where the skill or the knowledge, or specialist experience of the doctor
is the material factor, standards will be regulated by the standards of responsible
members of the profession. However the issue of what properly falls within the ambit of
medical expertise should not be regarded too narrowly since, for example, the doctor's
skill in handling his patients may be as much a product of his clinical experience as
diagnosis or the prescription of medicine.'54
This was confirmed in Gordon v Wilson 5 in which Lord Penrose endorsed medical
paternalism saying: 'In my opinion nothing in the speech of Lord Bridge was intended to qualify
the Bolam test. That was the view taken by Lord Caplan in Moyes ... and I respectfully agree
with his comments.' However, Lord Penrose acknowledged that the test was that set out in
Hunter and the Bolam test was (merely) helpful rather than decisive. It remains the case that
Scottish Courts are even more reluctant to hold practitioners liable than are their English
counterparts.56 As for the test, since Moyes it has been accepted that the two tests are equivalent
to one another. It is the test of reasonable proficiency as assessed by the defender's peers.
The requisite reasonable57 proficiency is variable according to circumstances and
commensurate with the standing professed. It is applicable only once the doctor-patient
58
relationship has been established because there is no negligence without a duty of care and
breach of this duty of care involves failure to reach that standard. Lord Fraser, in Whitehouse v
Jordan, expressed the position in the following way:
'The true position is that an error of judgement may or may not be negligent; it depends
on the nature of the error. If it is one that would not have been made by a reasonably
competent professional man professing to have the standard and type of skill that the
defendant holds himself out as having, and acting with ordinary care, then it is
negligence. If, on the other hand, it is an error that such a man, acting with ordinary
59
care, might have made, then it is not negligence.'
The standard of care is expressed in Bolam in England and in Hunter v Hartley in Scotland. This
54
Ibid., 450.
55 1992 SLT 849. 852.
56
This argument is based on the fact that fewer Scottish informed consent cases are won by pursuers than those
which are won by plaintiffs. It is acknowledged, however, that this may have to do with the fact that the
jurisdictions are different in size and the fact that a case being won depends on such a case coming to the
attention of the courts, that is of injury occurring which is the alleged result of an uninformed consent. Cf. 6.3.
& 6.4.
57
Which is often synonymous with 'responsible' in the case law.
58
Comprising a willingness to examine, diagnose and treat on the part of the doctor and to be examined and
treated on the basis of that diagnosis on the part of the patient.
59
[1980] 1 All ER 650, 659.
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standard amounts to peer-assessment in British courts. In the Commonwealth different tests are
used in different jurisdictions according to the extent to which the court accepts a medical
professional standard. British acceptance of that standard means that in order to determine what
constitutes proper treatment, the court consults the medical profession as represented by expert
60
witnesses.
3.2.1. Two British tests?
The salient point about a legal test for the validity of consent is whether any decision regarding
treatment has been based on adequate information; it is about the legal test for the adequacy of
information given. In England and Scotland, judiciaries view materiality from the perspective
of the reasonable doctor rather than the reasonable patient in the actual patient's position. The
relevant question is 'what can the doctor be expected to have disclosed to this patient?' To
answer this question, courts in England apply the Bolam test and in Scotland courts apply
Hunter v Hanley. Either way the matter is one of judicial policy and the extent to which it
favours the doctor's opinion over the patient's rights.61
3.2.1.1. England
The Sidaway case concerned a patient who was not told of a chance of about one per cent that
paralysis might result from an operation on her neck. That chance eventuated. The House of
Lords confirmed the Bolam test with regard to disclosure of inherent risks. It did, however, rule
that medical opinion was not decisive and retained the right to overrule it if disclosure was
'obviously necessary' to an informed decision by the patient.62 Lord Bridge considered that
circumstances could arise where the court might reject the standard of accepted medical
practice, indicating a possible flexibility in the Bolam standard.63 Lord Templeman agreed and
said that the court would determine whether the doctor had 'blundered' in not disclosing
information. The central issue here concerns the weight given by the court to the medical
evidence of each side, and indeed the fact that the court weighs up evidence from both sides.64
60 Cf. Chapter 5.
61
See M Robertson 'Informed Consent to Medical Treatment' (1981) 97 LQR 102 in which the author
appreciated this point in the very early days of acceptance of the doctrine in the Commonwealth.
[1985] 1 All ER 643 (HL), 663.
6"' Cf. Chapter 6, particularly 6.3.
64
Although it may not prefer one body of respectable opinion over another. Cf. Ch. 5 on the expert witness.
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Lord Scarman, dissenting in Siclaway after considering Canterbury v Spence and Reibl v
Hughes, would have found the doctrine of informed consent to be the law in England.65 The
majority of the bench in Sidaway, however, adopted a paternalistic approach oriented towards
the medical practitioner and aligned informed consent with professional duty. Yet it did not
leave the issue in the hands of the medical profession alone. Bolam, it should be noted, was a
decision of first instance and what has become the Bolam test was part of a judicial summing-up
presented to the jury.66 It was supported by the House in Sidaway, even though their Lordships
were divided on its adequacy.67 Lord Scarman, however, expressed the view that the Bolam test
constitutes a dilution of patient autonomy, which is the very basis of the principle of consent.
According to Balen, 68 a doctor 'needs to ask the question 'is the "level of capacity
demonstrated by the patient commensurate with the gravity of the decision to be taken in giving
or refusing consent?".' Only if the answer is 'no' should paternalistic principles be invoked; yet
the problem will remain that the Bolam standard is still employed in assessing the capacity of
the patient to understand 69
According to the Canadian Law Reform Commission, on the other hand, the test for
comprehension should be apparent-subjective, with the onus on the practitioner to take
reasonable steps with regard to the particular patient to ensure understanding. Paternalism in the
65
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governers [1984] AC 871, 885. He said, '[M]y Lords, I think the
Canterbury propositions reflect a legal truth which too much judicial reliance on medical judgement tends to
obscure. In a medical negligence case where the issue is the advice and information given to the patient as to
the treatment proposed, the available options and the risk, the court is concerned primarily with a patient's
rights. The doctor's duty arises from his patient's rights.' However, Teff (Reasonable Care: legal
perspectives on the Doctor-Patient Relationship. 1994. Oxford University Press. Oxford) at 103 considers and
criticises this rights-based dissent by saying that with medicine considered as trade the effect is to breed
medical relations in which 'rights' rather than 'duties' becomes the 'appropriate form of moral discourse'.
This places legal and medical discourses at loggerheads. 6.3.1.2. will consider this position more fully and in
the light of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.
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It was, however, confirmed and applied (and hence elevated) by the Privy Council in Chin Keouw [1967] 1
WLR 813, in the context of an omission to enquire of a patient about allergy to penicillin.
57
Even though Bolam was supported, it was watered down, in Sidaway. Maynard v West Midlands Regional
Health Authority [1985] 1 All ER 634 HL accepted this as watered-down support.
68
In having to 'ask the right questions' in English law, the onus of inquiry is placed on the patient and the
obligation is raised only in the case of the inquisitive patient. See Balen, P. 'Consent to Medical Treatment'
(1994) 138 Solicitors Journal 121-123, 121.
69
The test for competency, too, is from the point of view of the medical practitioner in British Jurisdictions and
from the patient's point of view elsewhere. Consider, in this light, the Grannum test for competency in
America in 1.1.4. and the consideration of the contractual context of the doctor-patient relationship in 3.4.2.
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form of the Bolam test is, however, under increasing pressure in England. Miller70 noted that in
1988 the British Medical Association, too, had changed its emphasis in doctor-patient relations
from paternalism to partnership. There is further evidence in the National Health Service
Patients' Charter of 1992,71 which states that every citizen has the right 'to be given a clear
explanation of any treatment proposed, including any risks and alternatives.'72
In Gold v Haringey Health Authority73 the English Appeal Court overturned the decision
of court of first instance and held that the Bolam test applied not only to the medical arena but to
any raised standard or professional duty of care in which special skill has been professed.74 This
professional standard also applies in Scotland.
3.2.1.2. Scotland
In Moyes v Lothian Health Board75 the Court of Session held that it was not the law that the
informed consent of a patient had in all circumstances to be obtained. Similarly, in Gordon v
Wilson & others™ the Court of Session considered Sidaway and Moyes and attached particular
weight to the judgement of Lord Bridge in Sidaway. His Lordship was responding to comments
of Laskin CJC in Reibl v Hughes in which the latter distinguished the informed consent case
from cases involving the question whether the doctor had carried out his professional activities
by applicable professional standards. This distinction was accepted by Lord Bridge yet the same
standard, the Bolam standard, was held applicable in both scenarios (as was the case in Gold).
The judgements in Gordon v Wilson and Moyes v Lothian Health Board indicate that Scottish
courts do not truly acknowledge that distinction and see the practitioner's duty (in Hunter and in
Bolam) as defined by a single test.
Common practice still plays its most conspicuous role in actions based on alleged
70
Frances H Miller 'Denial of Health Care and Informed Consent in English and American Law' (1992) 18




The Patients' Charter 1992, 9; emphasis added. This is supported by M Dean The Lancet 341 (April 1993)
883 (quoted by Balen at 121) as well as by the Medical Defence Union in the United Kingdom.
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[1988] QB 481, [1987] 2 All ER 888, 894.
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An apposite point which this thesis will go on to make is that this standard applies to treatment and to
information in the UK, whereas elsewhere in the Commonwealth, different standards are applied to these
different aspects of medical practice.
75 1990 SLT 444, 449; [1990] 1 Med LR 463, 469 per Lord Caplan.
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1992 SLT (NOTES) 849.
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medical negligence.77 The Court of Session in Moyes considered practices varying between
practitioners and affirmed that a failure to warn of risks was always to be judged by
practitioners' standards, which is increasingly being seen as inappropriate by other jurisdictions.
Because as a general rule the judiciary lacks medical expertise, it is possible for a
plaintiff to make good use of the Bolam test only in respect of the standards of disclosure of
inherent risks which is required by the law. This is because materiality of information can be
assessed in lay terms, while negligence simpliciter can not. In Sidaway and Gold it was held
that the standards applicable to diagnosis and treatment should be the same as those applied to
disclosure,78 with the court remaining the arbiter on the matter.79 What emerges is an isolation
of the duty of information from treatment standards and it is at the point of the duty of
information at which the Bolam standard is proving useful to the plaintiff in both England80 and
Scotland.81
3.2.2. Three Commonwealth Tests
Once a jurisdiction has accepted informed consent as describing the standard of care in cases
which involve information on risks and alternatives, the only remaining moot point is that of
causation. The exception here is the case of South Africa, in which the doctrine was neither
accepted nor rejected, but adapted to fall in line with volenti non fit iniuria as a mechanism of
describing the duty of information.
There are two possible standards which can be adopted which represent different
interests: a medical standard is accepted to a degree in the United Kingdom, but a more patient-
centric standard is adopted elsewhere in the Commonwealth. Such a standard may be either
subjective or more objective.
77 Cf. E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 99 ALR 601, 650, [1991] 2 Med LR 303, 329.
78
[1984] QB 493, 511 et seq., [1984] 1 All ER 1018, 1026 et seq.
79
In Rogers v Whitaker and Reibl v Hughes, however, a difference between information and treatment was
acknowledged: Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 109 ALR 625, 632, quoting Reibl v Hughes.
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Cf. McAllister v Lewisham [1994] 5 Med LR 343, Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority [1994] 5 Med
LR 334 and Newell and Newell v Goldenberg [1995] 6 Med LR 371 which will be discussed in Chapter 6
(6.2.). See also Kennedy and Grubb 'The New Bolam', Medical Law Review Vol. 3 No. 2 p 197. This will be
considered more fully in 6.3.
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Goorkani v Tayside Health Board [1991] 3 Med LR 33
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The subjective test has been criticised for being enslaved by the hindsight of the
unreasonable patient and on the basis that it would not be practical to handle all patients
identically and with a view to fairness. A more objective test, on the other hand, dispenses with
the problem of hindsight by asking how the average prudent person in the plaintiffs situation
would have decided in the given circumstances. It also dispenses with the problem of holding a
practitioner liable for the 'whimsical' courses of action of his patients under a more subjective
test. The plaintiffs apparent desire for knowledge comes into play only as indicative of what
the physician ought objectively to have known of the patient's information needs. Although
called objective, it remains a test taken from the patient's point of view. Objectivity is injected
by considering the prudent patient rather than the particular or subjective patient assessed.
3.2.2.1. Canada
What the reasonable patient in the particular patient's position would want to know forms the
basis of the test as set out in Canada in Reibl v Hughes?2 It was held that the court or the jury
may assess this. This is the case in which the doctrine was adopted. It concerned the surgeon's
failure to warn of a ten per cent risk of a procedure resulting in a stroke. There the court
formulated the apparent-subjective test for materiality, which was different from the test used
where negligent performance of the surgical procedure itself is alleged (negligence simpliciter).
The Court held, 'The patient's particular situation and the degree to which the risks of surgery or
no surgery are balanced would reduce the force, on an objective appraisal, of the physician's
83recommendation'.
Later, in White v Turner?4 the Ontario High Court of Justice extended Reibl v Hughes to
some degree in holding not only that material risks as well as unusual risks should be disclosed,
but that there is an overlap between these two categories. With the advantage of hindsight it
would be easier for a plaintiff to assert that he would not have undergone a certain procedure.
82
(1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1
83 Reibl v Hughes, 16. Laskin CJC formulated a modified objective test for causation to be applied in informed
consent cases, saying, 'the adoption of an objective standard does not mean that the issue of causation is
completely in the hands of the surgeon. Merely because medical evidence establishes the reasonableness of a
recommended operation does not mean that a reasonable person in the patient's position would necessarily
agree to it if proper disclosure had been made of the risks attendant upon it, balanced by those against it'. This
means that negligence may be established, but that does not mean that liability - and hence damages - follows.
See Chapter 4 on Causation.
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(1981) 120 DLR (3d) 269.
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For this reason, the Canadian decision in Hopp v Lepp85 asserted that the issue is whether the
reasonable person in the plaintiff s position would have declined or accepted treatment given the
information available at the time and excluding the advantage of hindsight. This modified
objective test for causation injects objectivity into the plaintiffs assertions on materiality and
causation and the result disposes of the case.
This 'apparent subjective' or 'modified objective' standard was confirmed in White v
Turner86 according to which the court has to be satisfied regarding what the reasonable patient in
the same situation would have done or wanted. In Haughain v Paine1 it was held that in order
to enable a patient to give informed consent to surgery, in addition to disclosing the material
risks of the surgery, a surgeon must also explain to the patient the consequences of leaving the
ailment untreated as well as the alternative means of treatment and their risks. This is the test
for the standard of care. The process is subtly different in Australia where the test applied to the
patient is a subjective one, which is then turned into an objective expectation of the surgeon.
3.2.2.2, Australia
Although a Bolam style test had traditionally been employed in Australia,88 the decision in
Rogers v Whitaker demonstrated a move towards more objective testing of the informed consent
issue.89 The case turned on whether the amount of information the doctor had disclosed
complied with the standard of care which could reasonably be expected of him. The court held
that notification should have been given of a one in 14,000 risk of the patient developing
sympathetic ophthalmia during eye surgery.
Significantly, the defence relied on Bolam but the court, like its Canadian counterpart,
rejected that submission by distinguishing information from treatment.90 The court in Rogers v
Whitaker held that evidence of acceptable medical practice serves as merely a useful guide to the
courts, whose prerogative it remains to determine the appropriate standard of care, particularly
85
(1981) 112 DLR (3d) 67, which was supported in Reibl v Hughes (1981) 114 DLR (3d) 1 (in fact Laskin CJC
was on the bench in both cases) and advanced an objective disclosure test.
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(1981)120 DLR (3d) 269, 283 et seq.
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(1987) 37 DLR (4th) 624.
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Australian courts had adopted the subjective approach in Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital [1990] 2 Med LR
103, H v Royal Alexandra Hospital [1990] 1 Med LR 297 and F v R (1983) 33 SASR 189.
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That is the issue of the scope of the duty of care rather than the issue of the test for causation.
90 Cf. Discussion of Reibl v Hughes in 3.2.2.1.
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with regard to disclosure of information.
There the plaintiff successfully argued that the Bolam principle should not be applied
because it involves deferring to medical experts in medical negligence cases.91 Counsel for the
plaintiff also argued successfully that the primary judge was correct in not deferring to the views
of those medical practitioners who gave evidence that they would not have warned the plaintiff.
The Bolam standard, then, is prone to displacement wherever courts assert their own primacy
92
over medical practice, in the context of advice and information given to patients.
Account is to be taken of the particular patient's position; this is then translated into an
objective requirement of the doctor. If, for example, the patient indicates a clear concern of a
certain nature and a general inquisitiveness (as occurred in Rogers v Whitaker), the reasonable
medical practitioner could then be expected to know that she would want to be informed of any
such related risk. In this instance, it was held that because Mrs Whitaker had shown a general
concern regarding damage to her 'good' eye93 during surgery, the reasonable eye surgeon ought
to have appreciated that this particular patient would want to be warned of the risks94 of damage
to that eye and that one such risk was that of sympathetic ophthalmia.
Under the objective test it is reasonable to contend that the surgeon ought to know the
seriousness of inherent consequences is directly proportional to this patient's need for that
information.95 Even a slight risk, given the obvious interest and interests of the patient, is
subject to a warning under the objective and apparent-subjective tests. In many cases involving
inadequate warning, the plaintiff failed to ask specific questions. Where she does ask such
questions, she is entitled to a full answer, as was held in three jurisdictions in Rogers v Whitaker,
Reibl v Hughes and Sidaway.96
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Cf. Ch. 5 on the expert in context.
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This is of greater significance in British jurisdictions and will receive fuller treatment in Chapter 6.
93 She had partial blindness in the other eye prior to surgery.
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Because the lay person cannot appreciate the vagaries of sympathetic ophthalmia.
95
With the notable exception of a patient in a state of denial.
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3.2.2.3. South Africa
Until the appeal judgement in Castell v DeGreef, South Africa had followed a position like that
expressed in English and Scottish Courts. In Blyth v van den Heever, Corbett JA set out a
Bolam style test when confronted with the question as to what constitutes negligence in a
therapeutic medical context.97 On disclosure of information, the court in Lymbery v Jefferies98
held that it is not necessary to inform a patient of all complications which could arise and that
'there should be some evidence for the inference that had the explanations as to the danger been
given, she would have refrained from the treatment.'
The benchmark case in medical negligence is Van Wyk v Lewis99 in which it was
accepted that the degree of skill to be expected is that customarily adopted by the relevant
branch of the profession concerned; not the highest possible degree. These are decisions which
were to have been expected in 1924 and 1925 when South African and English law were very
much closer than they are today100 and when the issue of disclosure was not high on the agenda.
These cases continued to gain approval in South African courts with regard to standards
of treatment. However, some movement was evident regarding disclosure of inherent risks,
which showed that two duties may be separated. In Richter v Estate Hammann,m Watermeyer J
conceded that failure to disclose risks may amount to negligence.102 Considering the doctor's
dilemma in a decision reminiscent of that handed down in Sidaway, the learned Judge said,
'It may well be that in certain circumstances a doctor is negligent if he fails to warn a
patient, and, if that is so, it seems to me in principle that his conduct should be tested by
the standard of the reasonable doctor faced with the particular problem.'103
This indicates simply that there are two separate duties (of information and in treatment) and
that the standard is the same for both.
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In England, however, Kerr LJ held in Blyth v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1993] 4 Med LR 151 that a
patient is not necessarily entitled to a full answer because the consultation is subject to professional privilege
(which argues that it is the practitioner who best knows what is in the best interests of the patient).
97
Blyth v van den Heever 1980 (1) SA 192, 220-21 (negligence simpliciter).
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In making up its own mind and 'maintaining judicial sovereignty over expert
evidence',104 the court in Richter asserted itself and potentially eroded the Bolam-style test.
Here, the Cape Provincial Division was leading towards the situation which was to be broached
in Reibl v Hughes and which had already been outlined in Canterbury v Spence. In Richter, as
in Sidaway, one is able to detect an erosion of the Bolam principle as useful to the practitioner
only in respect of disclosure standards:'05 judicial sovereignty over expert and lay evidence.
Richter had opened the door to the prudent-patient standard. Courts asserted dominance over
the medical profession and adopted Sidaway together with its qualifications of Bolam.
The nature and extent of the duty to warn a patient of risks inherent in a surgical
procedure was affirmed at first instance in Castell v De Greef06 as embracing the normal and
expected consequences. There the Cape Provincial Division discussed the doctrine of informed
consent more fully. Significantly, Scott J affirmed both Sidaway and Bolam, noting that the
House of Lords in Sidaway had declined to adopt Reibl v Hughes or Canterbury v Spence and
instead had reaffirmed Bolam.
On appeal, Castell v De Greef01 was overturned in part and the 'Gospel according to
Rogers v Whitaker was adopted. Ackerman J considered a wide range of authorities including
108
Sidaway, Rogers v Whitaker and Reibl v Hughes. He found the Australian case F v R
important, yet based his judgement on the South African law of delict to hold that the defence of
volenti non fit iniuria was available. The plaintiff averred that the surgeon was under a duty to
warn of material risks and complications which might flow from cosmetic breast surgery, as
well as alternatives to the proposed procedure. Ackerman J held that it was not in dispute that
consent had to be obtained from the patient prior to surgery, quoting Neser J in Rompel v Botha:
'I have no doubt that a patient should be informed of the serious risks he does run. If
such dangers are not pointed out to him then, in my opinion, the consent to the treatment
is not in reality consent - it is consent without knowledge of the possible injuries.'109
It is this argument that returned the informed consent case scenario to the context of culpa rather
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This was approved by Castell v De Greef 1993(2) SA 501, 517F-H.
104 Goldrein 1378 (October 7 1994).
105
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than negligence. Ackerman J went on to consider the matter in terms of the patient's rights,
siding with Lord Scarman in Sidaway. He disagreed with the 'reasonable doctor' test as
articulated in Richter v Estate Hammann saying that it did not leave determination of the issue in
the hands of the medical profession because the court remains the final arbiter on the issue.110
The plaintiff had averred that she did not give full consent. The defence was a rebuttal
in the form of the volenti defence which would justify an otherwise wrongful delictual act.
Having considered authority from other jurisdictions, Ackerman J said,
'As already indicated, the matter is approached somewhat differently in South African
law, the inquiry being whether the defence of volenti non fit iniuria has been established
and in particular whether the patient's consent has been properly informed consent.'111
Significant to the present thesis, he went on to note that 'on either approach the same, or
virtually identical, matters of legal policy are involved'.112
Outlining the volenti defence, the judgement in Castell v DeGreef held the following to
be required for success:113 the consenting party must have knowledge, awareness, appreciation
and understanding of the nature and extent of the harm or risk and have consented to that harm
or to have assumed that risk. Further, that consent 'must be comprehensive, that is extend to the
entire transaction, inclusive of its consequences.' This is a question of fact and is no different
from the post facto inquiry in any jurisdiction in which the court asks, on the facts, what
information the plaintiff had actually been given and had understood.
Following a consideration of materiality in the instant case, Ackerman J concluded that
this patient had not given her informed consent to the surgical procedure in question and
consequently that the defence of volenti non fit iniuria failed. This case indicates that the test in
South African law as regards whether a patient gave informed consent is, under the volenti
defence, a subjective and factual one. This is a very recent move away from the English and
Scottish positions as well as from negligence principles. It is broadly in line with the Australian






He cited a passage from the judgement of King CJ in F v R on the conflict between the doctor's duty and the
patient's rights.
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3.2.3. The Law in Summary and Contrast
The law in both Scotland and England has rejected the doctrine of informed consent as
describing the standard of care.114 But when the patient entrusts himself to the doctor he
expects, and is entitled, to be kept fully informed about decisions which have to be taken and
which may concern his welfare, even if the doctor is considered to know best. The difference
between British and Commonwealth jurisdictions on this point is between the reasonable doctor
and the prudent patient - between a medical and patient centric standard. This exposes judicial
policies of different jurisdictions as protective of different interests.
Current trends indicate that the Bolam and Hunter v Hanley standards are passe115 in
Canada, America and South Africa where courts now favour tests which take the patient's rights
into account to a greater extent. However, Lord Caplan in Moyes correctly acknowledged that
the standard in Hunter v Hanley is flexible as standards change within the medical profession.
What this means is that the standard is the same in a different context rather than that the
standard is flexible, as any legal standard or test should be.
This acknowledgement came in the context of the delict principle that conduct should be
assessed at the time of injury: Lord Caplan said that the medical practices at litigation in 1990
may differ from those at the time of injury in 1981.116 This standard is not prima facie as
flexible as the Bolam standard because Hunter v Hanley requires unanimity of method while
Bolam requires acceptance by or accord with a responsible body of opinion. The central
linguistic difference between the two tests may be expressed as follows: the Bolam test is a
negative one which tells the court when a practitioner is not negligent, while the test in Hunter is
a positive one, which tells the court when the practitioner is negligent. It has already been
argued that the difference between the two tests remains a linguistic one.
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including disclosure of information regarding material or substantial risks; information with
which the disadvantages and dangers are communicated, as well as full and truthful responses to
questioning by patients."7 Lord Templeman spoke of the need for information standards
suitable to a balanced judgement, saying that he '[did] not subscribe to the theory that the patient
is entitled to know everything or to the theory that the doctor is entitled to decide everything',
thereby positioning himself somewhere between autonomy and paternalism.
In this way, the House of Lords in Sidaway adopted the principles embodied by the
American doctrine into the English law of negligence in a diluted form. The court accepted the
need for information, retained the power to determine adequacy and materiality of the
information given and reduced the authority of the doctor's decision - presumably in favour of
the patient. If negligence is based on a professional standard, that standard might be prone to
lowering in order to protect the profession from within: the 'conspiracy of silence' described by
several authors and judicial opinions.118 For this among other reasons, proponents of the
objective test119 advocate a 'prudent patient' test, while the medically-based standard is
becoming less and less able to hold water. However, as we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6, the
Bolam standard is now able to support the plaintiffs case.
In Daniels v Burfield and Rogers v Whitaker, the Australian Supreme Court followed F
v R and categorised it as an 'informed consent' case in which, three years before Sidaway, King
CJ had rejected the conclusiveness of evidence of accepted practice. Judges remain under no
obligation to scrutinise medical practices because that is outwith their realm of expertise. But
they can consider the amount of information required by patients under the category of
reasonableness and indeed the Wednesbury unreasonableness of having omitted material advice
and information.120 In Rogers v Whitaker, Mason CJ recognised 'informed consent' as an ideal
to which practice can and should aim, though he saw it as 'amorphous' when considered as a
duty.121
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With Rogers v Whitaker and Chappel v Hartx" the Australian position has moved closer
to that in Canada with regard to the objective test, and in England Sidaway did not conclude the
debate.1"3 When it comes to informing patients of inherent risks, the use of the professional
standard by the courts falls short of the ethical principle of autonomy and because the
judgements in Sidaway and subsequent cases in England now demand it through their
qualifications of Bolam,'"4
Having argued that different tests are used to determine the standard of care, it is
apparent that these tests interrogate, from different points of view, the materiality of information
omitted. It is now possible to consider what constitutes material information. Informed consent,
as a doctrine, comprises a two-stage test. The first stage is the test for the standard of care -
discussed in the present chapter. The second is the test for legal causation - discussed in the
next chapter. Both stages provide fertile ground for judicial policy formulation and application
and both stages depend on a definition of materiality. It is this that renders materiality pivotal to
any disclosure case.
3.3. Materiality
This term forms an important and controversial part of the law of insurance. In insurance law,
policies may be voided for non-disclosure of a material fact.121 The analogy here is that the law
of informed consent to medical treatment also reaches a critical point in any judgement at which
the plaintiff's knowledge of a material risk, and that patient's willingness to undertake (or
underwrite) that risk, proves pivotal. The court will have to formulate a test to determine in
each instance whether a particular piece of information was material.
The insurance case law indicates that a fact is material if it would influence the decision
of the prudent insurer whether to insure the risk. Similarly, in the law of informed consent, the
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v Pine Top Insurance Co [1992] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 101, [1994] CLY 2698 and Deutsche Ruckversicherung AG v
Walbrook Insurance Co Ltd [1996] 1 All ER 791. As will become apparent, not only is there no statutory test
for materiality in respect of informed consent cases, but jurisdictions apply different judicial tests.
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court will formulate a test which will ask whether or not information on a particular risk would
have influenced the decision whether or not to undergo the medical procedure in question. In
this way the test for materiality of risk will work in conjunction with the test for legal causation
and that for the standard of care. This is because the duty is to warn of a material risk and a
material risk is one which would influence the patient's decision in the treatment offered.
The doctrine of informed consent comprises tests for causation and for the standard of
care and materiality. These two tests dovetail with one another.126 What will be argued in
Chapter 4 on Causation will draw on what will be argued here on materiality - the emphasis here
being on those jurisdictions which accept the doctrine as describing the scope of the duty of care
- only once the duty of care facet has been won by the plaintiff is a judicial discussion of
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causation of any consequence.
It is at the point of materiality that the doctrine has been expanded in many American
jurisdictions and adopted to varying degrees in parts of the Commonwealth in the form of a
more subjective test for causation.1"8 Dealing as we are with a wholesale American doctrine, it
is important to consider this facet because it is central to the doctrine itself. The cases with
which we are dealing here are those which fall within what has been described as the informed
consent fact genre.
To recap: what these cases have in common is a pursuer or plaintiff who was allegedly
not informed of a risk inherent in the medical procedure performed. That risk must have
eventuated for litigation to occur; it would be alleged that lack of knowledge of that risk was the
legal cause of the injury suffered.129 The plaintiff would have to prove that a duty existed which
included the provision of information concerning the risk which eventuated. To determine
whether this is the case, courts need to assess whether that risk was material in the
circumstances.
This is defined from different viewpoints in different jurisdictions: from the point of
view of the medical community in British jurisdictions, from that of the prudent patient in
126
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Or if negligence is established through the use of Bolam and Hunter v Hanley in British jurisdictions




Australia, from that of the prudent patient objectively assessed in Canada and somewhat post
facto in South Africa through volenti spectacles.
It is instructive to consider how American jurisdictions define the term before
considering what leading cases have to say on this matter in other jurisdictions. This will follow
the same 'geo-chronological' route taken by the doctrine itself.130 In Canterbury v Spence a
material risk was defined as one to which 'a reasonable person in what the physician knows or
should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance ... in deciding
whether or not to forego the proposed treatment.'131
3.3.1. Canada
According to the Law Reform Commission of Canada in 1980,132 all material or relevant facts
which could influence the patient's decision whether to undergo treatment should be disclosed.
The test for materiality is to be objective but is to become subjective to the extent that the doctor
knows the patient and as a consequence expectations of that doctor are raised.
In Reibl v Hughes, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the proximate relationship
between patient and surgeon gives rise to a duty of disclosure of all material risks. The court
then cited Hopp v Leppm as it defined a material risk as one to which a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position would attach significance,134 that is in making it more apparent-subjective or
modifying the degree of objectivity. This is the same test as that for causation:135 that is from
the point of view of the particular patient as objectively assessed on the basis of reasonableness.
Chief Justice Laskin went further when he argued that to allow expert medical evidence to
determine materiality is tantamount to handing over to the medical profession the determination
of both the standard of care and the matter of its breach. He found that expert medical evidence
is important and is relevant to findings of fact that have to do with the extent of risks and the
alternatives to the recommended procedure.
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influencing a patient's consent.' (1981) 112 DLR (3d) 67, 81. This was an overt adoption of the dictum in
Canterbuty v Spence.
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As far as materiality was concerned, Laskin CJC found that medical evidence would
have a bearing on the issue, but the issue would be determined by that evidence in conjunction
with other factors. This means that this is an area in which expert evidence is important, though
not decisive. It contrasts with the position in Britain and differs subtly from that in Australia,
but ultimately it will be a matter for judicial determination in all jurisdictions.
That this position is stable in Canada has been reiterated in Lenis v deVilliersUb in which
it was held that the test is relative to the reasonable patient rather than to the reasonable
practitioner. When the court determines what constitutes a 'material risk', the test is what the
reasonable patient in the actual patient's position would have considered material. This test is to
be tempered with a degree of objectivity through the court's exclusion of hindsight.
Most recently, in Arndt v Smith the Court held, 'The entitlement of the patient to know
the full facts about risks and to make a personal assessment of those facts in the light of the
patient's own view of his or her own circumstances is a major determinant of whether there has
been the disclosure required by law.'1"'7 Another major determinant is the fiduciary relationship
between patient and practitioner - that is the actual context of the consultation. The
establishment by the court of this position precedes the court's determination of causation and
indeed predetermines the test to be adopted in the latter inquiry.
3.3.2. Australia
A similar, though more subjective, position was adopted in Australia in Rogers v Whitaker. In
that case Mason CJ said,
'The law should recognise that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of a material risk
inherent in the proposed treatment: a risk is material if, in the circumstances of the
particular case, a reasonable person in the patient's position, if warned of the risk,
would be likely to attach significance to it or if the medical practitioner is or should
reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned, would be likely to attach
significance to it.'1"18
113 Reibl v Hughes (1981) DLR (3d) 1, 5-6 & 15-17.
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In Rogers v Whitaker the test for materiality was being used in conjunction with the causation
inquiry and is clearly subjective whether considered from the point of view of the patient (by
asking what information a patient in the position of the actual plaintiff would have required) or
from the point of view of the medical practitioner (by asking what can reasonably be expected of
that practitioner vis-a-vis the reasonable patient in the actual plaintiffs position). Therein lies
the difference between the Canadian and Australian tests. Considering the matter in the
alternative allows Australian courts to use a subjective test first, as dictated by the law of torts,
and then to turn it into an objective expectation of the practitioner. It also poses problems for
the practitioner who will be looking to judicial tests as a form of guidance on how to avoid legal
liability; that practitioner will be offered a test which is ambiguous.139
This position was confirmed in Hart v Chappel140 in which it was held that the test for
establishing which inherent risks are material is whether the 'medical practitioner is or should
reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach
significance to it.' Again, this precedes and sets the scene for the inquiry into causation.
However, it must be appreciated that even if a risk is held to be material on that test, a plaintiff
may, on the basis of medical evidence to the contrary, yet fail to prove causation.141
3.3.3. South Africa
The position in South Africa is broadly similar to that in Canada and Australia, yet with an
important difference. The court approached the inquiry from a different direction by asking
whether, on the facts, the patient had knowledge of the risk which eventuated.142 It was held that
there is an obligation on the surgeon to warn of material risks, defined as those to which a
person in the plaintiff s position would be likely to attach significance or those to which a
medical practitioner might reasonably be expected to be aware that the patient would find
significant, so siding with the Australian position.143
The difference between the two jurisdictions lies in its adaptation to the 'needs of South
139 Cf. Chapter 7.
140
[1994] 5 Med LR 365, 375. For the appeal, which upheld Hart v Chappel, see Chappel v Hart 1998 HCA
55.
141
Where, for example, a patient would have been compelled to accept the inherent material risks as a matter of
medical urgency or necessity
142 Cf. 3.4. &3.5.
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African Jurisprudence.' Under the volenti defence it became a test predicated on the hindsight
of the court, determined as a matter of fact and then extended in a non-normative way to form an
'unimpeachable consent' to the consequences of the medical procedure. This is anomalous
when considered alongside a necessarily normative test for materiality, even though it is seen by
the South African court as analogous to the Australian position from a policy point of view.144
3.3.4. England
British courts and academic opinion are at odds with one another on this issue insofar as academic opinion
sides with the prudent patient standard more than it does with the reasonable doctor standard. Prior to
Sidaway, the South Australian Supreme Court had in F v R145 agreed with the rationale in Reibl v Hughes.
This is important because Australia had until that time followed a position broadly similar to that of
England in accepting the Bolam test.
In Sidaway, Lord Scarman agreed with the rationale on materiality iterated in Canterbury v
Spence, but his was a minority judgement.146 In that case counsel for the plaintiff invited the court to
adopt the doctrine of informed consent, of which materiality forms an integral part. Because the majority
of the House declined that invitation and held that under the Bolam test the surgeon was under no such
duty, it was not necessary to formulate or apply any definition of materiality. This is because, as Lord
Diplock put it, a doctor's duty towards his patient comprises,
'a single comprehensive duty covering all the ways in which a doctor is called on to
exercise his skill and judgement in the improvement of the physical or mental condition
of the patient for which his services either as a general practitioner or as a specialist
have been engaged. This general duty is not subject to dissection into a number of
component parts ...\147
However, because he accepted the doctrine of informed consent of which it is an
integral part, Lord Scarman did consider materiality, saying,
'The critical limitation is that the duty is confined to material risk. The test of
materiality is whether in the circumstances of the particular case the court is satisfied
that a reasonable person in the patient's position would be likely to attach significance
to the risk. Even if the risk be material, the doctor will not be liable if on a reasonable
assessment of his patient's condition he takes the view that a warning would be
144 Castell v DeGreef 1994 (4) SA 408, 426G.
144
Cf. 3.4.2. & 3.4.3. Indeed, the test in Castell v DeGreefwas taken verbatim from Rogers v Whitaker.
145 33 SASR 189, 192-193.
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147
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detrimental to his patient's health.'148
In time this part of Lord Scarman's dissenting judgement may itself prove material to the
resolution of informed consent cases in England.149
The majority judgement in Siclaway has remained largely unchanged in England. That
said, it must be borne in mind that there has been some modification of the Bolam standard as
regards disclosure of inherent risks. Where the Bolam standard proves useful to the plaintiff's
case in one facet of the duty of care and not in others, does this not indicate a tacit separation of
the various aspects of the duty of care?150 For example, under the causation head in McAllister v
Lewisham,151 Rougier J adopted a subjective test, which took the plaintiff's personality into
account. Similarly, Smith v Tunbridge Wells152 and Newell and Newell v Goldenberg153 indicate
a more patient-oriented Bolam standard within the causation inquiry.154
In considering what a plaintiff might or might not have done in the presence of
information which was absent prior to treatment, is the court not considering the materiality of
that information? And in taking the plaintiff's personal circumstances into account, is the court
not considering the materiality of that information from the plaintiff's perspective? These are
rhetorical questions which cast the Bolam test as exclusively useful to the medical practitioner in
a dubious light. Yet the test still reigns and hence whether or not a risk would have been
material to the patient (and have had a probable effect on causation in a subjective test) remains
irrelevant until a more subjective test is found for the standard of care.
3.3.5. Scotland
The court in Moyes v Lothian Health Board155 and Gordon v Wilson 56 upheld the test in Hunter
v Hanley. The first of these cases confirmed that any warning is to be governed by medical
148
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criteria unless it is established as necessary.157 This had the effect of defining materiality from
the point of view of the medical profession as a whole. The court in Gordon v Wilson went
further in holding that where two responsible bodies of medical opinion existed, negligence
could not be found.158 This meant that were the court to have been confronted with the
materiality question where two opposing bodies of evidence were to have been led, no
negligence would be found. This would be the case irrespective of whether the doctrine of
informed consent were accepted by all practitioners because the inquiry into materiality comes
after the decision as to whether the duty of care includes the provision on information on
material risks.
However, in Goorkani v Tayside Health Board159the Court of Session found that the
medical practitioner who failed to warn that a certain immunosuppressive drug designed to save
the patient's sight could cause sterility, was negligent in making that omission. After that the
court had to consider causation and to formulate a test for that stage of the legal inquiry. Hence
it is possible to establish negligence on the standard in Hunter v Hanley, it is in the causation
inquiry that the pursuer's case meets a more onerous hurdle.
3.3.6. Communication
From the preceding paragraphs, it is apparent that there are several different tests for materiality.
It is an issue which the court will not need to confront until it is agreed that the duty of care
includes the provision of information on material risks and alternatives. Only at that point is it
necessary to define which risks are material in the circumstances and from whose perspective.
This inquiry dovetails with that into causation because a risk is often material to the decision
whether or not to consent to treatment at all.
By this stage communication will have emerged as one of the main thrusts of the
informed consent scenario. This involves a factual inquiry: was the information, which the court
held to be material, actually communicated to and understood by the plaintiff-patient? In South
Africa this involves almost the whole of the inquiry, but in other jurisdictions it raises, to a
greater degree, questions of evidence, practitioner's notes, the expert witness and memory of the
157
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107
consultation between practitioner and patient.
Communication has been defined inter alia by Ladeur160 as a synthesis of information,
communications and understanding. In the context of English and Scots law, in a comment
reminiscent of the Grannum test,161 Balen argued that a doctor needs to question the capacity of
the patient to comprehend information.162 What is needed in this context is a set of judicial
criteria which has the approval of the medical community - of that responsible body of medical
opinion so dear to the judiciary. There are indications that this is possible in England.
England and Scotland maintain a medical professional test and so cannot adopt the
doctrine of informed consent because the doctrine considers materiality from the patient's point
of view, even though the judgement may be expressed in terms of the standard of care of the
reasonable doctor. The need to confront or to alter the test for causation arises only when the
court accepts the doctrine or decides that the pursuer has proved the duty of care facet of their
case in terms of Bolam or Hunter v Hanley.m
It is impossible to convey to the patient all the medical knowledge of the trained medical
practitioner; consent will be imperfect to the extent that it is ill-informed. Indeed, at first
instance the court in Castell v De Greef applied Lymbery v Jejferies,XM in which the Appellate
Division had held that it is not necessary to inform a patient of all complications which could
arise from a given procedure. And as Mr Justice Kirby put it, 'the very notion of informed
consent implies a sophistication on the part of the patient'.165 If a patient is genuinely unable to
comprehend, then autonomy is nebulous and the patient will fall under the applicable Mental
Health Act or Children Act.
The doctrine of informed consent suggests that a doctor's role is simply to inform. But
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the patient's understanding should be the emphasis. In communication terms this would mean
that ideally the practitioner would take steps to become aware of how much information the
patient requires for that patient's decision to have been adequately informed166 and to insure that
the patient's communication of that decision is as unfettered as possible.167
The standard in Reibl v Hughes is that a normal intelligent patient would want an
objectively reasonable explanation of the risks involved according to a patient-based standard.
This middle ground between the American vitiation of consent giving rise to an action in
negligence or battery, and the medically based gospel according to Bolam and Sidaway, is to be
preferred as the 'right approach'.168
3.4. POLICY
It is now appropriate to simply draw attention to aspects of judicial policy at this stage of the
informed consent inquiry. To raise such a topic begs the question what is policy? Dictionary
definitions lean towards conduct which is characterised by prudence and sagacity achieved
through reason and deliberation. This is the case in informed consent as judiciaries consider the
likely effect on the common law of the ethical or moral decision they are to reach.169
Policy per se denotes a certain pragmatism which has moral undertones. In the context
of the law of torts or delict, such a mechanism may act as a limitation device. A prime example
of this is that of nervous shock cases which use proximity as a device for limiting the number of
potential plaintiffs that may claim; it is the policy of the court to keep the number of claimants
low. Similarly, in medical negligence cases, there must be an established relationship between
the parties for a duty of care to arise. After that the judiciary may assert a moral reason to limit
or to extend liability. This is often expressed as 'the right of the patient to know'170 or,
conversely, the need to stem the flow of litigation by favouring the medical practitioner.171
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Whichever particular policy is asserted, policy per se concerns the judiciary's self-proclaimed
right to decide on these matters.
On the doctrine of informed consent, Robertson observed that it 'was born at a time
when judicial policy in the United States was beginning to turn in favour of the plaintiff in
medical malpractice cases.'172 The matter of the standard of the duty of care is a policy issue. A
duty of care is imposed when it is considered fair and reasonable to do so, based on dicta such as
that of Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson.173 The medical practitioner having the patient 'in
contemplation' falls within the ambit of this dictum.
The determination of the standard of that contemplative duty will be made on the basis
of legal policy and will appear as a finding of fact. The imposition of a particular standard of
care is a major policy area because essentially the court is asked to pronounce on whether the
duty of care includes the provision of information material to the patient's decision whether or
not to undergo the treatment proposed. We are dealing here with the policy of compensating
victims of non-intentional torts where liability is based on an omission and where there is an
anterior duty of care.
The real function of culpa and the judicial definition of the scope of the duty of care is
to allow courts discretion to increase - or indeed decrease - limitations on liability within the law
of torts or delict. This makes the scope of the duty of care an important policy device.174 Moral
factors such as proximity come into play where a positive duty to act is held to exist by virtue of
the relationship between the parties175 such that proximity itself is defined in terms of reliance;
incrementalism is a technique whereby the boundaries of proximity are extended. In such
instances, courts use categories such as 'reasonableness' to test reliance and so to justify the
availability of remedies.
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Because moral attitudes towards liability for omissions are often sceptical, courts are
hesitant to impose liability. Such hesitancy is more marked in British jurisdictions where
liability for failure to inform a patient of inherent risks is circumscribed by Bolam or by Hunter
v Hanley. However, once courts accept such liability in principle, the writing is on the wall.
Because these are moral issues, courts often slip into rights discourse to justify the granting of
remedies on the basis of omission-liability, as did Lord Scarman in Sidciway. Policy operates in
determining to whom a duty is owed, so making the duty facet of the inquiry another policy
zone. The question before the courts in Britain, for example, would be 'what possibilities are
open to the plaintiff and to the practitioner through the use of the tests in Bolam or Hunter v
Hanleyl'116 The question before courts in Canada and Australia, on the other hand, would be 'if
there is a duty to warn of material risks which positions the definition of materiality as the
177
standard, what flexibility is possible under that standard?'
3.4.1. Rationale
The purpose of the law of torts or delict is to compensate a victim for damage wrongfully
caused. What presents first is the injury itself, without which no action can exist. To understand
against whom any such action might lie, the injured plaintiff asks whose act or omission
factually caused the injury. If that person owed a duty of care in the circumstances of the injury,
damages may follow (on proof of legal causation). This is because in this area of law plaintiffs
bring the action having answered the questions in that order. However, judgements of the
courts approach the issue from the opposite direction, asking first whether the actual defendant
owed a duty of care in the circumstances of the case and then whether that defendant was in
breach of that duty in such a way as to have caused harm to the plaintiff.
Courts also have to find a legal category for the matter before them. In the informed
178
consent scenario, courts across the Commonwealth argue the matter in the tort of negligence.
The question before the court is whether in the situation being adjudicated the medical
practitioner owed the patient a duty of care which included informing the patient of the
particular inherent risk which did in fact eventuate and cause harm. Omission in this instance
176 Cf. the discussion of the 'erosion' cases in 6.3.
177
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forms the basis for liability. The decision whether or not to hold that a duty exists is a policy
matter, as is the test which will determine whether or not the duty was breached and indeed
whether or not the breach caused the injury actually suffered.
Finding a legal category involves asking 'what is the fault?' If the injury can be said
sine qua non to have been caused by lack of information on an inherent risk to the procedure in
question, and the court considers that information to have been material to the patient's consent,
then the fault element lies with the information which was allegedly absent. The question which
follows is 'was there a duty in these circumstances to divulge that piece of information?' This is
inseparable from the question, 'was this piece of information material!'
If, in Britain, the doctor's duty of care were to include the disclosure of all risks material
to the patient, then the law of medical negligence based on consent would become as patient-
centric as that of Australia unless a more objective test for causation were adopted. This is one
reason why England is holding on to the Bolam test as articulated in Sidaway: if they let that
backstop fall, then with an already well-established subjective test for causation, radical and
swift change would be unavoidable.179
The Bolam test may be eroded by the assertiveness of the court over evidence. Yet the
Bolam standard in England is also eroded through the Bolam test itself by arguing that a doctor's
allegedly negligent behaviour is based on a responsible body of medical opinion.180 Bolam is
more a rule of evidence than a rule of law and as current opinion evolves so standards are able to
come in line with new developments in medicine. Paradoxically, this has been argued as the
strength of the test, yet it means in effect that Bolam can be used to adopt a form of the doctrine
of informed consent.
With the current trend towards more comprehensive disclosure in practice,181 the
question arises: is good practice defined by the law, or is the Bolam standard defined by
currently accepted interpretations of what constitutes good practice? This difference would be
178
As discussed in Chapter 1 and, latterly, with the exception of South Africa.
179 Cf. Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of causation.
180 Cf. Chapter 6.
112
illusory in Britain were a responsible body of medical opinion to agree on court guidelines
which amount to the adoption of some form of consent doctrine. That way they would be able
to maintain the Bolam or Hunter tests yet still establish more balanced consent principles while
not fully accepting informed consent as a wholesale doctrine.18""
3.4.2. The South African Example
Such a judicial adaptation of the doctrine occurred in South Africa in Castell v De Greef. In that
case the plaintiff averred that the surgeon was under a duty to warn of material risks,
complications and alternatives so arguing for a displacement of the 'reasonable doctor' test. The
judgement in Castell v DeGreef was based on the South African law of delict. Having
considered a test for materiality the court held that this patient had not given full consent and
consequently that the volenti defence failed. The South African court found in volenti a legal
category for consent and risk-taking. On policy grounds, the court then transposed that scenario
to another context in order to test whether consent had been given. This involved a post facto
inquiry and allowed the court to escape the category of negligence. The problem here is that
success under volenti will mean that it will be held that the defendant was not in breach of the
duty of care. This shows the importance of the sequence of the judgement: in South Africa the
judgement considered policy prior to rationale, while in Britain policy emerges from the
judgements themselves.183
Judge Ackerman pointed out that the court in Rogers v Whitaker had criticised the term
'informed consent' on the ground that consent is relevant to actions in trespass rather than
actions in negligence.184 He held the position formulated in Rogers v Whitaker to be correct, but
sought to adapt it. What is important here, from ideological and precedent points of view, is the
ability of a judiciary to adapt a doctrine to fit its own jurisprudential needs, and indeed to adapt
the volenti defence to fit the medical scenario.
The use of volenti had two effects other than removing the issue from the realm of
181
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negligence, if temporarily.185 It placed the disclosure and materiality of risk in a contractual
context and it shifted the evidentiary burden onto the defendant who must show that on balance
of probabilities the plaintiff was volens,186 This is done by showing that, in terms of judicial
criteria, the plaintiff had in fact made a 'conscious, deliberate, informed and voluntary decision
to run a known risk [which is] is therefore in its nature subjectively determined.'187
3.5. Conclusion
The whole issue of informed consent turns on 'materiality' and how, and from whose viewpoint,
the judiciary defines the term. In South Africa a plaintiff would be volens if he knew of the
inherent risks which are material. Volenti non fit iniuria is non-normative, yet all informed
consent cases turn on whether information is or is not supplied and hence require a definition of
'materiality'. As soon as materiality is defined and that definition is judicially applied, the
matter becomes intrinsically normative. But because normativity and volenti are mutually
exclusive, this makes for distinctly incongruent law, because volenti is a question of fact.
The difference between jurisdictions is seen at the policy level. In Scotland and in
England, policy decisions are made almost covertly in a manner in which the policy of the court
emerges from the decision itself.188 In adopting a view on informed consent in which materiality
is assessed from the point of view of the medical practitioner, courts adopt a policy favourable
to practitioners. The South African court, on the other hand, considered policy more overtly and
in the opposite sequence by beginning with a desirable position and then considering a possible
legal peg on which to hang that policy.
Canadian and Australian courts fight the corner of the injured patient by making the
policy decision to assess materiality from the patient's point of view. Courts then translate that
185
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assessment to the language of the standard of care which is to be imposed on medical
189
practitioners in the consent scenario, but temper that language with the language of rights.
Whichever tests are employed in an assessment of the various facets of the informed
consent inquiry, medical evidence is critically important. In British jurisdictions, bodies of
opinion are juxtaposed and an assessment made by the court. In Canada and Australia, on the
other hand, expert evidence on information actually disclosed and material to the patient is
merely a useful guide to the court. In South Africa in the context of volenti non fit iniuria, the
evidence of experts is useful to establish the facts rather than to help the court formulate a
normative standard. These are positions which will be considered in Chapter 5 on the expert.
However, because of what has been argued about the dovetailing of the test for materiality with
that for causation, it is appropriate to precede any discussion of the role of expert evidence with






The issue of causation deals with the alleged consequences of a negligent act or omission. In
this instance the negligent omission to inform of an inherent risk in a procedure or an alternative
to that procedure would be alleged to have caused the injury suffered by the plaintiff. To prove
this, the plaintiff would argue that but for the omission to inform, he would not have suffered
the injury because he would not have undergone that procedure at that time. This involves
proving a negative and is, consequently, hypothetical.1 This chapter will investigate this final
facet of proof in disclosure cases by considering the concept of causation itself and then the tests
for legal causation used in the jurisdictions under discussion.
A causal statement is one from which the inference can be drawn that two events are
causally connected. We speak of a chain of causation because events are consecutive and the
chain can be broken by other events. This picture is made more complex when several possible
events can be said to have caused a given injury.2 This advances the discussion from a pair of
events to the relation between a consequent event and a chain of antecedent events.3 When the
cause of a harm is the sum total of the conditions of an event, this tells us that the harm is
caused by the event only when that event is one element in a general set, and one without which
the harm would not have occurred.
In this context it is simplistic to say that a doctor's omission to inform a patient of the
possible consequences of a procedure caused the injury suffered by that patient.4 Yet a
judgement will be expressed in those terms through the use of legal tests for causation. This
chapter will be examining these tests in the context of informed consent. The law asks in what
conditions a single event can be spoken of as a cause; in the present context, one must ask
whether a non-event - the omission to give material information to the patient - can be
1
See Tony Honore, 'Causation and Disclosure of Medical Risks', (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 54.
2
This is what happened in Wilsher v Essex. Cf. 1.3.3.
3
Drawing on Mill's philosophy on causation. See HLA Hart and T Honore. Causation and the Law. (2 Ed.)
1985. The Clarendon Press. Oxford. 18.
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considered to be causal. When an event is seen as a cause, blame or responsibility can be
ascribed. This is important in the light of the desire, on the part of injured patients, for an
explanation. Such a 'necessary condition' is discovered through the application of the sine qua
non test for factual causation.
The difference between factual and legal causation is important in the informed consent
scenario because of how these different facets of the causation inquiry speak to the ethical
issues within disclosure cases. Through the sine qua non test, the inquiry into factual causation
speaks to the probable, and therefore hypothetical, actions of the plaintiff. It for this reason that
it is the evidence of the plaintiff which ought to carry most weight. This true is in the case of
Canada and Australia, though significantly not so in Britain.1
If the negligent non-disclosure on the part of the medical practitioner can be said to be a
conditio sine qua non of the plaintiff's injury, the court will go on to consider legal causation.
For this final facet of the inquiry, the court will ask whether the omission was the causa causans
of the plaintiff's injury. Legal causation is synonymous with words such as direct, decisive,
proximate, real and substantial6 and is related to the absence of a novus actus interveniens which
may be said to have broken the chain of causation between the negligent omission and the
injury. It is difficult to think what event, if any, could constitute a novus actus in the informed
consent inquiry.
This difficulty stems from the fact that within the doctor-patient relationship,
confidentiality and privacy are highly esteemed values. Other than in the context of a referral,
there is unlikely to be any event, related to the plaintiffs condition and the medical indications
for and against surgery, which is likely to constitute a novus actus between wrongful omission
and injury. This follows from what was argued in Chapter 2 on the relationship between doctor
and patient which is accepted judicially and being constituted by reliance and an imbalance of
power in the context of which the patient tends to accept the doctor's advice with little
questioning until after injury has been suffered. This, in turn, means that the informed consent
inquiry turns almost entirely on the inquiry into factual causation, because legal causation is less
important and because the rest of the case will turn on the court's definition of materiality which
4
Because the surgery itself would have caused the injury.
5
Chapter 5 will go on to consider this point in greater depth.
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itself has a direct bearing on factual causation.
That is not to say that legal causation is unimportant. Two factors are said to be
important in the determination of the causa causans: reasonable forseeability and the sequence
of events. The latter has been considered above. Reasonable forseeability is about the patient's
value system which courts would expect the reasonable medical practitioner to be aware of if a
particular injury is held to be reasonably forseeable. If the sine qua non test is both a subjective
one (which asks what the patient would have done) and a hypothetical one, this means that there
is not much room for paternalism. This, the cynic might argue, is why British jurisdictions
adhere to a more paternalistic test for the standard of care as embodied in the Bolam test.
Reasonable forseeability is objective in the sense that it is about reasonableness; it is also
subjective in the sense that it is about forseeability which is itself contextual and therefore
dependant on the patient's value system and the doctor's knowledge of that value system.7
Medical knowledge has become very important to the law in answering the question of
factual causation and in answering questions of both moral and physical responsibility. This
task is accomplished with the help of medical evidence. The determination of factual causation
is no easy task for the court because it deals with the probable actions of the plaintiff.8 In the
medical field, pre-existing conditions,9 as well as consequent and subsequent developments, can
obscure the factual picture. The outcomes of disclosure and some medical product liability
cases turn on the acceptance of the expert evidence on the issue in dispute, by the court's trier of
fact. It also turns on the basis of the court's finding on causation.
In the law of torts or delict, causation is a necessary element of the claim. It is common
ground in all the legal systems under discussion that the plaintiff in personal injury cases bears
the burden of establishing on balance of probabilities that the defendant's alleged negligence
6
See Thomson. Delictual Liability, pi 17.
7
This will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5.
8
This is not unique to this area of law and crops up inter alia when dealing with safety around the workplace.
9
Such a problem would pose itself in the case of iatrogenic injuries. For example, in operations on areas of the
body where high concentrations of bacteria occur naturally (an appendectomy, for example), where sepsis
results it is difficult to determine whether sepsis was caused by inadequate pre-operative sterilisation
procedures or as by the bacteria naturally occurring in the appendix. Similarly, it may at times be difficult to
distinguish as a matter of fact, between the natural progression of a disease and an extraneous causal agent.
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was a proximate cause of, or materially contributed to, the injury to the plaintiff.10
The issue in this thesis is the supply to the patient-plaintiff of what we can now call
material information on the medical procedure in question. This plaintiff must then prove that
the defendant's negligent omission to supply that information caused the injury suffered. To
establish this, the plaintiff is required first to satisfy the but for test, that is to prove that had he
been informed of the inherent risk in or alternative to a medical procedure, he would not have
undergone the procedure at that time and hence would have avoided the injury associated with
the inherent risk. As we will see, the issue of and test for causation differs among jurisdictions.
It is these tests which will be juxtaposed in this chapter. Alternatively, in the law of torts or
delict, 'material contribution' may establish causation."
Having established that a duty of care in fact existed in the circumstances of the case,
and that it included provision of information on the risk which eventuated, there should be
established a sufficiently proximate link between this negligent omission of the defendant and
the loss suffered by the plaintiff. The causation inquiry is in two stages. Factual or proximate
causation is established first as a question of medical fact which asks whether the treatment
could possibly have caused the injury complained of. Thereafter, and given an answer in the
affirmative, the court asks, 'would the plaintiff have suffered the loss or injury which he in fact
suffered, but for the act or omission of the defendant?'
If the answer to the sine qua non question is 'yes', then the plaintiff fails to establish a
sufficiently proximate link. More specifically, the question is not whether a given event in fact
occurred, but rather whether that event is 'sufficiently like the standard case [of such events] so
as to be classified alongside it for legal purposes.'12 If the answer is 'no', then the court goes on
to consider legal causation. This is where the issue becomes controversial because it is at that
stage of the inquiry that policy considerations come into play.13 It is in the causation inquiry as
a whole that different tests and policies are employed to different effects. This is important
because not only is there a difference among jurisdictions; there is a difference in respect of the
10
Except in cases where the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies or the example of South Africa, where the defence
of volenti non fit iniuria is available.
"
See the discussion of the McGhee principle in 4.3. and 6.2.2.
12
Hart & Honore. 111.
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tests for negligence simpliciter and in respect of disclosure cases - though not in the case of
Britain.
The term by which the inquiry is known is not taken literally. In fact it is questionable
whether legal causation has anything to do with 'relations between particular events in time and
place',14 because the main objective of the inquiry is to ensure that at its conclusion the victim is
fully compensated. Legal causation itself has nothing to do with cause and effect, yet remains
an inseparable facet of a dual causation inquiry. It has to do with proximity and policy and with
the desire to ascribe blame and responsibility and to exhort explanation following medical
mishap.
The issue of blame or culpability is an important one and, ideologically, this is another
reason why the causation inquiry is an important one. If a medical practitioner can be said to
have factually and legally caused a particular injury due to their negligent omission, this will
render that practitioner responsible for that person's injury. Vicarious liability aside, it is this
which injured patients would seek: someone to shoulder the responsibility. This gains enhanced
importance in our present culture of blame because to say that a doctor caused someone to
suffer an injury which was itself a risk inherent in the medical procedure undertaken, implies a
very weighty value judgement. The court would, in effect, be isolating a single non-event as
blameworthy and, in that isolation, ignoring the many other factors which went into the
patient's decision.15 This is ironic in view of the application of the test for causation which - if
it be modified-objective in the Canadian sense, or even if it be subjective in the Australian sense
- which requires the court and the medical practitioner to take these factors (such as lifestyle,
value system, etc.) into account.
In negligence matters, policy has two main opportunities to express itself.16 The first is
the inquiry into whether a duty of care exists in a given set of circumstances and relations - and
indeed the matter of the test for the standard of that care. The second concerns the interests of
13
For a full treatment of this topic, see B S Markesinis & S F Deakin Tort Law (3 Ed.). 1995. Oxford. New




For a discussion of blameworthiness and the relation between criminal and civil law in this respect, see
Padfield, Nicola. 'Clean Water and Muddy Causation: is Causation a Question of Law or Fact, of Just a Way
of Allocating Blame?' [1995] Criminal Law Review 683.
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the plaintiff and the extent to which these interests are protected by legal tests for materiality
and causation. It is at that point that the scope of legal responsibility is guided by policy. Legal
policy is both made and guided within the inquiry into causation because the two facets are
amalgamated.17 Rules on the burden of proof make a matter more or less easy for the plaintiff
to prove, and these rules can be manipulated. An example of such judicial manipulation was
seen in the discussion ofmateriality in this thesis.18
Limits on liability imposed by the rules governing causation are matters of judicial
policy. An example of this is cited by Hart and Honore as the McGhee principle19 in which a
decision was made on the loss of chance doctrine in the law of delict based on policy and using
causation rules. Legal policy is a question for the court rather than for the jury or the finder of
fact. It comprises a question of whether the method of inquiry into causation is able to protect
the interests of the plaintiff and it is predicated on whether, in the view of the court, those
interests are worth protecting.
The inquiry into proximate causation is an example of such a court-imposed limitation
on liability. Proximity has little to do with factual causation and so for reasons of policy falls
under the inquiry into legal causation. Causal principles, then, are supplemented by judicial
policy in order not to impose too great a burden on defendants. Hart and Honore argue that
20these questions are essentially non-causal and are in fact fit for consideration by a jury." This is
considered to be the correct view on the ground that it would remove from the judiciary an
existing hegemony of approach which would serve the purpose of the inquiry into legal
causation by benefiting the plaintiff. At the same time it would allow more scope for reform in
the law.
Factual causation, on the other hand, is not particularly controversial in disclosure cases
because it is answered on the basis of medical evidence in the United Kingdom.21 Difficulties
arise where there is more than one possible factual cause of injury, which is why the matter is
16
Although, as this thesis has pointed out, many smaller policy 'junctions' exist (Cf. 1.6., & 3.4., as well as
6.1).








Which can itself be controversial, however. Cf. 5.5.4.
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determined on balance of probabilities rather than on actual possibility.22 Yet controversy exists
insofar as there is an 'air of arbitrariness' in ascertaining probability of greater than fifty per
The causation inquiry as a whole remains controversial, because that is one of the points
at which different policies of jurisdictions become apparent.24 It is at that point that policy is
able to be made through objective or subjective tests which produce different judicial decisions
because policy is, after all, another term for selective reasoning. It is therefore the tests for
hypothetical25 causation which deserve consideration here, particularly in respect of which
parties' values are taken into account to a greater degree through the form of testing used. Once
again, it is instructive to begin with the positions in some American jurisdictions.
4.2. America
Because the so-called doctrine of informed consent is an American product and because
causation is a pivotal stage within disclosure cases from a policy point of view, it is important to
consider the position on causation in that country. The American plaintiff still bears the burden
of proof of establishing the prima facie elements of the cause and so must establish that the
defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of the injury actually suffered.
Canterbury v Spence26 remains the American case on informed consent which is most
cited within the Commonwealth and in the literature on the topic. In that case it was held that
once it has been established that there was a duty to disclose a certain risk, and that the
practitioner negligently omitted to do so, the 'unrevealed risk that should have been made
known must materialize, for otherwise the omission, however unpardonable, is legally without
22
See Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074.
23
Markesinis & Deakin. 170. This also has to do with what was argued in Chapter 2 on medical thinking. As
a science, medicine is empirical; an expert witness, turning the learning of experience into probabilities for the
benefit of the court and without the benefit of personal knowledge of the plaintiff, is a very inexact science.
24
Another being the degree acceptance or rejection of Bolam-style standards on the matter of informed consent
outlined in Chapters 3 and 6.
23
It will be hypothetical because the result will depend on the evidence-led conclusion drawn by the court as to
what the plaintiff would have done had he or she had the information which was lacking.
26
464 F.2d 772 (1972).
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consequence.'27 This is because of the tort principle that negligence unrelated to injury is not
actionable.
There must be an injury and this must be caused by the practitioner's omission. It was
established in Canterbury v Spence that a 'causal connection exists when, and only when,
disclosure of significant risks incidental to treatment would have resulted in a decision against
it.'28 It was held that the rationale behind this is that the disclosure rule has the purpose of
allowing the patient to avoid adverse consequences if in his estimation the risk of those
consequences materialising is too great.
The court went on to consider the subjective test for legal causation, which asks what
this patient would have decided had the information been given. Judge Robinson argued that
linking a conclusion on factual causation with the plaintiff's testimony in this matter rendered
the question hypothetical. He preferred an objective test, holding that the subjective approach
'places the physician in jeopardy of the patient's hindsight and bitterness.'29 He opted for
solving the issue in terms of what a prudent person in the plaintiffs position would have
decided if suitably informed of all perils bearing significance.'30 For this the plaintiffs
testimony is relevant, but not dispositive.
That said, there has been modification of this standard in some jurisdictions: for
example, in McPherson v Ellis,31 the Supreme Court of North Carolina used a subjective test.
Having agreed that the problem with subjective testing in proximate causation lay with
hindsight, Mitchell J said, 'The detriments of the objective standard are more severe,
however.'32 This is because, as he put it, '[t]he right to base one's consent on proper
information is effectively vitiated for those with fears, apprehensions, religious beliefs, or
superstitions outside the mainstream of society.'33 Accordingly, he held the subjective test to be
the proper standard.
27
790 [30]. An exception, perhaps, might be a sterilisation operation in which refusing to undergo the
operation on the ground of the risk of failure would be counter-productive because the very purpose of the
surgery would be ignored.
28 790 [31].
29 790- 791 [31].
30 791 [32],





More recently, in Bernard v Char 4 the Appeal Court of Hawaii discussed the matter
more fully, noting that 'a divergence of views exists' on the standard to determine proximate
causation.35 Judge Wanatabe cited with approval another Hawaiian case, observing that the
court in Leyson v Steuermann36 had 'opted to apply a "modified objective standard" that
determines causation "from the viewpoint of the actual patient acting rationally and
reasonably".' Accordingly, the Hawaiian judiciary adopted a compromise standard, which
placed that jurisdiction in the same position as that adopted by the Canadian judiciary. We will
see that there is as little uniformity among American jurisdictions as there is among the others
being considered.
4.3. England and Subjectivity
The issue as settled in England is the starting point taken by other Commonwealth jurisdictions.
It is fitting to start in that jurisdiction in which the test for causation in tort law has been held to
be and remains subjective and individualised.37 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management
38
Committee and Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the
Maudsley Hospital39 together remain the leading cases on consent in England.
Bolam concerned alleged negligent administration of treatment as well as failure to
warn a psychiatric patient of the risk of fracture involved in electro-convulsive therapy for
depressive illness. Having found that the defendant was not negligent in omitting to give a
warning, McNair J did not need to consider the issue of causation. Prior to this finding,
however, he had asked the jury, 'Suppose you come to the conclusion that proper practice
34 903 P.2d 676 (1995) Haw. App.
33 383. Watanabe J cited the following cases as critical of the subjective standard: Sard v Hardy Md., 449, 379
A.2d, 1025 (1977) (quoting Canterbury v Spence, 464 F.2d (772), 790-91) and Hartke v McKelway 464 U.S.
983, 78 L. Ed. 2d 360, 104 S. Ct. 425 (1983). As having adopted the subjective standard, the judge cited
Hammer v Mount Sinai Hosp. 220 Conn. 933, 599 A.2d 384 (1991), McPherson v Ellis, 305 N.C. 266, 287
S.E.2d 892 (1982) and Scott v Bradford 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979).
36
Haw. App. at 517 n.10, 705 P.2d at 47.
'
But consider the arguments in 6.3. and later in this section on the introduction of more objectivity. Consider,
too, Tony Honore, 'Causation and Disclosure of Medical Risks', (1998) 114 Law Quarterly Review 54 in
which Honore argues that all jurisdictions [covered by this thesis and with the exception of some American
Jurisdictions] other than Canada adopt a subjective test for causation. With respect, it is submitted that that his
view is incorrect, though courts do not state the issue overtly. Cf. 6.3.
38
[1957] 2 All ER 118, [1957] 1 WLR 582.
39
[1985] 1 All ER 643 HL, [1984] 2 WLR 778; [1984] AC 871.
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requires some warning to be given, would it have made any difference?'40 Significantly, he
went on to assert that only the plaintiff could answer that question.4' The jury was directed that,
'in order to recover damages for failure to give warning the plaintiff must show not only that the
failure was negligent but also that if he had been warned he would not have consented to the
treatment.'42
Hirst, J in Hills v Potter, did not need to consider causation either, because he had
already held that the defendant had not been negligent; yet he did so 'for the sake of
completeness.'43 Having drawn on Reibl v Hughes extensively in his consideration of the
appropriate form of action he suggested that the test would be objective and that on that test the
plaintiff would have failed. Not only were these comments obiter, but this was not the position
adopted by the judiciary when they were to consider the matter of causation when it mattered.
Sidaway remains the most important English decision on informed consent, yet the
court was silent on causation because the case turned on whether or not English law should
adopt the doctrine of informed consent. Having decided that it should not, a discussion of
causation was not necessary because it was held that the standard of care did not include
obtaining informed consent, and that on the Bolam standard, the duty of care had not been
breached. This case did consider the legal positioning of the doctrine and found that its correct
place is in the law of torts; specifically in negligence.44 Lord Scarman noted, 'One point is
clear, however. If failure to warn of a risk is actionable in English law, it must be because it is
in the circumstances a breach of the duty of care: in other words, the doctor must be shown to be
negligent.'45
Had the case not been concerned with the duty of care and the adoption of the doctrine
of informed consent, or indeed had the House adopted that doctrine, the House of Lords would
have had to consider causation. Causation is material in the United Kingdom only after it has
been established that the relationship between the litigating parties was sufficiently proximate to
40
[1957] 2 All ER 118, 124H.
41
This approach has changed radically in other jurisdictions and is no longer supported in England either. Cf.
6.2.
42
[1957] 2 All ER 118, 1181.
43
[1983] 3 All ER 716, 728/-g.
44
Consider the discussion of the law in Sidaway [1985] 1 AC 871, 883 per Lord Scarman.
45
Sidaway [1985] 1 AC 871, 885E per Lord Scarman.
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found a duty of care, and that that duty was breached by the defendant. At that point the court is
able to make or enforce policy at the level of causation. In negligence terms, this means that the
plaintiff would have to prove that the defendant's act or omission was causal as a conditio sine
qua non in terms of the test adopted by the court. The standard on the Bolam test and informed
consent as set out in Sidaway remains the standard in England, although some modification has
been noted at the level of causation.46
Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority47 considered the matter of whether the
loss of a chance was an issue of causation or quantum. Lord Bridge held that the applicable
legal principle here is:
'Unless a plaintiff has proved on balance of probabilities that the delayed treatment was
at least a material contributory cause of the [injury] he failed on the issue of causation
and no question of quantification could arise.'48 He went on to confirm that, 'This
amounts to a finding of fact.'49
The matter of loss of chance will be reconsidered in greater detail in Chapter 6 when discussion
turns to possible routes towards British adoption of the principles embodied in the doctrine of
informed consent. In that context, it will be suggested that the loss of chance is the chance to
engage an alternative physician. This argument will be based on some of the extents to which
the doctrine has been taken in America. It is for that reason, and in the interests of
completeness, that loss of chance is mentioned in a chapter on causation. However, given that
the court in Hotson rejected loss of chance as a form of recovery in medical negligence cases, it
is considered unlikely that courts would adopt it as part of a doctrine which does not form part
of the law of the United Kingdom. That said, in Goorkani, the pursuer, having lost his case on
its merits, was awarded damages for loss of the opportunity to become accustomed to the
sterility which was an inherent risk in the treatment to which he had consented. In the informed
consent scenario, the patient 'loses the opportunity to escape the full effects of his illness'50
because an inherent risk caused him injury. The argument is the following: if the court in
Hotson left the issue open as regards the possibility of recovering damages in medical
negligence cases for loss of chance, and given the judgement in Goorkani and the argument
which will be presented in Chapter 6 which asserts that the American extremes are a form of
46 Cf. Chapter 6.
47






Marc Staunch. 'Causation, Risk, and loss of Chance in Medical Negligence.' (1997) 17 Oxford Journal of
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lost chance, it is possible that loss of chance as a causation issue, could come to the aid of the
plaintiff.
If one is considering the loss of chance to engage a physician who has a better track
record, the Kokemoor omission to inform of the physician's track record would be considered to
be material information only within the confines of the doctrine of informed consent, once
adopted.51 Thereafter, one might argue that the less experienced surgeon performing the
operation, materially increased the chances of suffering an inherent risk. The plaintiff would
argue that had they known of both the inherent risk and the surgeon's inexperience, they would
not have consented to the procedure and would hence not have suffered the injury.
Other than loss of chance and sine qua non, another way of proving causation is by
establishing material contribution. Putting any single event or non event forward as a cause in
law is tantamount to an exclusion of other factors such as the patient's lifestyle, which is why,
as Staunch suggests, one ought to begin to consider a particular non-event as a cause if it is a
necessary element in a set of events which together comprise the cause of an injury.52 The twin
tests of balance of probabilities and material contribution entail the mixing of questions of law
with causal questions of fact, must precede the question of what action the plaintiff would have
taken in the event of having been informed. Similarly, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, drawing on
the McGhee principle,53 stressed the need to establish a relationship between the injury suffered
and the defendant's omission.
In McGhee, the court found that the omission to provide washing facilities materially
contributed to the dermatitis suffered by the plaintiff. That omission was part of a set of events
such as the fact that the plaintiff had to cycle home, so allowing the brick dust (a further causal
element) to remain on his skin and lead to dermatitis. The omission to inform of a risk can be
seen as having made a similar material contribution because, along with other factors which
have to do with the plaintiff's lifestyle, values and pre-existing medical condition, it would have
appeared to the patient that treatment was an indicated option. In that sense, the doctor's
51 See discussion of Johnson v Kokemoor 199 Wis. 2d 615, 545 N.W.2d 495 (1996). In 6.2.2.
32
See Marc Staunch. 'Causation, Risk, and loss of Chance in Medical Negligence.' (1997) 17 Oxford Journal
ofLegal Studies 205." Established by McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 All ER 1008, [1973] 1 WLR 1. Lord Mackay drew
on this principle despite the fact that neither party relied on the decision.
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omission may be said to be a cause if it was both a necessary element among a set of other
factors for the harmful effect.
In the final analysis of the judgement, one puts the non-event forward as a cause and, in
that act, isolates it from other factors. This becomes a policy question - albeit in subtext - and a
matter of the allocation of blame and responsibility. In Britain, this effect is minimised by the
application of the Bolam test because it is the medical practitioner's view of materiality which
carries more weight in courts than the injured patient's view. This means that those 'other
factors' are not recognised as being as important as they are seen to be in Canada, Australia and
South Africa.54
Considering the Bolam test in the context of materiality and causation tends to beg the
question of the applicability of Bolam to the causation inquiry. The Court of Appeal (and later
the House of Lords) considered this in Bolitho and Others v City and Hackney Health
Authority.55 The defence admitted negligently omitting to attend and to intubate a child
suffering from respiratory blockage insofar as the paediatrician had not responded to a pager
call from the ward sister, but disputed the matter on causation, arguing that the case turned on
what the reasonable doctor would have done in the situation.
This argument was based on the fact that intubation would, on the evidence, have saved
the patient. By extension the omission was a proximate cause of the injury because but for
those material omissions the plaintiff would not have been harmed. The argument was accepted
by Farquharson LJ on behalf of the Court of Appeal who held that '[wjhether Dr Horn's failure
to appear would have made any difference depended on what she would have done had she been
present.'56 This is because her actions would have determined the chain of causation.
Lord Justice Dillon supported the Maynard51 approach in this case, seeing it as
'essentially [a question] of causation.'58 In the Court of Appeal Lord Justice Simon Brown
threw a cat among the pigeons in his dissenting judgement in Bolitho. Considering causation,
14
Thought in the next chapter this view will be challenged.
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he noted that the court at first instance used divergent tests at separate parts of the judgement.59
He argued that the matter was resolved according to what he termed the 'Maynard test'60 which
lies in the answer as to whether a senior Registrar of ordinary skill would have intubated the
patient. He argued that what he termed the 'probability test' ought to be employed; that is that it
was more probable than not that had Dr Horn attended, the action she would have taken would
have averted the injury.
Simon Brown LJ argued that the contextual basis for the Maynard test is Bolam and
Hunter v Hanley and that that in itself makes it inappropriate to a discussion of causation. He
argued that '[in this instance] no doctor ever took a decision whether to intubate' and so it was
not a question of preferring one body of respectable medical opinion over another. Simon
Brown LJ cited McWilliams v Sir William Arrow & Co. Ltd!'1 in which Lord Hudson had said,
'it rarely matters where the onus originally lay, the question is which way the balance of
probabilities has come to rest.' As Puxon argued,
'It is worth noting that the Maynard principle - "negligence is not established by
preferring one responsible body of professional opinion to another" - only applies to
treatment and diagnosis, not causation.'62
This was not an argument which was to appeal to the House of Lords.
The central importance of Bolitho concerns causation on the level of hypothesis; it is
this that makes the comparison between Bolitho and the disclosure cases an appropriate one. On
that point the House of Lords addressed two questions: would the doctor have intubated and
was such failure to intubate contrary to accepted medical practice.63 The second question can
only be broached if the first is answered in the negative.
It was not disputed that, as a question of fact, the failure to intubate led to the patient's




From the judgement in Maynard the grounds for this test lie in Lord Scarman's judgement in which he held
that 'negligence is not established by preferring one respectable body of professional opinion over another.
Failure to exercise the ordinary skill of a doctor (in the appropriate speciality if he be a specialist) is necessary.'
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question. There was no question in the evidence of what the consultant paediatrician in fact did;
but it was essential to her case to argue that she would not have intubated had she attended/'4
Determination of what would have happened had someone attended the patient therefore fell to
be resolved on the basis of hypothesis; to so hypothesise the court used the Bolam test.
Such a situation can arise only in cases dealing with omissions. This is because the
court did not, within the inquiry into causation, ask whether the treatment was one among
several alternatives that would have been rightly employed by the reasonable medical
practitioner. The court asked whether an omission would have been made by the reasonable
consultant and then applied that answer to their test for causation.
This means that the case did not concern an assessment of the relative risks and benefits
within the standard of care as much it considered that assessment within the causation inquiry.
A common practice can be condemned as unacceptable, but that has more to do with credibility
and internal consistency of evidence than Denning-style judging. The medical profession still
polices itself subject to judicial sanction; we must bear in mind that the defendant won precisely
by applying a medical standard to causation which is, in fact, the controversial aspect of the
judgement.
The decision in Bolitho will be closely monitored - less for what it held on the matter of
expert evidence than for its consideration of causation and the applicability of the Bolam test at
that stage of the judicial inquiry. The danger in this case is hybridisation: mixing the Bolam test
with tests for causation in a test which requires the plaintiff to prove that had the omission not
occurred, what would have happened in its place would not only have been what the reasonable
practitioner in that situation would have done, but that this reasonable practitioner's actions
would have prevented the injury to the plaintiff. This is viewing the argument from the opposite
angle: ordinarily one has an act or omission which falls to be assessed by the standards of the
reasonably competent practitioner in the situation. Now we have an injury from which we are
required to determine what the reasonably competent practitioner in the situation would have
done prior to it and from that we may assess whether negligence has occurred.
64
The analogy here is that in disclosure cases the defence would argue that the reasonable medical practitioner
would not have informed the patient of a particular inherent risk.
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That the Bolam test was formerly inapplicable to the causation inquiry follows a
conclusion which was anticipated in Sidaway.b5 A responsible body of opinion supported the
defendant and the court was not entitled to prefer one body of respectable opinion over the other
unless one opinion was found to be Wednesbury unreasonable. The application of Bolam is not
usually applicable to the issue of causation, being 'too simplistic an approach when it comes to
causation.'66 Legal causation is not a matter to be assessed by weight of expert opinion. This
sort of giving way to medical evidence can be ascribed to a tendency of the courts rather than to
the weight of the evidence because, as Puxon noted, it was 'certainly not encouraged by
Sidaway.'61
From the preceding discussion, it is arguable that Puxon has been proven wrong by the
House of Lords judgement in Bolitho. Bolam, then is applicable to the causation inquiry
because causation is hypothetical and Bolam is a useful test as a basis on which to hypothesise.
On the basis of this argument on omission liability, one can speculate68 on what the effect of this
might be on disclosure cases. For now it must be borne in mind that Bolitho was a case which
did not concern the informed consent scenario, but it remains important from the point of view
of the use of the Bolam test at the level of the inquiry into hypothetical causation. It is therefore
important to consider some English decisions on informed consent, which did broach the
question of causation.
Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority69 was an informed consent case in which the
surgeon had allegedly failed to explain sufficiently clearly the risk of impotence arising out of
the so-called Wells operation. Here the plaintiff succeeded in 'applying the Bolam test as
elucidated in Sidaway,,ia so was obliged to prove causation. Morland J held that on balance of
probabilities had the risk been disclosed, the plaintiff would have refused surgery. This was
65 Consider Loveday v Renton and Wellcome Foundation Ltd [1990] 1 MLR 117 in Lord Justice Stewart-Smith
held that 'it was fundamental to the Bolam test that if a doctor acted in accordance with the practice and
opinion of a respectable and responsible body of medical opinion, he was not guilty of negligence, even if
another respectable and responsible body of opinion held different views; such a test could not, therefore, apply
to causation.'
66
Comment by Margaret Puxon QC. [1993] 4 Med LR 393.
67
Ibid. This is largely irrelevant in Australia and Canada; and even more so in South Africa where the issue is
treated as one of consent rather than of negligence, even although causation remains an essential element of the
law of delict.
68
As will be done in 6.3.
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[1994] 5 Med LR 334
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decided on the grounds that the plaintiff was at the material time 28 years of age, happily
married and had by that stage suffered with his condition for eight years. The decision indicates
that the test in England is a subjective one.
A similar case to Smith v Tunbridge Wells, and reported directly after it, is McAllister v
Lewisham.11 An informed consent case which considered Bolam test, it concerned a consultant
neurosurgeon's allegedly negligent failure to inform the plaintiff of the risk of sensory deficit
beyond her leg (the area affected prior to surgery) as a result of brain surgery. Fortunately, this
case did not make a hybrid from causation and Bolam. In his judgement Rougier J said, 'Of one
thing however I feel confident and that is that Mrs McAllister would have postponed the
operation until such time as she had established herself in the new job which was so important
to her.'72
Mrs McAllister would under tort law have been required to establish just that, but the
judge in this case asked somewhat rhetorically, 'Is it possible to say, on a balance of probability,
what her decision would have been?'73 He concluded that the plaintiff s own 'reluctan[ce] to
hypothesise' on the basis of hindsight did not preclude a judge from so hypothesising. He also
concluded that the plaintiff would probably 'have continued to decline the operation.'74 Again,
the test for causation appears to have been subjective. Rougier J cited as reasons for coming to
this view, inter alia, the plaintiffs personality ('a sensible and independent-minded woman ...
who could be expected to make a rational decision') and her job and the independence it gave
her. Most importantly, Rougier J held that,
'given time to think, and in view of the fact that this was one of the most important
decisions of her life, she would, as she thought herself, have taken a second opinion,
and for the reasons I have already expressed, it is far more likely in my opinion that that
second opinion would have been much more keenly aware of the dangers of operating
and would, in whatever way it was expressed, have not been in favour of the
operation.'75
This decision effectively held that there was a causal connection between the
defendant's omission and the injury suffered by the plaintiff - an injury the risk of which was
70
339. Cf. Chapters 3 and 6. This case indicates an abandonment of the pure Bolam principle (see Puxon's
comment after this case).







inherent in the procedure. Notably, in the face of the plaintiffs inability to answer, Rougier J
considered himself able to assert that with the information which was lacking the plaintiff would
have sought a second opinion, so delaying the surgery and avoiding injury. Taken together and
considering the issue of causation, Smith v Tunbridge Wells and McAllister v Lewishcim indicate
a greater judicial sensitivity to the patient.
Newell and Newell v Goldenberg76 is an all too common example of a sterilisation
operation (vasectomy) about which the plaintiff was allegedly insufficiently acquainted with the
risk of failure. The defendant conceded that he did not give warning of a 1:2,300 chance of
recanalisation of the vas, but argued that this failure was consistent with the practice of a
responsible body of respectable medical opinion.
Mantell J held that that body of medical opinion was 'neither responsible nor
respectable', hence the omission was negligent. He said, 'in failing to warn of the risk that Mr
Newell might resume fertility the defendant fell below the standard required and was in breach
of duty.'77 Under the causation head, he went on to say,
'It follows that the plaintiffs, or at least one of them, must succeed, but to what extent?
That turns on the resolution of ...[a] more difficult question. What would the Newells
have done had they been told [of the risk]?'78
The plaintiffs had given evidence that had they known of the risk, Mrs Newell would also have
undergone a sterilisation - which she had in fact done after the birth of the child conceived
following Mr Newell's vasectomy. He held that this action was taken and this decision made
with the advantage of hindsight. He accepted the word of one expert that he knew of no case
where such a decision had been taken once a patient had been warned of the risks involved, of a
second that he rarely advised female sterilisation and of a third that he never advised
simultaneous sterilisation of both partners.
These factors, together with the plaintiffs' decision not to terminate the pregnancy, lead
to the conclusion that had they been fully advised as the duty of care demanded in this instance,
they would still have accepted the risk without Mrs Newell having surgery - which would have
75 353.
76
[1995] 6 Med LR 371.
77 A
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been medically contraindicated.79 In this case the test seems to be more objective, yet able to
take the particular plaintiff into account. What is apparent from this case and from McAllister v
Lewisham is that the courts do not take what the plaintiff has to say at face value; so showing a
similar skepticism of hindsight and proclivity for apparent-subjective testing to that of their
Canadian counterparts.80
The final English case for discussion here is Lybert v Warrington Health Authority.8I It
also considered a failed sterilisation operation; this time on a woman. The plaintiff proved that
there was a duty to inform and that this duty had not been fulfilled.8" The onus and the test for
causation remained as they had been in Newell and Newell v Goldenberg. According to that
test, Lord Justice Otton held that 'there was an inherent likelihood that the plaintiff and her
husband would have heeded a proper warning; conversely, there was an inherent unliklihood
that they would have ignored or forgotten had such a warning been given.'83 Here Otton LJ
accepted the evidence of one expert witness that 'in normal circumstances it would be
intrinsically improbable to use contraception in addition to sterilisation.' The judge quoted with
approval the judge at first instance, considering the following finding unassailable:
'I have come to the firm conclusion on the balance of probabilities, but to a degree
going beyond the mere balance, that the plaintiff would not, if she had been properly
counselled and warned before or after the operation, have engaged thereafter in
unprotected sex.'84
The plaintiff was thus allowed damages in respect of the birth of her child following failed
sterilisation.
Otton LJ held it to be intrinsically improbable that a couple would use contraceptive
methods additional to sterilisation in normal circumstances. However, he also held that these
did not constitute normal circumstances83 and were 'sufficient to tilt the balance of inherent
79
This is similar to the fact situation in Arndt v Smith.
80
This is important when considering the erosion of the Bolam test (in Chapter 6) and the direction that erosion
is likely to take. Cf. 6.3.
81
[1996] 7 Med LR 71.
82
By the contents of the signed consent form.
83
[1996] 7 Med LR 71, 72.
84
Ibid., 74, Col. ii.
85
The plaintiffs previous history of three caesarean section births, the problem of a waiting list for the
procedure and the advice (having reached the top of that list and also having fallen pregnant), that it was not
possible to perform a hysterectomy during a caesarean section, as well as the fact that a fourth caesarean
section would have been her probable lot had she fallen pregnant a fourth time (which she indeed did).
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probability in the opposite direction.'86 Here we see the court taking on trust the evidence of the
plaintiff, yet formulating this and other material in terms of 'inherent rmliklihood' and 'inherent
improbability'.
In summary, the law in England maintains the Bolam test and so does not adopt the
doctrine of informed consent. Similarly, and in accordance with the law of torts, courts
maintain a subjective test for causation, by taking the views of the patient into account. The
need to alter or employ any test for causation does not arise until the court finds in favour of the
plaintiff on the standard of care. At that point slightly more objectivity is needed in order to be
neither unduly harsh on the medical profession nor to give way to the hindsight of the patient.
This will become apparent when considering the Canadian test and be equally apparent, though
from a different perspective, when considering the Australian test. As discussed earlier, there
seems to be evidence for this in Newell and Newell v Goldenberg and McAllister v Lewisham.
If English courts adopt the doctrine of informed consent and include disclosure of all
material risks within the doctor's duty of care, then the law of medical negligence based on
consent could become as patient-centric as that of Australia unless a more objective test for
causation were adopted. This is because, as Chief Justice Laskin said in Reibl v Hughes in
Canada,
'Since liability rests only in negligence, in a failure to disclose material risks, the issue
of causation would be in the patient's hands on a subjective test, and would, if his
evidence were accepted, result inevitably in liability unless, of course, there was a
finding that there was no breach of the duty of disclosure.'87
That is why England is holding on to the Bolam test as articulated in Sidaway. It is also why
such decisions should be carefully monitored in the future because of the slippage towards a
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4.4. Scotland
Cosgrove v Lothian Health Board and Another19 followed Hunter v Hanley and Sidaway in
finding that there was no duty on a gynaecologist who was to perform a laparoscopic
sterilisation on the pursuer, to point out alleged additional risks of bowel damage in the case of a
patient who was obese. Accordingly the case failed because no negligence was found.
Counsel's 'insurance policy' was the submission, which was accepted by the court,90 that had
the pursuer established her case, that case would fail on causation. Lord Milligan held that even
if informed of an increased risk of bowel damage due to obesity from 0.18% to 0.36%, it was
very unlikely that she would have refused the operation. However, according to Cosgrove, the
test for causation remains only apparently subjective. This was held despite her evidence to the
contrary, which shows the same skepticism of hindsight as that shown in Newell and in
McAllister in England.
The volenti defence, which exists in the law of delict, is a defence which comes in at the
point of proof of causation. The chain of causation will have been broken by the patient's
voluntary assumption of risk. It has already been noted what test the court would apply in the
context of informed consent to medical procedures,91 yet this defence has not been held to apply
in the Scots law on informed consent.92
In disclosure cases the court will not confront the matter of causation until it is accepted
that the medical profession accepts the doctrine of informed consent, or that the duty of care
included provision of information on the material risk. In Scotland this depends on the opinion
of a respectable body of opinion. That this is the case is clear from Gordon v Wilson,93
In Moyes v Lothian Health Board the Outer House found that a neurologist who failed
to warn of the risk of stroke following an angiography procedure was not negligent on the
Hunter standard. The court thus had no need to consider causation. Even so, in Lord Caplan's
89
Court of Session: Outer House (1990), 9 March 1990, Unreported, Lexis, 1990 GWD 15-839.
90 Another matter unnecessarily covered in the judgement of Lord Milligan was that of quantum: he held that




The position in Scots law should be considered in conjunction with what was said in 3.3 on materiality and
the test laid down in Hunter v Hanley and in comparison to South Africa on volenti in 3.2.2.3., 4.7. & 6.4.
93 1992 SLT 849, 852F & 852L-853C. Cf. 3.3.1.
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opinion, had the failure to warn been found to be negligent, the outcome of the case would have
been different only if the patient would have refused to undergo the operation had she known of
the risk.94 A similarly subjective test was used in Goorkani v Tayside Health Board. In that case
the plaintiff established negligence in the failure to warn of the risk of infertility from a drug
used to treat an eye condition. However, it was held that even in the presence of such
information, the pursuer would have taken that risk because the drug saved his sight.95
4.5. Canada: Modified Objectivity
The causation inquiry in Canadian common law begins with the English law of torts in which a
subjective test was established. This test was comprehensively reanalysed and modified in the
context of informed consent in Reibl v Hughes96 which is the first major port of call of this
inquiry and which remains the benchmark case on informed consent in Canada.97
Before that case, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with the matter of informed
consent in Hopp v Leppm That case demonstrated that the first issue with which the court deals
is the duty of care. If the court holds that there was in the circumstances of the case a duty of
disclosure, the court may consider factual and then legal causation. That these are different
issues is clear from the fact that Laskin CJC quoted the trial judge, concerning the inherent risks
of the procedure, as having said, '[they] need not concern matters which directly cause the
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to become accustomed to his impending infertility.
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The facts of this case and its relevance to the issue of informed consent have been discussed in 1.2.1.
Discussion here will be confined to causation.
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Other cases to be considered here include: Lenis v DeVilliers 1992 Ont. CJ LEXIS 332, Kitchen v McMullin
(1989) 62 DLR (4th) 481, Haughain v Paine ((1987) 27 DLR (4th) 624, Zubrug v Bowie et al (1992/93) 91
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The value of this case lies in its discussion of materiality of risks100 and causation
because this case preceded Reibl v Hughes in which the doctrine of informed consent was
accepted and then modified. Where there is a duty to warn of risks, as there was in Canada at
the time, these risks are defined as those which 'would reasonably be expected to affect the
patient's decision to submit or not to submit to a proposed operation or treatment.'101
Taking a step forward, Reibl v Hughes adopted and modified the American doctrine
and, accordingly, modified the English test for causation to become more objective. While the
test in some American jurisdictions is objective, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a
modified objective test to include some subjective elements102 - possibly the legacy of English
tort law. Chief Justice Laskin began with the American argument for an objective test for
causation, noting that Canadian case law had hitherto employed a subjective test.103 He said,
'An alternative to the subjective test is an objective one, that is, what would a reasonable person
in the plaintiff's position have done if there had been a proper disclosure of attendant risks.'104
He recognised that a problem with the objective test lies in establishing causation where
the reasonable patient would have acted contrary to the surgeon's recommendation. This would
mean that the objective standard would 'put a premium on the surgeon's assessment of the
relative need for the surgery and on supporting medical evidence of that need.'105 He felt that it
was for that reason that Brooke JA, who handed down the Appeal Court judgement, put forward
a hybrid test.
Laskin CJC thought that the objective test did not leave the issue completely in the
surgeon's hands because the patient's individual circumstance reduces the force of those
recommendations. He argued that the better course was to balance the outcomes of having
surgery and not having surgery, against one another. He felt that the objective test was the
applicable one, but said that it should none the less be based on the decision a reasonable person
in the plaintiff's position would have made. He said. 'In short, although account must be taken
100
In which it was held that, 'Materiality connotes an objective test, according to what would reasonably be
regarded as influencing a patient's consent.' (1981) 112 DLR (3d) 67, 81.
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of a patient's particular position, a position which will vary with the patient, it must be
objectively assessed in terms of reasonableness.'106
Buchan v Ortho Pharmaceutical107 was not strictly a case of medical negligence or
informed consent, but it did concern the medical arena and information to the patient and the
court did discuss causation with reference to Reibl v Hughes The case concerned a woman
who was insufficiently warned by the manufacturer that taking a particular contraceptive pill
could lead to a stroke in some users. Although this case is complex,109 it is only the arguments
on causation which concern us here. The plaintiff established on balance of probabilities that
the taking of the drug itself was the factual cause of the stroke suffered.110 It was held that,
'While a low probability of injury or a small class of endangered users are factors to be
taken into account in determining what is reasonable, these factors must be balanced
against such considerations as the nature of the drug, the necessity for taking it, and the
magnitude or the increased danger to the individual consumer.'111
Robins JA held that once it had been established that the defendant was in breach of its duty to
warn prescribing physicians, there followed a reasonable presumption that the 'inadequacy of
the warning was a contributing cause of the ingestion of the drug',112 which was in turn a factual
cause of the injury.
The plaintiff had to go on to prove that had she known of the risk, she would not have
taken the pill because the final line of defence was that even if properly informed, the plaintiff
would still have taken the contraceptive. The defence submitted that the trial judge ought to
have applied the test as laid down in Reibl v Hughes rather than the subjective test beloved of
the law of torts. The trial judge accepted the plaintiffs testimony that had she known of the risk
she would not have used the pill, yet questioned the applicability of the objective test in
products liability cases. He argued that the plaintiff would 'labour under a difficult evidentiary
burden of adducing what a reasonable person in her particular circumstances would have
107
(Canada) Ltd (1986) 25 DLR (4th) 658 (Ont. CA)
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done',113 if the test were to be strictly applied.
Accordingly the trial judge modified the Reibl test. Despite this, he considered the case
in terms of the Reibl test (finding that 'a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would not
have taken the drug') as well as in terms of a more subjective test (finding that this plaintiff
would not have taken the drug). Even though it was applied at first instance, Robins JA held
that 'the Reibl test is inappropriate to products liability cases and ought not to be imported into
this department of the law.' He went on to say, 'Needless to say, the Reibl test must be applied
in Canada in appropriate medical malpractice actions.'114 It seems that informed consent cases,
while fitting broadly into the law of negligence, differ in Canada (and indeed in some American
jurisdictions) in one important respect: the test for causation is a modified objective rather than
a subjective one. It is difficult to see how this is not a policy-guided element of Canadian tort
law.
Considering again the question encountered in English courts - of causation and the
matter of a test for 'probability' or for 'possibility' - the court in Rothwell v Raes115 decided the
causation issue on possibility rather than probability, thereby recognising 'that causation may
well have to be proved without resolving the conflicting expert evidence, but rather by adopting
a "robust and pragmatic approach to the primary facts of the case.'"116 Here we see another
apparent split from English courts. Yet English decisions from recent years117 indicate that this
split is not as dramatic as it seems at first glance because the courts are showing a tendency
towards such a 'robust and pragmatic approach', as seen in Lybert v Warrington Health
Authority.
The important issue of causation was highlighted in the recent informed consent case of
Arndt v Smith.118 There a new trial was ordered when the trial judge took purely subjective
factors into account when determining causation. It demonstrates the ardour with which
Canadian courts hold to the modified objective Reibl test. The case involved the failure of a
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doctor to warn a pregnant mother of the risks119 to her foetus from her own infection with
chicken pox. Lambert JA held that there was no reason to alter the conclusions of the trial judge
who had 'found that Dr Smith had failed to inform Ms Arndt of all material risks faced by Ms
Arndt's foetus' which 'amounted to medical negligence.'120 He went on to consider the nature
of proof of a causal link between that negligence and the injury suffered by the parents through
the costs of caring for a handicapped child.
Reibl v Hughes was correctly seen as authoritative on the matter. Lambert JA observed
that 'usually the issue of causation is an issue of fact',121 but that it had been altered by the
modified objective approach taken by the court in Reibl v Hughes. Lambert JA summed up the
matter succinctly when he said,
'The question has been changed. It is no longer whether the breach of duty caused the
loss. Instead a new question has been substituted: Would the breach of duty have caused
the loss if the plaintiff had been a reasonable person acting in his or her own best
interests who was in the same objectively ascertainable circumstances as the
plaintiff?'122
He called the test a 'substitute test' rather than a 'test about causation in fact' which 'removed
from the trial judge the opportunity to assess the credibility of the plaintiff with respect to the
state of mind of the plaintiff as it relates to causation ... and the opportunity to weigh the
evidence of the plaintiff who may be credible but possibly mistaken on that point.'123
What is excluded is evidence on the plaintiffs state of mind and what is substituted is
the reasonable patient as opposed to the reasonable practitioner (the Bolam test being
inapplicable). What needs to be assessed by the court is 'behaviour which might reasonably be
anticipated and foreseen: not in relation to anticipated reliance [of the patient on the practitioner
in what Canadian courts see as a fiduciary relationship124; not in relation to causation in fact; but
119
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in relation to a form ofdeemed causation in law.'1'5
The court in Arndt v Smith accepted and adopted the Red:I test, but went on to define it
further on the ground that the test does not cater for some situations. Lambert JA asked, 'What
happens if some reasonable patients in the actual patient's position would have undergone the
treatment and others would not?'126 In the face of the risks of abnormality in the foetus, the
relevant decision would have been whether or not to terminate the pregnancy. Interestingly,
Lambert JA drew on Buchan v Ortho Pharmaceutical saying,
'So long as the court is satisfied that the plaintiffherself would not have used the drug if
properly informed of the risks, this causation issue should be concluded in her favour
regardless of what other women would have done.'127
Mr Justice Lambert concluded from this that the court distinguished the Reibl causation test
where 'the plaintiff's own evidence is likely to be neither more nor less suspect than in a case of
a relationship between a doctor and a patient.'128 Here we see the modified objective test
becoming slightly more subjective.
The approach to causation adopted by Arndt v Smith is that which was adopted by Lord
Thankerton in London Loan and Savings Co. of Canada v Brickenden.129 In Arndt v Smith
Lambert JA said that this test would apply when the Reibl test failed to provide a clear answer.
He said,
'If that clear and consistent answer is not reached, then the plaintiff who was a victim of
the wrong and who was deprived of a choice about the patient's own bodily integrity
should have judgement in his or her favour.'130
To support this conclusion he cited the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient
115. Emphasis added.
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relationship,131 the duty of communication on the part of the doctor132 and the effect on the
patient's life of the wrong suffered. Most importantly, the court argued that with possibilities so
split, to reach a conclusion about the plaintiff, based on possible or probable percentages, 'is not
an analysis of causation at all, nor an analysis of a framework for legal responsibility, but ...
pure speculation.'133 He held that the relevant risks would have persuaded a 'significant number
of reasonable and prudent prospective mothers in the particular objectively ascertainable
circumstances of Ms Arndt, acting rationally in assessing the risk ... to undergo an abortion and
* 134
try again.
In summary, the test for causation in Canada remains that set out in Reibl v Hughes, but
with the addition created by Arndt v Smith. The test is what is now known as the modified
objective approach which considers the probable decision of the reasonable patient in the same
objectively ascertainable situation as the plaintiff. If the result of this inquiry is split, judgement
should be given in the plaintiffs favour in view of the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient
relationship.
4.6. Australia
Australian decisions have arrived at a different test from those adopted in either England or
Canada in as much as the High Court adopted the doctrine of informed consent in Rogers v
Whitaker,135 and rejected the conclusiveness of the Bolatti test.136 At the same time Australian
law maintains a subjective test for causation. It can be seen as a combination of different
elements of the tests in the other two systems in a way which makes it the jurisdiction most
sensitive to the particular patient.
131
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Prior to Sidaway, a full court had in F v RU1 already moved away from the Bolam test,
while still approaching the matter on the basis of the doctor's duty of care. Some years later, the
case of Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital138 emerged as important in demonstrating a judicial
ability to draw inferences within the subjective test. Samuels JA felt he was able to consider the
matter '... from her evidence as a whole, taking advantage of the light which that cast upon her
character and likely attitudes.'139 Unusually, Ellis tackled causation before considering
negligence because that was the sequence of grounds on which the judgement was being
appealed.140 Despite the fact that no negligence was found, and following a discussion of
vicarious liability, causation was given full treatment.
Delivering the judgement of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, Kirby J held that
'Cole J was correct in applying the "subjective" test rather than an "objective" one on the
question whether Mrs Ellis would have undergone the operation had she been fully informed
...'. He went on to say, 'It is not whether a hypothetical "reasonable" patient or even the
"reasonable patient in the position of the plaintiff' would have accepted or rejected the
treatment ,..'.141
This is clearly opposed to the position in Canada and is possibly a matter of the luck of
the draw (of judges).14" Samuels JA stressed that the trial judge erred in 'taking the view that
the appellant's failure to offer any evidence as to how she would have reacted to information ...
put her out of court on the issue.'143 He considered that, '[t]he absence of direct evidence as to
how she thought she would have behaved at the time did not preclude consideration of the issue
on a subjective basis.'144 This indicates that while the subjective test for legal causation is the
appropriate one in Australia, the court remains free to determine the issue regardless of direct
unreported, December 2, 1992, No. 15405 of 1991, 84-91 and Dunning v Scheibner, unreported, Feb. 15, 1994,
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evidence from the plaintiff.145
Until Rogers v Whitaker in 1992, Australia had been hanging on to Bolam s coat tails
with regard to informed consent. In Rogers v Whitaker, however, the court drew on American
and Canadian authorities to adopt the doctrine.146 The causation inquiry is more significant
once a jurisdiction adopts informed consent. With respect to Australia, the interest lies precisely
in the fact that there was no reformulation of the existing subjective test for legal causation.
In Rogers v Whitaker, the test for causation was held to be subjective on the basis of the
law of torts. Mason CJ found that there was no need to deal with causation in the appeal
because the trial judge had already found that 'the respondent would not have undergone the
surgery had she been advised of the risk ...'; the appellant did not appeal that finding.147 Yet
there is some evidence to indicate that some form of objectivity, albeit in terms of materiality, is
still applicable. Mason CJ had held that 'the risk was material in the sense that the reasonable
person in the plaintiff s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk and thus
required a warning.'148 Thus the test for materiality was used in conjunction with the causation
inquiry.
The causation inquiry remained wedded to its subjective positioning in the law of torts
in the New South Wales Supreme Court decision in Hart v Chappel.149 In this case the plaintiff
claimed for alleged failure to warn of the chance that there would be damage to the laryngeal
nerve during throat surgery. Donovan AJ was able to hold the omission to be negligent, having
held that a reasonable person in the plaintiff s position would have attached significance to such
a warning and that, in accordance with the materiality test set out in Rogers v Whitaker, the
reasonable medical practitioner should have been aware of this.
He was then obliged to move on to the issue of causation, with which he was able to
dispense remarkably quickly. Adhering to the subjective test, the judge held that the question
143
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was 'whether this patient would have had the operation had a warning been given.'150 However,
in the same way as the Canadian court did in Arndt v Smith,151 the Australian court advanced its
test to take into account situations not covered by the test laid down in Rogers v Whitaker.
Donovan AJ said,
'The question goes further than that because in her case it is not so much a question of
whether she would have had the operation at all if a warning had been given but rather
whether she would have had the operation at this time and at the hands of Dr
Chappel.'l52
The argument here is already framed in a subjective context. It is for this reason that
Sidaway cannot apply. Here the test can be seen to be becoming even more subjective, or at
least allowing an existing subjective test greater flexibility at the hands of the plaintiff. Mr
Justice Donovan held that while the operation would have been necessary at some time, she
need not have had it at that particular time. He considered that he was not bound by the defense
testimony to the contrary.
Drawing on Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital, he said that 'in coming to a conclusion
about what the plaintiff would have done, the test which [he] must apply is the subjective test
...'; but he contended that he was entitled to draw certain inferences of legal causation.153 He
said that the plaintiff appeared to him to be a cautious person who was meticulous about her
health. He also took into account evidence given by medical professional witnesses who knew
the plaintiff at the material time and concluded that 'the important thing was the consequences
which might happen to her rather than the statistical likelihood of risk.'154 He found that she
would have deferred the surgery given the warning of risk.
This decision was upheld in the appeal to the High Court of Australia.155 Significant to
the present chapter, one of the grounds of appeal was that of causation. That ground had two
facets to it. The first facet argued that causation did not need to be established because the issue
375. Emphasis added.
151
Arndt v Smith 1995 [7] Med LR 108. Cf. 4.5. and consider, in this context, what is to be argued in 6.2.2. on
the loss of the chance to engage an alternative surgeon.
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was in fact one of 'the loss of a chance to have surgery performed by somebody else at some
other time'156 and hence that the issue was not one of physical injury. On causation, Gaudron J
considered that the court would have to be satisfied by evidence as to what Mrs Hart would
have done in the presence of a warning. He went on to dismiss the loss of chance argument in
the following way:
'If that evidence is to the effect that the injured person would have acted to avoid or
minimise the risk of injury, it is to apply sophistry rather than common sense to say that,
although the risk of physical injury which came about called the duty of care into
existence, breach of that duty did not cause or contribute to that injury, but simply
resulted in the loss of an opportunity to pursue a different course of action.'157
The second argument of the appellant in respect of causation had two aspects to it. The
first was that because the surgery was medically inevitable and because the risk was inherent in
the surgery, Mrs Hart did not suffer any legal damage. The second aspect was that Mrs Hart
suffered a random risk of infection, but that she voluntarily undertook the risk. Again, Gaudron
J dismissed these arguments because it (the argument) assumed that the degree of risk would
remain the same regardless of the experience of the surgeon. Additionally, the argument
assumed that the damage suffered was simply the exposure to risk; this assumption, he held,
was fundamentally flawed. On voluntariness, Gaudron J had the following to say:
'The second aspect of the argument must be rejected because it treats the infection
which occurred as a supervening event breaking the chain of causation which would
otherwise begin with Dr Chappel's failure to inform Mrs Hart of the possible
consequences in the event of perforation and subsequent infection. It is contrary to
common sense to treat part of the very risk which called the duty into existence as a
supervening event breaking the chain of causation beginning with the breach of that
duty.'158
By this point the test bears a remarkable similarity to that in England, with the vital
difference in the law between the two systems being that in Australia the doctrine of informed
consent has been adopted as describing the standard of care, while in England it has not. It is
the combination of the adoption of the doctrine and the maintenance of the subjective test that
makes Australia the most radical and patient centric of the jurisdictions under discussion, with
South Africa not far behind.
3
Per Gaudron J.
157 An exact page reference for this quote is unavailable because the judgement is unreported but is available on
the internet.
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4.7. South Africa
The first item which must be established in the plaintiffs mind in negligence cases, is that of
factual causation.159 In Blyth v van den Heever60 Corbett JA, having considered the expert
evidence in the field, held that the probabilities lay in the appellant's favour and went on to
consider whether that 'eventual result can be attributed to negligence on respondents' part.'161
Here we see that the inquiry into factual causation preceded that into negligence. This differs in
informed consent cases only in that having found for the plaintiff on factual causation and
negligence, the court may then consider legal causation in terms of a conditio sine qua non.
Richter and Another v Estate Hammann62 concerned negligent treatment as well as
failure to warn of dangers inherent in the surgical procedure.161 The hindsight of the plaintiff is
of note in this case.164 The plaintiff alleged that had she been warned she would not have
consented; yet because the defendant was deceased and his notes were inconclusive on the
matter, the court was entirely dependent on her evidence. Having held that if (which was not
proven) Dr Hammann had not mentioned these risks, he would not have been negligent in that
omission, Watermeyer J went on to note,
'Plaintiff would of course have had the further problem of having to show that her
disabilities were caused by the failure to warn, and this would have entailed proof at
least of the fact that if Dr. Hammann had told her that the incidence of risk was as low
as that set out above she would still have refused the operation.'165
He said that he could not attach much weight to her evidence on this matter in view of the fact
that it was clouded by hindsight.
In a case similar on the matter of causation, the court in Friedman v Glicksman166 found
that the doctor had a duty to inform a pregnant woman of birth defects to her child following her
questioning him on the matter. The birth of the disabled child would have been caused by the
159
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negligent omission of the doctor to inform the plaintiff, only if she would have terminated her
pregnancy had she been so informed. Evidence of what choice the plaintiff would have made is
established by the law of contract through the exchange between doctor and patient.
As we have now seen, until Castell v De Greef,167 South Africa had adhered to a Bolam
style standard on the matter of information. This situation changed with the appeal of Castell v
De Greef where the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court held that the standard on
consent set by Rogers v Whitaker was the appropriate one. The court held that (with the
exception of therapeutic privilege and subject to an assessment of the materiality of the risk),
'The formulation laid down in Australia in Rogers v Whitaker, being in accord with the
fundamental right of individual autonomy and self-determination to which South
African law is moving, as well as with developments in common law countries and
judicial views in continental Europe, ought to be adopted here, suitably adapted to the
needs of South African Jurisprudence.'168
Unlike other Commonwealth jurisdictions, the court held that the defence of volenti non
fit iniuria was available.169 The use of the volenti defence is anomalous in the context of
informed consent because of the relation of the defence to contributory negligence and, more
importantly, because being volens depends on both knowledge of the risk involved as well as
the acceptance thereof.170
This turns almost the whole of the issue into a question of fact. Ackerman J had said of
the volenti defence in Castell v DeGreef that the same issues of policy are involved as those
which occupied the court in Rogers v Whitaker and that to test whether a patient was volens the
quality of information given had to be assessed according to certain criteria. If the attack of the
plaintiff is, 'I did not consent', the defence is, 'Yes you did, you were volens.' In assessing
whether a patient was or was not volens, the court interrogates the adequacy and materiality of
the information given and required.
160 1996 (1) SA 1134.
167 1994 (4) SA 408.
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alcohol): '... the volenti doctrine can apply to negligence, though it must depend upon the extent of the risk, the
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Considering that in the majority of informed consent cases this knowledge of risks is
precisely what is in dispute, it would appear a doubly anomalous defence to permit. Be that as it
may, its use had placed the disclosure and materiality of risk in a contractual context and shifted
the burden of proof onto the defendant.171 Volenti is a subjective inquiry into whether an
'inference arises from all the evidence that plaintiff must have understood and accepted such a
risk.'172 This involves 'a subjective test of foresight which, once established, is deemed
objectively to amount to causation.'173
The question at large is what has this to do with causation? The answer is that it had
very little to do with causation. The judgement had already been through the scope of duty of
care owed and established that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed those risks in undergoing
surgery. But like legal causation has little to do with conventional understanding of cause and
effect, so the operation of the volenti defence is still considered under the causation head, yet
remains outwith any conventional semantic understanding of voluntariness. Volenti is
established inferentially and proves causation the way res ipsa loquitur proves negligence, such
that the mere act of participating in surgery is deemed to be causative. This is the same as
alleging that with certain information, the plaintiff would not have 'volunteered' for the
treatment.
When the question of causation is confronted, the matter still involves a conflict of fact.
What it does not involve is a policy-guided inquiry into legal causation because factual and
legal causation are subsumed in this aspect of the law of delict.174 Rather, policy will have been
considered at the level of the inquiry into whether or not there was a duty of disclosure on the
surgeon. On that standard the plaintiff averred that, on the basis of not having been made aware
of the chance of post-operative sepsis, she had not given her informed consent to the cosmetic
surgery on her breasts.
It is noteworthy that under volenti, it is unnecessary to establish that connection because
171
See Boberg PQR. The Law of Delict. 1984. Juta. Johannesburg. 767-8. On the contractual context of the
relationship between doctor and patient in England, as seen in terms of The Social Contract, see British
Medical Journal editorial 1998; 316:1622-1623 (30 May), 'Renegotiating medicine's contract with patients'.
Rosseau v Viljoen 1970 (3) SA 413 (C), 418A-C.
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it is established by inference. However, Ackerman J did suggest175 that the causal connection
should be in the sense mentioned in Blyth v van den Heever.llb This seems an anomalous
statement of the court, considering that in the context of volenti they were not going to get on to
causation. What it does suggest is that there would be a test for causation built into informed
consent cases were South Africa, like England, to scrap the volenti defence. More importantly,
it supports the argument that volenti was used here as a legal test for consent and as a legal peg
on which to hang disclosure cases.
Using the volenti defence as a test of fact and combining that test with a test for
materiality taken from the Australian case law, the court was able, through this combination, to
reformulate the South African law on informed consent to become as patient-centric as that in
Australia. It is the patient-centric test taken from Rogers v Whitaker that told the court which
information is material. After that, the volenti defence allowed the court to test whether the
defendant had been aware of that particular piece of information. After that, which is the issue
of wrongfulness, the court will ask whether any lack of awareness would have made any
difference.
In this case, Ackerman I found that, 'in the circumstances Scott J was fully warranted in
his finding that the plaintiff was aware of the risks involved ...\177 The plaintiff, however, had
tried to persuade the court that she had been labouring under a misapprehension in respect of the
consultation between herself and the surgeon. The court, therefore, found that as a question of
fact, she was aware of the risks. The court drew certain conclusions to her detriment, from the
fact that her husband, who was present at the consultation, was not called to give evidence on
her behalf. Her evidence, therefore, lacked credibility. The court then went on to consider what
the position would have been had she been aware of the risks.
On causation, the court used the same test as in Blyth v van den Heever and found that
she would still not have refused the surgery or had an alternative procedure performed. This is
because the rationale for having had the surgery was to avoid breast cancer - which other
members of her family had contracted. Weighed against the risk of necrosis, the court found
174
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that she would not have refused the surgery offered had she known of the risk. This
demonstrates an injection of objectivity and an exclusion of hindsight similar to that employed
by Canadian courts, which was also employed by Scott J in the court a quo. Of additional
interest here is that even although the court used a patient-centric test, the plaintiff failed to win
her case, which is perhaps a testament to the fairness of adjudication.
To return briefly to Blyth v van den Heever, Corbett JA had set out a Bolam style test in
a therapeutic context.178 Causation warranted a separate head in the judgement. The court held
that it was to 'make its findings upon a preponderance of probability' in which the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof179 - that is determine whether it was more probable than not that the
defendant's negligence was the legal cause of the injury suffered.
The decision in Blyth v van den Heever indicates that, although it was not necessary to
discuss or argue the matter in Castell v De Greef in the context of informed consent, the test for
legal causation in South African law is the same as that in English and Australian law. In the
context of informed consent, the test would be a subjective one in which the plaintiff would
have to prove that had he been aware of the risks which eventuated, he would not have
180contracted to undergo that medical procedure at that time.
Although this is broadly in accordance with the South African law of delict, a different
set of delict principles on voluntary assumption of risk is used in the operation of volenti non fit
iniuria. Because delict principles are generally differently applicable in South Africa and
because Ackerman J in Castell v De Greef cited with approval academic writings and case law
in favour of a more objective test suitably modified to take into account subjective elements,181
South African law will be guided by a combination of Canadian and Australian authorities -
probably siding more with Australia if one gives weight to the fact that Ackerman J cited almost
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4.8. Conclusion
The test for materiality dovetails with that for causation. This is important in the light of the
argument in the preceding chapter that the inquiry into materiality and standard of care is the
most important facet of the judgement from a policy point of view. The fact that it is connected
with the inquiry into causation lends greater importance to the latter inquiry.
Several points are clarified by this discussion. The first is that the court's primary
inquiry occurs at the level of liability and concerns the test for the standard of care and the
matter of its breach. The matter of factual causation is then determined on the evidence and
according to the sine qua non test, which is based on the test for materiality. Those inquiries
settled, the issue of causation takes on a different nature in different jurisdictions according to
the result of those inquiries. As Robins JA held in Buchan v Ortho Pharmaceutical,
'It can now be taken as a legal truism that the duty of reasonable care which lies at the
foundation of the law of negligence commonly comprehends a duty to warn of danger;
the breach of which will, when it is the cause of injury, give rise to liability... . Once a
duty to warn is recognised, it is manifest that the warning must be adequate.'182
The adequacy of the warning is the subject of the present discussion. It has been found
that different jurisdictions test that adequacy in different ways and on the basis of different
policy considerations. This goes beyond the test for materiality and the argument that if the risk
in question is found to be material, then it must be disclosed. Different tests for legal causation
are employed, giving plaintiffs and defendants different respective advantages. In this way a
judicial system can be said to be patient- or physician-centric to varying degrees.
Aside from the Bolitho case in England, which mixed the Bolam test with the causation
inquiry, English courts find against the adoption of informed consent and in favour of settling
the issue according to the Bolam test. After that and having classified such cases as falling
within the ambit of tort law and negligence, a subjective test for causation is used.
Canadian courts, on the other hand, reject the Bolam test (although still find it useful as
a matter of evidence), adopt and adapt the doctrine of informed consent and then consider the
issue of causation in more objective terms than do English courts. In this way the approach of
153
Canadian courts is similar to that of some American jurisdictions. An advantage of this is that it
is less likely to favour either plaintiff or defendant unduly and will tend to exclude hindsight.
Australian and South African courts adopt a third position. Like Canada, they accept
the policy and ideology behind the doctrine of informed consent and reject the Bolam test.
From there the two jurisdictions split. Australian courts, like English courts, see the issue as
one of negligence and so adopt a subjective test for legal causation. South African courts see
the issue as one of consent rather than negligence183 and consider the matter on the facts and in a
contractual context. This makes Australia the most radical of the jurisdictions discussed here
because the plaintiffs chance of a verdict in her favour is greater when a patient-centric
doctrine as well as a plaintiff-centric test are adopted. South Africa, too, has this radical
potential, but it is at this stage still potential because South Africa has not had the opportunity to
take the test as far as Australia did in Chappel v Hart and because volenti is a strong defence.
It is clear from the law of torts (seeking to compensate the particular patient for their
actual loss) and from the tests for materiality that a subjective test favours the plaintiff. That the
doctrine of informed consent is itself patient-centric is obvious from the discussion of this topic
in Chapters 2 and 3 and from the legal etymology of the term itself. This argument places the
Bolam test in the position of a safeguard for England against liberalising the law in this area in
favour of the patient and it places the modified objective test in the position of a safeguard
against further liberalisation in Canada. Australia remains the most liberal jurisdiction covered
by this thesis because the inquiry there has more subjectivity than in any other jurisdiction.
8
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183 See Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408, 425E-F.
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Chapter 5
The Expert inDisclosure Cases
' there is no pretext which has not been used in some country or other, as a reason for
excluding whole classes of witnesses. Combine all these pretexts, and there would no
longer be any admissible judicial evidence.'1
5.1. Introduction
The function of the expert is to assist the court by explaining medical matters which the court
will then understand.2 In the civil law cases under consideration, the expert is a medical
practitioner who, in negligence matters, will comment on the acts (or omissions in disclosure
cases) of one of his peers. In the context of the medical thought-collective discussed in 2.3., of
which both defender and witness will form a part, it will become apparent that there are
differences between legal, medical and lay thinking. It is the expert witness who is able to
interpret the medical fact genre for the benefit of the court; he is a tool in the hands of judicial
process in the adversarial system3
Medical thinking and practice diverge: the theory describes the singular yet exemplary
while the practice in each instance works with the plural yet unique.4 This can be problematic
when it comes to the testimony of an expert witness on desirable clinical actions. The expert
was not at the consultation, yet he remains within the thought-collective. The result is that his
testimony will be unable to take account of intuition in the doctor-patient encounter.5 This gains
enhanced importance in respect of the communication between doctor and patient which gives
rise to the facts of a disclosure case.6
Once the expert is seen as an aid to the judicial process, we can consider him in the
context of the inquiry into informed consent. In Britain, for example, we would need to see him
as commenting on or as representing a responsible body of medical practice and as asserting that
1
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he would or would not have made the omission that the actual defender in fact made. This is
because of the tests set out in Bolam and in Hunter v Hanley.1 The extent to which this
evidence will dispose of the case in a particular jurisdiction has been discussed. In this chapter
we will be considering how judiciaries have applied the rules of expert evidence to disclosure
cases, as well as those points in the judicial inquiry at which medical evidence is more or less
influential on the decision of the court.
In each jurisdiction, the court declares itself the arbiter on the matter. Indeed, in Britain
a practice must be rightly adopted by the defender;8 and in South Africa the court declared itself
sovereign over expert evidence.9 It is self-evident that this declaration is a policy issue:
empowering itself to determine the value of evidence places the court in a very strong position
from that point onwards, despite the evidence itself. Our interest lies in the use of expert
evidence to answer those questions which speak to judicial tests in disclosure cases, which were
discussed in Chapter 3.
Certain matters can be assessed by lay persons, but others require medical knowledge.
Factual causation, for example, is a question of medical fact and requires medical evidence.'0
Legal causation, on the other hand, may or may not require medical evidence, depending on the
form of testing used by the court, and on the credibility of the plaintiff s testimony on the
matter. This has been discussed in the previous chapter. Here, that discussion is useful as a
platform from which to consider the weight of particular evidence across various jurisdictions in
the inquiry into legal causation and, more specifically, into materiality of information.
Because medical evidence determines causation questions and disclosure cases hinge on
the causation inquiry, the importance of expert evidence cannot be underestimated and,
therefore, the matter of materiality is crucial." It must be remembered that we are dealing here
with access to information and with omission liability generally. It is in the territory of
omission liability that the importance of the expert comes to the fore more prominently because
6
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of the importance of hypothetical causation. Crucial to a determination of whether a piece of
information is material, will be the test used by the court and, of course, the evidence of the
expert on the matter. It is the expert, in conjunction with the evidence of the pursuer, who will
fill in many of the missing pieces, whichever judicial test is employed. This is because whether
or not information which is said to be material was actually given, will be a matter of assessing
and interpreting the defender's clinical notes. This brings us full circle back to the matter of
communication between doctor and patient.1"
This chapter will consider those points in the judicial inquiry of each jurisdiction, at
which expert evidence will be useful to the court to varying degrees.'1 The preceding chapters
have outlined the doctrine of informed consent as accepted, rejected or adapted in separate
jurisdictions. Common Law jurisdictions are not in agreement as to the use of the expert
witness; there is a split between those adopting the doctrine and those rejecting it. This is
evident in the weight given to expert testimony and the extent to which that testimony, taken as
a whole, is decisive of the case before the court.
In cases of alleged medical negligence the plaintiff cannot know any fact concerning the
alleged breach of duty until he or she has information that the surgeon did not act in accordance
with the standard of care required of surgeons.14 He or she can get this only information from
other medical professionals.
This chapter will begin with the general principles within the law of delict or torts and
the rules on the acceptance of expert evidence. Having considered the law of negligence on the
expert in each jurisdiction, we will want to consider the case law in detail, in order to ascertain
how these principles have actually been applied in disclosure cases. Now we can consider the
consent scenario which we by now know so well: in the case of Canada in Reibl, Australia in
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instructive to consider the preceding cases too, and in the case of England to consider the
'erosion' cases, because they are the ones which go on to consider causation and hence the cases
in which the expert is more important in disclosure cases.
The split between Commonwealth and British jurisdictions can be placed in the
category 'risk assessment'. It will be remembered from previous chapters that in disclosure
consent cases, typically the plaintiff or pursuer has suffered some harm from the eventuating of
a risk inherent in the medical procedure to which broad consent was given. That plaintiff would
be asserting that had they known of that risk, they would not have had the treatment and would
hence have remained unharmed.
5.2. The Medical Practitioner
5.2.1. used by the law
The law needs to enlighten itself on matters falling within other discourses - in this instance on
medical matters. For this purpose, the expert medical witness acts as an interpreter: he is asked
questions by counsel and by the court, answering them in order to allow the court to understand
the facts of the case. The court interprets those facts in the context of a legal test, to arrive at a
decision on liability or culpability.
Medical experts have been used by the law in this way for some centuries. In the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the testimony of medical practitioners was also used for
certificates of competence, religious conformity and the good character of colleagues within the
profession for the purpose of gaining ecclesiastical licences to practice.15 In various capacities,
and by the nature or their professional duties, practitioners often come into contact with legal
machinery at some time in their career. In the present context, contact with the law is as
defendant or as witness. The latter developed from the early use of medical experts in criminal
matters. With the explosion of professionally trained medical practitioners in the nineteenth
century came a corresponding increase in their use as witnesses in criminal trials because of the





growth of confidence in scientific evidence and reasoning.16
Of anecdotal interest in medico-legal terms is the use of midwives in the eighteenth
century to extract, as a vocational obligation, a 'statement in extremis' from a woman in labour
about the true identity of the father of the child for use in adultery cases and maintenance
matters.17 Such a statement took evidentiary precedence at a hearing. Medical professionals
were also increasingly used in rape, abortion and infanticide trials from the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution and the credibility of their evidence rested more and more on their own
integrity. Even so, the professional witness remains an alien in the legal environment - a useful
tool in the hegemonic process that determines culpability and liability through credibility.
We are now considering a facet of civil law. In negligence cases the personal and
academic integrity of witnesses is important insofar as it speaks to credibility. During legal
examination, cross-examination and re-examination, there is the perceived need to discredit
witnesses.18 In the context of the reasonable medical practitioner, a responsible body of medical
opinion is not a matter of numbers, but of credibility. In DeFreitas v O'Brien and Connolly,19
for example, it was held that there is now a recognised sub-speciality of spinal surgery which
should be judged by its own standards. The question is one of the reliability of the witness
called as well as the internal consistency of his evidence. But the question whether one
specialist is enough is also raised. One witness would be sufficient if that one witness was both
credible and representative of a responsible body of opinion."0 It is questions of internal
consistency and credibility that must be confronted when dealing with the expert witness.
5.2.2, The Expert Witness
The Medical Witnesses Act 1836 was the first legal provision which allowed for the payment of
16
Another facet involved the issuing of medical certificates excusing witnesses, expert or otherwise; this was
the beginning of an insanity defence to be elaborated in the nineteenth century.
17
See P C Hoffer & N E H Hull Murdering Mothers 13-17.
1S In Maynard v West Midlands HA [1985] 1 All ER 635 court overturned the earlier decision in which the
court had made a preference for one body of reasonable opinion over another reasonable body of opinion.
19
[1995] 6 Med LR 108.
20
Scott v Highland Health Board (unreported, Outer House, 1981) concerned the allegedly negligent
interpretation of a femur x-ray by a consultant radiologist. The Pursuers instructed 2 orthopaedic surgeons who
believed the radiologist ought to have been able to interpret the x-rays correctly. The Defender called a
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money to expert witnesses in an attempt to offset the pessimistic view that associated
involvement in testimony with loss of income through time wasted. That act marked the
coming out of a dark period of medico-legal scholarship after which, but not necessarily as a
result of which, such work came to be seen as more respectable within the profession. But
medical witnessing is not without its troubles.
An expert was not an independent witness in the post-medieval period, but a neighbour
who gave an opinion on a medical condition in his official or bureaucratic capacity. The 'expert
witness can be said to have fully emerged into the legal forum'21 with a more organised medical
profession in the eighteenth century. The development of the medical witness progressed
alongside legal developments in the modern adversarial system. Yet partisanship remains,
although in a different form: in a negligence action, victory is often a matter of which side has
presented its testimony most convincingly.
The discourses of medicine and law, both of which lay claim to truths which serve
different social functions, meet inter alia at the point of the legal employment of experts. The
professional witness is used by the law to legitimate accounts of fact situations vis-a-vis medical
matters. The question is: which situations justify the application of a particular legal rule and
the appeal to expert analysis and opinion? For example, at the practical level 'insanity' is
different for lawyers and for psychiatrists; this is why expert evidence is an important if
problematic sphere of legal practice and is important in the 'epistemological game played out in
the courts.'22
The question of credibility of expert witnesses is answered only through law's
observation mechanisms which embrace some areas of science less readily23 than others,
particularly in view of the modern tendency to give a specific name to non-specific symptoms.24
Child welfare, for example, is seen as less acceptable than the 'pure' sciences and thus the
acceptance of the evidence of 'psy' professionals will be contentious, although on the increase,
consultant radiologist who believed failure was not negligent. The court held that it was entitled to rely on
evidence of the consultant radiologist as he was an expert in the same field as the defender.
21




Such as the 'psy' disciplines.
24
Consider, for example, the courts acceptance of Repetitive Strain Injury.
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especially in child welfare cases.25 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice26 has advised a
Forensic Science Advisory Council which would have an 'accreditation requirement' according
to which only accredited witnesses would be able to give opinion evidence. However, an expert
will still have to prove his experience through his curriculum vitae.
With these methods, the law maintains primacy: information is legally viewed, while it
remain operationally more specific to the disciplines concerned. In Frenchay Healthcare NHS
Trust v S, the court held that '[t] he court [has] the ultimate power and duty to review the
doctor's decision of what was in the patient's best interests ,..'.27 Then, within the trial itself,
the use of the 'ultimate issue' rule28 ensures that the expert is for the use of the law to ensure
that the expert does not transgress the law of evidence.
Complexity of multiple witnesses in 'child care' cases is evident from Re G29 and Re
M30 which are apparently 'commonplace under the Children Act 1989.'31 The need for expert
witnesses is becoming more specific3" because of the way in which medicine is sub-dividing
into specialities. A witness who is an expert in these non-traditional specialities is needed.
What emerges is law's demand for the legally valid expert; an expert of the law's own
construction which touches the legal system at a convenient, legally determined, point.33 That
way it is easier to observe after the court has indicated the area of expertise required; for
example the strict and specific guidelines of Wall J on this subject in Re G.34
The adversarial proceedings which constitute a major point of contact between doctors
and the law, produce a suspicion of the law among doctors, despite the fact that the law in the
25
These 'psy' disciplines are producing syndromes all the time - e.g. battered woman syndrome. Acceptance
by the judiciary operates in parallel with acceptance of syndromes by the psychiatric fraternity through
successive editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorder.
On this point, consider Royal Commissions and their place in legislation as well as autopoietic closure, infra.
27
[1994] 1 FLR 485; June [1994] Fam Law 320.
28
That an expert can comment on anything which does not pre-empt the verdict, or the question of culpability
in criminal cases or liability in civil cases.
29
(Minors) [1994] Fam Law 229 in which the plaintiffs solicitors instructed six experts, thereby necessitating
the issue of judicial guidelines; this indicates that law will determine the use of experts.
30
(Minors)(Care: Conduct of Proceedings) [1994] Fam Law 234.
31
'Newsline', (1994) Family Law 238 & 309.
32"
So much so that a conference was held in March of 1994 by the British Juvenile and Family Courts Society.
33
King 1991, 313 et seq.
34
(Minors) [1994] Fam Law 229.
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United Kingdom is more favourably oriented towards medical practitioners. This constitutes an
impediment to the maintenance of good doctor-patient relations.35 Teff pointed out that the law
is the only discipline that uses bipolar trials to determine facts and so it is unsurprising that
experts tend to feel that legal tests are less rigorous than scientific tests because of differing
notions of causation and the fact that legal analysis of scientific data is compromised by social
pressures,36 as well as by policy.
Because the question of negligence is a mixed one of fact and law, the dual function of
expert evidence is both didactic and, by extension, assisting.37 However, as has already been
argued, courts continually assert predominance.38 Further incidentals apply to expert witnesses.
For example, legal advisers modifying their reports39 is a common complaint which begs the
question of motive. Secondly, the legal code of conduct barring counsel discussion with
witnesses does not apply to experts,40 thus arguably bringing the two discourses in line with one
another.41
The expert remains a pawn of the law in that the law determines how to use him, when
to use him and when his evidence is admissible - and indeed what evidence will be drawn from
him by counsel. The fact that there is a disjunction between the standard of care actually
employed in the clinical environment and that advocated by texts on a particular topic and hence






Jackson and Powell on Professional Negligence 6.41 - 6.45.
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See Chapters 1 and 3.
39
Whitehouse v Jordan [1980] 1 All ER 650, 655 per Denning. On expert reports generally see Jackson and
Powell on Professional Negligence 6.45.
40
Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales 607.1.
41
Whitehouse v Jordan [1980] 1 All ER 650. Some consultation is proper for the expert to enlarge on certain
aspects of his evidence.
4~
This disjuncture was highlighted in a study involving the time to administration of antibiotics in children
with meningitis. The article which accompanies the results asks somewhat rhetorically if expert testimony
concerning the 'standard of care' ought to describe 'standard medical care' usually given rather than an
idealised standard of care. See William L. Meadow, et al 'Ought "Standard Care" Be the "Standard of Care"?'
(1993) 147 American Journal ofDiseases of Children 40-44.
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5.3. Medical Evidence
5.3.1. The Law of Evidence and Rules of Policy
Courts of a particular jurisdiction can apply only their own rules of evidence. However, because
of the comparative nature ofmedical law generally and informed consent in particular, there is a
flow of precedent within the common law world.43 The jurisdictions covered by this thesis
show a difference of opinion in respect of informed consent. While the broad nature of the law
of evidence in each jurisdiction may be similar, certain differences among jurisdictions are
apparent in respect of the weight given to the evidence of experts. Looking as the expert
witness per se, the courts adopt similar approaches to matters of credibility. Where they differ
is in respect of matters of weight. This is because of the different tests which have been
discussed in preceding chapters.
According to Goldrein, 'it is easy to confuse the caliber of witness with the caliber of
opinion he professes to hold'. Courts have developed rules by which expert opinion is assessed:
if the opinions of one group of physicians are clearly (Weclnesbury) unreasonable, that is that
such views would not be held by any reasonable body of doctors, they can be disregarded.45
Policy considerations come into play in the law of informed consent through rules of
evidence because it is that which governs the application of the substantive law of torts or of
delict. Evidence is not itself a coherent body of rules, but that is what gives judges the leeway
to mould policy.46 In respect of disclosure cases, these rules are taken from those applicable to
43
Cf. Introduction to this Thesis.
44
The position in Canadian law is succinctly set out in C A Wright & A M Linden Canadian Tort Law (6ed.)
Butterworths. Toronto. 1975. 181-190. This work was published before the decision in Reibl v Hughes and
hence excludes the matter of informed consent. That, however, is what is being discussed in this chapter. The
same is true in respect of the Australian law of evidence. On omission liability generally, see Francis Tindale
& Peter Cane. The Law of Torts in Australia. Oxford University Press. Melbourne. 1985. 327-329. On
consent to medical procedures, see 229-230 in which the author cites the cases of Chatterton v Gerson in
England and Murray v McMurchy in Canada, thereby indicating the similarities among the jurisdictions. On
the South African law of evidence in delict, see P Q R Boberg. The Law of Delict. Juta & Co. Johannesburg.
1984. On the liability of the medical profession, see 347-55, 747, 750-51. On proof of the element of consent
in the voluntary assumption of risk, see 725-7, 738-40 & 764-69. It is understandable that such similarities
should exist given what Comparative law has to say on legal families; Cf. Zweigertz & Kotz.
45
Goldrein 1315 (September 10 1994). See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp.
[1948] 1 KB 223.
46
CP Harvey QC said, 'I suppose there was never a more slapdash, disjointed and inconsistent body of rules
than that which we call the Law of Evidence. Founded apparently on the presumption that all jurymen are deaf
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negligence47 simpliciter and are then modified to fit the 'informed consent scenario'.
The burden of proof of all elements of the tort of negligence rests with the plaintiff48
and the standard of proof is on balance of probabilities.49 The role of the expert is to assist court
or jury in the weighing of the medical evidence before the court. The expert will also be able to
give opinion evidence on compliance with an accepted practice. We will see in this chapter that
in England and Scotland, compliance with this standard will dispose of the case in favour of the
defendant,50 but in Canada and Australia that will not necessarily be the case.51
It is important to bear in mind that a judge may not prefer one body of professional
opinion over another equally respectable body of opinion; to do so would constitute an error in
law.52 In Moyes v Lothian Health Board53 the defender failed to give the warning which it was
his custom to give. However, a responsible body of professional opinion, as represented by
expert witnesses, attested to the propriety of not giving such a warning. This lead to the ironic
position that even although the defender departed from his usual practice, the presence of an
alternative practice which represented a responsible body of medical opinion meant that he
could not be found negligent.
That said, Lord Bridge said in Sidaway that the matter of breach is to be based primarily
on expert medical opinion and that if there is a conflict among experts, the judge will have to
resolve that conflict.54 As Jones put it, 'the court may condemn even a universally followed
practice as to risk disclosure as negligent on the basis that the hypothetical reasonable doctor
to reason, that all witnesses are presumptively liars and that all documents are presumptively forgeries, it has
been added to, subtracted from and tinkered with for two centuries until it has become less of a structure than a
pile of builders' debris.'; quoted in Spencer & Flinn The Evidence ofChildren (2Ed.) 1992. Blackstone. p31.
47
Cf. Chapter 1 in which the fact that the law on disclosure matters falls within the law of negligence, is
discussed.
48
This may be reversed in situations in which the maxim res ipsa loquitur is applicable. Cf. 1.4. on the burden
of proof.
49
See inter alia Michael J Powers & Nigel Harris. Medical Negligence (2Ed.) Butterworths. London. 1994.
1.63.
50





Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634, per Lord Scarman at 639.
53
[1990] 1 Med LR 463,470.
54
[1985] 1 All ER 643,662-3.
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would not have adopted it.'55 This might be done on the basis of policy; it may be in the public
interest to declare a particular omission negligent even although an expert representing a
responsible body of medical practitioners cites that omission as reasonable.56
In Britain, there is a single standard in law for negligence, whether that allegation is
based on treatment or on the omission to give information. Indeed, negligence cannot be found
where responsible experts called by plaintiff and defendant each attest to different points of
view on whether or not they would have given the warning alleged to form part of the duty of
care. However, in Chapter 3 it became apparent that in other jurisdictions, a different standard
will be applied in respect of treatment from that applied in respect of information.
Both expert and lay evidence are important to this thesis, though in Britain expert
evidence outweighs lay evidence in respect of the test for the standard of care, while in Canada,
Australia and to a certain extent South Africa, the opposite is the case. In respect of factual
causation, medical evidence is of equal importance in all jurisdictions; similarly, lay evidence
will take precedence in respect of legal causation.57 For these reasons, there are rules on
disclosure of medical evidence - rules that will ensure that all parties have access to the same
information about which they will be arguing.58
In Chapter 3 we saw that the test for the standard of care in Canada in respect of
disclosure cases is based on the expectations of the reasonable patient in the particular patient's
55
Michael A. Jones. Ibid. 3-022. Jones cited the unreported case of Neilson v Basildon of Thurrock Health
Authority (1991, QBD) in which Garland J referred to Lord Bridge's speech and substituted his own judgement
on the ground of public policy.
56
This was the rationale in Reibl v Hughes, though it was couched in terms of forseeability, while it was in
reality an issue of policy to declare what is forseeable and what is not.
57
However, it is not unknown that lay evidence should be used to resolve a conflict in the medical evidence.
Consider, for example, Pickford v Imperial Chemical Industries pic [1988] 2 All ER 462 (HL) in which the
diagnosis of repetitive strain injury was disputed and the medical evidence was in conflict on the matter of
factual causation. For that reason, lay evidence of the plaintiffs colleagues in the workplace, was used to
establish the probable organic origin of the injury actually suffered. This was, of course, not a disclosure case,
but that does not alter the point being made here. Cf. 5.4.
58
See Naylor v Preston Area Health Authority and the modification of RSC Ord. 38 r. 37, which, according to
Nelson-Jones and Burton (Rodney Nelson-Jones and Frank Burton Medical Negligence Case Law.
Butterworths. London. 1995 at p. 211-212), 'arose out of the difficulties that were experienced in Wilsher v
Essex Area Health Authority' in which there had been no exchange of experts' reports on liability prior to trial.
This thesis does not propose to discuss the rules of disclosure or to compare the jurisdictions with one another
concerned, as it is, with the common law theory of informed consent and the policy considerations within that
area of law. Consider, however, Powers and Harris. Ibid. 9.81 et seq. and 11.82. On admissibility and
cogency, see 19.24 - 19.30.
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position. This means that expert evidence will be less important than the court's assessment of
the plaintiffs needs. In Anderson v Chasney59 the court held that accepted practice should not
constitute a conclusive defence because that would lead to groups of professionals closing ranks
for mutual protection. This is because there might be a difference between a standard practice
and a safe practice.60 As one might expect, the position is the same in Australia where the test
for the standard of care is an objective one. A cynical justification was given by King CJ in F v
R:
'Practices may develop in professions, particularly as to disclosure, not because they
serve the interests of the clients, but because they protect the interests or convenience of
members of the profession. The court has an obligation to scrutinise professional
practices to ensure that they accord with the standard of reasonableness imposed by
law.'61
This was upheld in Rogers v Whitaker.62 There have also been cases in England in
which a standard practice has been held to be negligent.61 This is because of the rationale
outlined by Lord Bridge in Sidaway and noted above and because it would be disadvantageous
to advances in science to hold all departures from accepted practice to be negligent.64 The
converse is also the case: an accepted practice might be held to be negligent.
In all jurisdictions covered it is the role of the court to use expert evidence to satisfy
their own tests one way or the other - 'to provide evidence upon which the court decides
whether there has been negligence or not.'65 This evidence will be an assistance to the court.
The weight which the court gives to the evidence will depend on the internal consistency of the
evidence, whether it is corroborated by other witnesses and on the particular test formulated by
the court to determine whether the standard of care has been complied with.
59
[1949] 4 DLR 71, 85, cited in Jones. Ibid. 3-025.
60
Cf. Crits v Sylvester (1956) 5 DLR (2d) 601.
61




In Hucks v Cole [1993] 4 Med LR 393, the court held that any lacuna in medical practice ought to be
examined by the court. In addition, consider the arguments advanced in respect of the 'erosion' cases and the
Bolitho judgement in 6.3.2.
64
This is a point made in Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200, 206 in which Lord President Clyde felt that the use of
new techniques would be inhibited if all departures from accepted medical practice were considered to be
negligent.
65
Michael A. Jones. Ibid. 3.126.
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5.3.2. Relevance, Weight, Credibility and Plausibility
It is fundamental that the evidence given is relevant to the case and that the expert speaks to the
issues at hand. In civil procedures, the judge will ensure that any questions put to the experts
are relevant to the. facta probanda of the case. All negligence cases have to do with adequacy of
skill; in disclosure cases this skill lies in the adequacy of the provision of information. Relevant
evidence will contain factual information on the standards of the profession and opinion
evidence on whether or not the defendant complied with those standards. This evidence is then
used to flesh out the test for liability; in the case of British jurisdictions, if the conduct of the
defendant complied with that standard, the defendant will not be held liable. On the other hand,
failure to meet the standards of the profession will be assessed relative to the risk, to potential
patients,66 of holding a defendant not liable. This is clearly a policy area in which expert
evidence has a crucial role to play.
It is also necessary that the evidence given, if it is not to be discounted by the court, is
credible and plausible. In Sidaway, Lord Diplock said that the evidence should be evaluated in
terms of a responsible body of opinion.67 Other than where the evidence speaks to matters of
medical fact or scientific technicality, the court may reject evidence on the grounds of
credibility or plausibility. This would occur, for example, where there is a conflict internal to
the evidence of one expert, where that evidence is contradicted by another expert or where it is
internally inconsistent.68 Much of this has to do with the demeanour of the expert in the witness
box and, hence, the judge's views on the expert.69
Of importance to the present chapter is that a judge may accept or reject evidence on the
basis of plausibility. This is important in a jurisdiction like England in which the case will turn
on the inferences the judge is able to draw from the evidence of the medical expert. Whatever
the jurisdiction, disclosure cases turn on whether a particular piece of information was in fact
66
See David Howarth Textbook on Tort. Butterworths. London. 1997. 77.
67
[1985] 1 All ER 643, 659.
68
On this point, see the analysis of McAllister v Lewisham in 5.4.4.1. below.
69
Jones (Ibid. 3-129) cites the case of Joyce v Yeomans [1936] 1 All ER 540, 542 in which Brandon LJ said,
'Sometimes expert witnesses display signs of partisanship in a witness box or a pack of objectivity. This may
or may not be obvious from the transcript, yet it may be quite plain to the trial judge. Sometimes an expert
may refuse to make what a more wise witness would make, namely, proper concessions to the viewpoint of the
other side. Here again this may or may not be apparent from the transcript.'
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disclosed. This will often depend on the recollections of defendant and plaintiff and,
consequently, on their credibility in the witness box. If a defendant does not have an exact
memory of the consultation, the court may find that his evidence is not credible. If he is able to
rely only on a recollection of his usual practice in such circumstances, that usual practice will
have to be corroborated by an expert - probably a colleague. While corroboration is not
necessary in civil cases, it will add weight to the evidence given.70
We are dealing here with evidence of an omission to take precautions which a
reasonable medical practitioner would have taken - the omission to provide information on
inherent risks and alternatives to the medical procedure proposed. Evidence will be led as to
whether there was a usual practice, what that practice comprised and whether the defender
complied with that practice.71 The first two questions can be answered with the evidence of
experts in the same field, but the third will require the evidence of the defender and the clinical
notes taken at the time.
5.3.3. Law andmedicine: aMutual Protection Society?
We considered 'medical thinking' in Chapter 1 and can now see how medical and scientific
thinking72 differ from legal thinking. The difference is one between the bipolar based on proof
on balance of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt, in the case of adversarial law, and the
multi-polar based on empirical proof in the case of medicine. In the sciences, the logic of a
dispute is inductive and derived from observation whereas in law this logic is deductive and
based on reasoning. In law it is often more a matter of form than content.
The content is supplied by the expert and manipulated in form by the legal practitioner.
70
In Scotland, for example, there is no requirement of corroboration in civil cases. After the abolition of this
requirement judges' view of witnesses reliability and credibility took on a new importance, with greater
reliance on their own 'instincts' about witnesses rather than on more demonstrable qualities of the evidence.
(See, in this context, Newell and Newell v Goldenberg .) In law this should not really be the case. However,
the case of Morrison v J. Kelly and Sons 1970 SC 65 makes it clear that the abolition of corroboration does not
relieve a judge of her responsibility to arrive at a reasoned view of the evidence which can be justified to an
appeal court. This can be compared with Lord Stott in McLaren v Caldwell's Paper Mill 1973 SLT 158.
Interestingly, it used to be thought that expert evidence did not require corroboration anyway (see Davie v
Magistrates ofEdinburgh 1953 SC 34) but it seems generally accepted now that in criminal cases if the expert
is speaking to one of the facts in issue, then corroboration is required. See also David M. Walker. The Law of
Delict in Scotland (2Ed.) W Green & Son. Edinburgh. 1981. 385-386.
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These being the three questions set out by Lord President Clyde in Hunter v Hanley.
72"
Which, it is maintained, are not synonymous.
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For lawyers, an argument is a set of premises designed to support a final statement or
conclusion. Partisanship of the physician to the side that called him, viewed in this light, is in
fact partisanship to his professional opinion; that is why he would have been called by the side
which in fact called him. The insidious art of the lawyer is to ask questions which advance
premises which the witness accepts. Through a chain of inferences, these premises are
ultimately used to support a final premise. This empahasises the expert's role as pawn of the
law or as a pawn of a particular lawyer.
The consequences for the medical profession are serious. In the examination, cross-
examination and re-examination process, the acceptance of lay evidence threatens professional
solidarity and control over expertise. What the lawyer wants is an expert at being a witness who
is already an expert at being a medical practitioner. This emerges as potentially pivotal with
regard to who is in control. In the nineteenth century with a more guild-oriented approach to
medical practice, there was at times outrage when laymen offered opinions on occupational
matters. This was significant of a reaction to an affront in which occupational skills were, and
to an extent continue to be, seen as non-transferable.73
Privileges and protection were initially granted to professional groupings by
government and indeed by society itself, but moral issues remain at times individual issues with
the difference being one between what a professional does and what the profession does.74
Professional ethics as a voluntary code of practice accepted within the profession may not be the
same as judicial or statutorily imposed codes of conduct and behaviour. In the legal encounter
the parallel discourses of law and medicine must operate simultaneously. Both professions will
have developed their own individual jargon for homogeneity and exclusivity, which may not be
understood by the other side. This is bound to lead to uncomfortable exchanges in court.
As the power of witnessing slips from the grasp of the medical profession, naturally its
members may seek to entrench that power. The medico-legal committee of the Australian
Medical Association, for example, is considering ways of using 'accredited' medical witnesses
to give evidence at trials involving charges of negligence and criminal behaviour so that cases
73
Johnson 57. Consider, in this light, the use of lay evidence in the inquiry into legal causation. Cf. 4.4.
74
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, [1957] 2 All ER 118 and consider
what has been argued on the Bolam test in preceding chapters.
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do not 'degenerate into ... battles of the experts.'75 This list of experts, compiled by the
specialist colleges, would be designed to 'keep bad science from the courts.'76 But is this not
merely an elaborate form of laager psychology in which the courts are intimidated by their own
medical ignorance into being less tolerant, as Wednesbury unreasonable, of the views of those
on the list than of those excluded from it?77
The court will use the medical facts, along with the plaintiff s evidence, to establish
whether the failure to warn of the material risk was unreasonable - or indeed whether the
plaintiff's assertion as to materiality is reasonable in the circumstances and given the medical
evidence.'78 This is a reaction to the gradual shattering of the myth of the community of equal
competence which generated public trust in the medical profession.
The medical profession is used by the law to appraise the court of medical facts and
opinions. By holding the defendant's omission non-negligent, a witness may be accused of
being partisan to defender or pursuer. However, because of what has been said about the court's
acceptance or rejection of expert testimony as implausible or not credible, it would be a more
cogent argument to contend that it is the policy of the courts in a particular jurisdiction which
guides the use of expert evidence and, hence, the protection (or not) of the medical profession.
This will become apparent from a consideration of how the courts handled the evidence in the
disclosure cases with which this thesis has been dealing.
5.4. Informed Consent Case Law
In Canterbury v Spence in America, the court held that the standard of disclosure should be one
demanded by law rather than one which physicians may impose upon themselves.79 The effect
of this judgement was to remove from the medical community the power to determine standards
75
Christopher Zinn (1995) 311 BMJ 709-10.
76
The Lord Chancellor did say that this principle should apply to solicitors too; i.e. only solicitors who know
about medical negligence should be allowed to take such cases on legal aid. See the Lord Chancellor's
Department consultation paper Access to Justice with Conditional Fees, March 1998, 3.15 - 3.19.
77
This should be contrasted with the system in Denmark which is based on Insurance. See Segest, E. 'Legal
Aspects of Cases of Medical Malpractice in Denmark.' (1993) 12 Medicine and Law 617-25. This thesis,
however, is concerned with the common law of negligence.
78
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 KB 223 in which it was held (at
226) that, 'unreasonableness has to be established but it is for the court to exercise its own judgement on the
facts established.'
79
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of practice, and hence to reduce the weight of the doctor's evidence. When considering the
'materiality' of information, the court imposed a patient-centric standard.80 This meant that, as
the court put it,
'Of necessity, the content of the disclosure rests with the physician. Ordinarily it is
only he who is in a position to identify particular dangers; always he must make the
judgement, in terms of materiality, as to whether and to what extent revelation to the
patient is called for. He cannot know with complete exactitude what the plaintiff would
consider important to his decision, but on the basis of his medical training and
experience he can sense how the average, reasonable patient expectably would react.'81
The doctor will have to speak to this issue in court. For the defendant's success in the case, the
court would have to be persuaded on the evidence that the defendant was justified in assuming,
on the basis of his knowledge of the patient and through clinical intuition, that the undisclosed
information would not have been important to the patient.
However, the court went on to note that from 'these considerations', the court would be
able to formulate the requisite legal standard of disclosure. That standard would not be
'subjective as to either the physician or the patient,'82 but was to be an objective assessment.
The court cited with approval an academic article to hold that a risk is material,
'when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or ought to know to be the
patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in
deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.'83
The only way the court can assert what a physician actually knew would be to consult
his notes or to ask him. He would be unlikely to incriminate himself by answering that he knew
the patient would deem a certain risk to be significant. For this reason the court would ask
whether the physician ought to have known. The patient's evidence will be important here, but
the very fact that the case has come to court indicates that the patient is asserting that the
physician ought to have known of that plaintiffs information needs.
To establish what the physician ought to have known, the court will need to hear from
80
Cf. introduction to 3.3. However, it was noted in Chapter 4 (4.2.) that this standard varies among states in
America. This particular case has been chosen because it is the case which is most cited by scholars in this
field when they consider the 'American doctrine'.
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(1970). Cf. 3.3.
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experts from both sides. These experts would say what they would have done in the same
situation. It is a question for the finder of facts84 to determine whether knowledge of a particular
risk would have resulted in a decision against treatment, but hindsight renders this question a
hypothetical one.85 For that reason the court opted for a more objective test - that is what a
prudent person in the patient's position would have decided had they been informed of the risk.
In the normal course of malpractice litigation, the patient will bear the burden of
establishing, through expert testimony, that the physician's course of action departed from
medical custom; this facet of negligence litigation was overturned in Canterbury. The court did
so in order to cater for the test for materiality and that for legal causation. The court noted that
experts are essential to provide the court with the facts concerning the therapy and the risk, as
well as facts relevant to factual causation, but argued that the objective test renders experts less
useful in disclosure cases than in cases of negligence simpliciter.
Indeed, the court held, 'It is evident that many of the issues typically involved in non¬
disclosure cases do not reside peculiarly within the medical domain.'86 The court held that lay
witnesses can establish the elements of the case and, more particularly, 'Experts are unnecessary
to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patient's decision on treatment, or to the
reasonably, expectable effect of risk disclosure on the decision.'87 If, as the court put it,
'medical facts are for medical experts' and 'other facts are for any witnesses', the role of the
expert witness in disclosure cases would appear to have been diminished. This is what the
doctrine of informed consent decrees.
On the basis of Canterbury, it is possible to argue that the more patient-centric the tests
for negligence in disclosure cases, the less decisive will be medical expert testimony. Further,
that expert testimony will always be necessary to speak to the medical facts. This means that
the inquiry into factual causation will, as we saw in the last chapter, hinge on medical evidence.
Legal causation, however, does not necessarily require a medically qualified witness. It would
seem, therefore, that those jurisdictions that adopt the doctrine of informed consent as
84
In Canterbury v Spence at 788 the court held that, 'Wherever non-disclosure of particular risk information is
open for debate by reasonable-minded men, the issue is for the finder of facts.'
85
790. Cf. 3.3. on materiality and Chapter 4 on hypothesis in the causation inquiry.
86




descriptive of the standard of care, will have less use for the medical expert, other than in the
establishment of factual causation. Our inquiry will, once again, follow the geo-chronological
route of the doctrine itself.
5.4.1. Canada
The Canadian case law supports the above contention. Marshall v Curry88 was an assault and
battery case brought before disclosure cases were litigated in negligence.89 The defendant
removed the plaintiffs testicle without consent during a hernia operation. This case serves as
an example of the use of the defence of necessity: no action would exist given that the belief
that the organ should be removed was reasonable. This is a matter of medical evidence alone.
In Marshall the evidence supported the finding that there was neither express nor implied
consent, but the evidence also established necessity as a question of medical fact that was also
supported by the plaintiffs best medical interest.90
The law had yet to clarify the position in respect of disclosure cases. Murray v
McMurchy91 continued the debate on medical evidence as useful in establishing matters of
medical fact. The issue was similar to that in Marshall: the justification for tying the plaintiffs
fallopian tubes without her consent during a caesarean section. Murray confirmed the position
in Marshall on necessity and life-preservation, but extended the ruling to hold that a surgeon is
not entitled to act when a procedure, for which there is no consent, is merely convenient. The
justification given was that there were tumours in the walls of the plaintiffs uterus; but medical
evidence established that these would pose a threat only in the case of a further pregnancy and
the tying of fallopian tubes was not the only way to prevent that occurrence. Indeed, Mcfarlane
J held,
'The evidence is that this is, to use the words of a witness called for the plaintiff who is
a specialist in gynaecology and obstetrics "not customary but common for cause".'92
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Medical evidence is used to establish medical facts which are based on common experience. It
was held that the evidence established only that the tumours might constitute a hazard and that
that would speak to quantum rather than to merits - another area in which medical evidence will
be central.
The court uses both medical and lay evidence to establish what happened in both the
consultation and the procedure itself. The court in Kelly v Hazlett' had to consider a scenario
closer to what we know as the informed consent scenario. The issue was the performance of an
osteotomy; the procedure had been explained only in broad terms, while the risk of stiffness to
the elbow had not been disclosed. The court used medical expertise to appraise itself of what
happened,94 of the level of risk involved,95 of cause in fact96 and of materiality.97 It is this last
element that is of interest here.
The court had used the evidence of both plaintiff and defendant as a guide to what the
plaintiff would have done had he known of the risk. The more persuasive evidence was held to
be that of the defendant and the defendant's witness: that the procedure followed was in
accordance with medical custom. The court held that there had not been negligence because
custom had been followed. Morden J still dealt with the issue of materiality to hold that,
'The evidence relating to the plaintiffs consent to this operation is somewhat sparse but I
am satisfied that she knew beforehand the basic nature of this operation and whatever
failure there may have been on the defendant's part to go into its attendant risks was
justifiable as a matter of medical judgement ... and, further, I am of the view that if he
had explained the risk of refracture she probably would have agreed to the operation.'98
This is a matter of using medical evidence to establish the plaintiff's likely state of mind and,
hence, hypothetical actions which speak to legal causation. This was expressly stated as a
policy matter, paving the way for the decision in Hopp v Lepp."
Hopp v Lepp concerned the duty to disclose that there were specialists in Calgary who
would be on hand to deal with resultant complications should the operation be performed there.
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This case highlights the difference between factual and legal causation by supporting the Court
of Appeal judgement which had held that, '[the undisclosed facts] need not concern matters
which directly cause the ultimate damage if they are of a nature which might influence the
judgement upon which consent is based.'100 This indicates that medical evidence can prove
useful to an assessment of materiality of risk, and hence legal causation, though that evidence
does not decide the case.
Considering the test in Canterbury - and in fact citing that case - Laskin CJC accepted
the view that a risk is material if the physician knows or should know that the plaintiff would
attach significance to that particular risk. He went on to hold that, 'No doubt, this invites a
finding of fact upon which medical evidence of the judgement to be exercised would be
admissible but not determinative.'101 So, when the desire for information on the part of the
patient is expressed as an expectation of the physician, medical evidence will be useful, though
will not in itself dispose of the case.
This was the vantage point from which the court could view the issues when deciding
Reibl v Hughes.102 The case involved the risk of a stroke from the repair of an artery in the
plaintiff's neck. The court had to consider whether an objective or a subjective test should be
employed for legal causation and materiality. This has been discussed in preceding chapters.
What is important at this point is the extent to which medical evidence proved useful in
answering the 'apparent subjective' test actually adopted in that case. Having debated the pros
and cons of the various tests available, and having decided to take into account the 'patient's
particular position, one which will vary with the patient,' and to assess it 'objectively in terms of
reasonableness', Laskin CJC went on to consider the evidence.103
He held that the crucial evidence was not that of the medical experts called, but that of
the plaintiff. Having assessed this evidence and prioritised it over medical evidence, the court
found the latter evidence useful for an understanding of the 'reasonable patient in this patient's
position.' In cross-examination the court learns what dialogue took place between patient and
physician. To that information is added any verification of matters of fact; this is where experts
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come in.
This position has been endorsed in Arndt v Smith.104 What is important is that the
influence of the medical expert has been diminished by the adoption of a test for materiality
which favours the patient over members of the medical profession. It has been argued in this
thesis that the test in Australia is the most patient oriented among those discussed. It will
therefore be interesting to see whether or not the importance of the medical expert has been
more expressly diminished in that jurisdiction.
5.4.2. Australia
It will be remembered that in Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital,105 Australian courts adopted a
more patient-centred approach than that adopted in Sidaway.W(' In Ellis the court held that
medical opinion and standard practices are important, but as a mere guide to the court. This
position was taken up in Rogers v Whitaker, where there was also evidence from similarly
reputable medical practitioners that they would not have warned of the risk. But the picture was
less clear before Rogers.
In F v R107 the court held that a failure to warn of the remote possibility of a tubal
ligation being unsuccessful was not a negligent breach of the standard of care.108 On the scope
of the duty of care, the court debated the approaches considered in Canterbury v Spence and in
Reibl v Hughes and noted that in Sidaway in England the 'extent of duty to advise and disclose
will be affected by the surrounding circumstances' and will be guided by an assessment of
reasonableness on the part of the doctor. For this, 'much assistance will be derived from
evidence as to the practice obtaining in the medical profession.'109 On this point the Supreme
Court of South Australia sided with the decision in Reibl v Hughes, saying that,
'To allow medical evidence to determine what risks are material and, hence, should be
disclosed ... is to hand over to the medical profession the entire question of the scope of
the duty of disclosure, including the question whether there has been a breach of that
Ibid. 17 et seq.
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The court noted that practices may develop within a profession more because of
convenience than altruism and that the court had an obligation to scrutinise these practices. In F
v R, medical evidence established that some practitioners would disclose and some would not.
While the trial judge had held that failure to disclose the risk was negligent, the Supreme Court
held that non-disclosure did not amount to negligence. In this case the respondent patient
averred that had she known of the risk, she would have elected another procedure. However,
medical evidence caused King CJ to hold that,
'If there had been a medically acceptable choice between tubal ligation with a slight risk
[0.5%-1%] of failure and another medically acceptable operation with no risk of failure,
I would have held that there was a duty to volunteer full information to enable an
intelligent choice to be made.'1"
Despite expressly citing the patient's right to information as grounds for disclosure,
the test for legal causation112 was not satisfied by the respondent patient on the ground of
medical evidence. Finally, King CJ held that it is for the court to decide what the responsible
doctor would have disclosed in the circumstances. This case was one which still adhered to a
Bolatn-style test, although took the patient's view into account."3 Considering Bolam and
Chatterton v Gerson,u4 Bollen J held that because some gynecologists would warn and some
would not and because the risk was a very slight one,115 the appellant was justified in not
disclosing that risk. Medical evidence is essential in establishing the facts on which such
decisions are based.116
Gover v State ofSouth Australia and Perriamni is a case which also involved the use
of expert evidence to establish the extent to which a practitioner conformed to the practice of
members of the medical profession. This judgement also questioned whether the plaintiff bears
110
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the onus of proving that had they known of the inherent risk, they would not have undergone
that procedure."8 Cox J was able to consider both F v R and Sidaway as to the duty of
disclosure. He approved of a passage in F v R in which King CJ had held that, 'The ultimate
question, however, is not whether the defendant's conduct accords with the practices of his
profession or some part of it, but whether it conforms to the standard of reasonable care
demanded by law.'119
To establish this, the court heard from medical experts on how they thought Dr
Perriam should have acted and on whether there is a responsible body of ophthalmologists who
might have acted in the same way. The court observed that 'the extent to which the courts are to
be influenced in these cases by a prevailing professional practice remains a vexed question in
the common law world',120 and noted the differences in approach on either side of the Atlantic
before again approving of the decision in F v R. This meant that reasonableness was a question
for the court which was to be guided by prevailing medical practice.
For this the court heard from nine experts, of whom five dealt with the subject of
liability. These witnesses examined and commented on the contents of the plaintiff's medical
notes and about the significance of the appearance of various symptoms, diagnosis, prognosis
and preferable forms of treatment. On these points the experts were not always in agreement, so
comprising a divergence of medical opinion. What the witnesses did have in common was the
task of explaining to the court the medical facts which, as Cox J explained, were 'quite
unfamiliar to [him].'121 Armed with this information, he was able to hold that the surgery was
itself justified and indeed that it was performed competently.
The duty of disclosure, however, is determined with the aid of 'opinion evidence' and
is hence more a matter of conjecture than medical fact. This is because while medical texts may
reveal the extent of a particular risk, they will seldom, if ever, issue guidelines at to whether
certain risks should be disclosed. In Cover the plaintiff complained that the risk of complication
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was not explained to her and that alternatives to surgery were not explained. These alleged
omissions were dealt with together because they were interrelated. It was held on the basis of
his own evidence that Dr Perriam had not mentioned complications because he saw no need to
do so; he had also not informed the patient of alternative procedures. It remained for the court
to establish whether this omission was a negligent one.
Again there was disagreement among experts regarding the propriety of non¬
disclosure. The court considered in some detail each of the complications, particularly the one
which occurred; the opinions of experts and the medical literature were canvassed on each.12"
The court found that some risks were to be disclosed on the basis of their severity (blindness).
This finding was based on the court's assessment of reasonableness as established by a
consideration of the medical evidence given by the experts. However, it was found that the risk
that eventuated was not subject to a duty of disclosure, because of its relative improbability. For
this reason no liability would follow because negligence unrelated to injury is not actionable.
That said, the plaintiff went on to argue that the negligent failure to warn of a risk was
material precisely because had she known of that risk she would have refused surgery and hence
would not have suffered injury.123 At that point Cox J considered the subjective, objective and
apparent subjective tests in Bolam and Chatterton in opposition to those in Canterbury and
Reibl. He noted that when F v R was heard, the trial judge did not have the benefit of the
decision in Reibl v Hughes, but that by the time of the instant case, the Reibl judgement had
been given. Cox J followed the full court decision in F v R and considered what the reasonable
person in the plaintiffs position would have done given the information. Supported by the law
of negligence, the court applied a subjective test and based the decision on the plaintiff s
evidence. This evidence will be hypothetical and will depend on the plaintiffs honesty124 and,
most importantly, will be non-medical in nature.
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By this stage the court will be armed with medical facts, the evidence of the plaintiff
and a body of legal principle. Cox J considered the ramifications of the subjective test in
relation to the hindsight of the patient-plaintiff. Based on her evidence, demeanour in court and
general opinions on undergoing surgery per se, he found that her actions would not have
differed from those of the reasonable patient in such a situation and, hence, that it was more
likely than not that she would have undergone surgery. This meant that her evidence was more
important than that of the medical experts, but would be tempered by the total body of evidence
125before the court.
It would appear that Australian law is clear on which evidence is useful to what end
and at which point in the judgement.126 This follows the same rationale as that in Canadian
courts. Medical evidence is more useful in establishing negligence and factual causation than it
is in establishing legal causation. This was the position inherited by the court at the time of
127
Rogers v Whitaker.
In that case Mason CJ said that he was both obliged and indeed wished to follow F v
R, because that was also an 'informed consent' case. Again the position in Canada was
juxtaposed against that in England, with the court noting that while the Canadian courts had
adopted and adapted the test, the English courts had declined to do so. He separated cases of
alleged negligence simpliciter from those involving disclosure, and then set out the test for
negligence. On the Bolam test Mason CJ said that in matters of medical evidence there is scope
for the 'genuine disagreement' among experts which was in evidence in the Gover case. In
considering the divergence of tests exemplified in English and Canadian courts, he sided with
Lord Scarman's dissenting judgement in Siclaway - a dissent which agreed with the position
established in Canterbury v Spence in America.
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The standard of care in Australia in matters of alleged medical negligence remains the
raised standard of the medical professional of analogous skill and qualification. However,
Mason CJ said that, 'that standard is not determined solely or even primarily by reference to the
practice followed or supported by a responsible body of opinion in the relevant profession or
trade.'128 The Bolam test had been discarded by the judgement in F v R and hence medical
evidence became something which served as a useful guide rather than as disposing of the case.
This is because the paramount consideration is the principle that a person is entitled to make
their own decisions about their bodily integrity.
Mason CJ noted that the approach of Lord Scarman in Sidaway was similar to that of
King CJ in F v R and was, in his view, the correct approach. Because disclosure matters involve
information and because patients' rights are implicated in the verbal interaction between doctor
and patient, a different standard was held to be applicable to disclosure cases.129 For this reason,
'it would be illogical to hold that the amount of information to be provided by the medical
practitioner can be determined from the perspective of the practitioner alone or, for that matter,
of the medical profession.'130 Perhaps more to the point, Mason CJ said,
'whether the patient has been given all the relevant information to choose between
undergoing and not undergoing the treatment ... is not a question the answer to which
depends upon medical standards and practice.'131
This introduces the test for legal causation. As it was in Canada and based on the
patient's right of self-determination, medical evidence served as useful to the court. It is the
Court's task to determine reasonableness on the part of the doctor with regard to the standard of
care. The court must also assess reasonableness on the part of the patient, based on the
plaintiffs evidence, in order to establish legal causation. Medical evidence is useful in
informing the court of current trends and of the medical facts, including factual causation. After
that it is for the court to determine whether the presence of information on the risk - in this case
of sympathetic ophthalmia - which eventuated would have made any difference to the decision
of the patient to undergo the treatment proposed - in this case cosmetic eye surgery.
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Because in Australia the test for legal causation and for materiality has been a
subjective one since before the judgement in F v R,132 the court relied more on an assessment of
the credibility of Mrs Whitaker's evidence, than on an assessment of the available evidence of
medical practice. On that basis it was held that because of a general concern for the health of
her 'good' eye, the reasonable ophthalmologist could be expected to translate that into an
expectation on the part of the patient, of a warning that there was an inherent risk of developing
sympathetic ophthalmia. This is because that risk was material to this patient as assessed by the
court on the basis of her evidence.
The Australian position confirms the thesis that the more patient-centric the legal tests
of a particular jurisdiction, the less important will be the evidence of the medical profession.
The South African position, however, is perhaps the exception that proves the rule. There the
position is undoubtedly patient-centric, yet medical evidence is of disproportionate importance.
5.4.3. SouthAfrica
For this, it will be instructive to return to those disclosure cases that preceded Castell v De
Greef As early as Van Wyk v Lewis133 it was clear that medical evidence established the
medical facts used by the court to establish liability because, as the court put it, negligence 'can
never be disentangled from the facts.'134 In Richter and another v Estate Hammann the court
held that,
'in reaching a conclusion a court should be guided by medical opinion as to what a
reasonable doctor, having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case should or
should not do. The court must, of course, make up its own mind, but it will be assisted
135
in doing so by medical evidence.'
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The Richter case concerned the advice of the doctor on whether or not to have a
particular surgical procedure;136 this advice included information on risks and alternatives. The
court held that the standard was to be assessed relative to the reasonable medical practitioner.
The court had recourse to medical evidence in order to establish a usual practice and then to
assess whether or not that practice was followed by the defendant. This Bolam-style standard
proved useful to the defendant in that case.
Even though it was unnecessary so to do, the court discussed causation and cited the
test for legal causation in the following way: '... this would have entailed proof at least of the
fact that if Dr. Hammann had told her that the incidence of risk was as low as set out above, she
would still have refused the operation.'137 The court would have to take the plaintiffs evidence
into account; Watermeyer J expressed scepticism of doing so in the light of the plaintiff s
hindsight, saying that he felt that 'very little weight should be attached to an ex post facto
statement of that nature.'138
In Castell v De Greef39 the court introduced a patient-oriented standard of care to
disclosure cases in allowing the volenti defence to be led. This decision attributed a
disproportionate importance to medical evidence in what has become a patient-centric
jurisdiction. It will be remembered from a discussion of Castell v De Greef in chapters three
and four, that this requires the establishment of two essentially medical facts: that no warning
was in fact given (attested to through practitioners' notes) and that the undisclosed risk factually
caused the injury suffered. This forms almost the whole of the inquiry. Conflict between
matters of fact and an assessment of materiality has already been discussed;140 for now it is
important to consider the court's treatment of the evidence.
Medical evidence was necessary to the court's understanding of the cosmetic surgery
performed and the level of risk of necrosis involved in that surgery, 'to determine what risks
inhere in or are the result of particular treatment ... and might have a bearing on their
136
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materiality Because the defendant led the plea of volenti non fit injuria and because that
defence plea was admitted, the court had simply to ask whether, as a question of fact, the
plaintiff knew of the risks involved. This was the case because, as the court held, necrosis was a
material risk as assessed by the subjective test gleaned from Rogers v Whitaker. To adopt such
an approach the court dispensed with the Bolam test and distinguished cases in which that test
had been used. This rendered expert medical evidence less conclusive than it had hitherto
been.142 The court sided with the judgement in Reibl v Hughes on this point.
The whole matter, thereafter, 'involved a conflict of fact.'143 To establish the relevant
facts, the court will call experts to help interpret the medical notes. It will also call both plaintiff
and defendant to recount what transpired between them in the consultation prior to surgery. It
will then assess the credibility of each witness and the reasonableness of the evidence of each
witness. On this point, and adopting a patient-oriented policy, the court found against the
plaintiff.
As regards lay evidence, of particular interest is the inference drawn by Scott J in the
court below and agreed with by Ackerman J. The plaintiffs husband was not called to give
evidence about what was said at the consultation between doctor and patient., even although he
was present at that consultation. The inference drawn was that the plaintiffs testimony - that
she was not warned of the risk which the court had held to be material - lacked credibility
because support it might have been given, had been withheld.
What is apparent from a discussion of the use of expert evidence in the three
jurisdictions which have adopted the doctrine of informed consent (to a degree), is that the more
patient-oriented the various tests for negligence and causation, the greater will be the
importance of the evidence of the plaintiff over the evidence of witnesses for the defendant
medical practitioner. This is a question of credibility, internal consistency and of the exclusion
of hindsight. That this is the case will become even more apparent through a consideration of








The general principles governing the use of the medical expert in negligence cases have already
been discussed.144 We know from previous chapters that British jurisdictions adopt a stance
unlike the other jurisdictions discussed and do not use the doctrine of informed consent to
describe the standard of care in disclosure cases. Looking at English and Scots law will reveal
that the use of expert testimony is used in the same way in those jurisdictions and is different
from how experts are used in Canada and Australia. It will also be possible to assert that this is
because British jurisdictions have not adopted the doctrine.145
5.4.4.1. England
The Bolam judgement set out the test still used in England in respect of negligence cases based
on non-disclosure of risks. We must remember that the Bolam test is a rule of evidence rather
than a rule of law; it is about how the law is able to treat the evidence. In the Bolam case it was
held that where the medical evidence showed that there was more than one body of competent
medical practice, and that the defendant followed one of them, no negligence could be found. If
the defendant can find an expert who represents a responsible body of medical opinion and an
expert to support that defendant's omission, this evidence will admonish him. McNair J put it to
the jury in the following way:
'
... it is not essential for you to decide which of two practices is the better practice, as
long as you accept that what [the defendant] did was in accordance with a practice
accepted by responsible persons; but if the result of the evidence is that you are satisfied
that his practice is better than the practice spoken of by the other side, then it is a
stronger case.'146
It is not a matter for court or jury to weigh up the practices of the profession; their task
is to assess the defendant's omission relative to the medical community. The court in Bolam
cited the evidence of experts and on that basis no negligence could be found. Subsequent cases
in English law have adopted the same approach. However, because of a shift in the outcomes of
cases since Bolam, simply by looking at the use and significance of the medical expert, one can
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track judicial movements within consent law.147
In Chatterton v Gerson48 the court considered the test of liability in circumstances in
which the doctor had explained to the patient the nature of the operation in broad terms. The
case had to do with whether the action lay in trespass or in negligence.149 It was held that the
action lay in negligence because of the presence of general consent. Accordingly, the Bolam
test came into play. The court questioned Dr Gerson's usual practice concerning the giving of a
warning of attendant risks, by asking both parties to try to recall what had taken place in the
consultation between them.150 After that, medical evidence was used to piece together the
pertinent medical facts. On that basis, the court was able to hold that the injury of which the
plaintiff complained was not related to the procedure earned out. The plaintiffs allegation was
that her consent was vitiated by the defendant's failure to provide information on the attendant
risks involved in that procedure. On the Bolam standard there was found to be no negligence;
even if negligence had been found, the medical evidence would not have established legal
causation because she would still have undergone surgery.151
At the level of proof of duty and fault, Hills v Potter52 is interesting from the point of
view of the measurement of the standard of care through the use of expert evidence. Adopting
the test set out in Bolam and in Hunter v Hanley, the court reaffirmed the ruling in Chatterton to
hold that the doctor was not negligent because, in his omission to inform, he had followed a
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of skilled medical practitioners.153 To
establish that this was the case, the court would have recourse to the evidence of representatives
of that responsible body; the court had to 'consider the legal standard applicable in this case to
the first defendant's conduct';154 again the court assessed the standing, within the medical
community, of the witnesses called; again the court had to look at the internal consistency of the
evidence given.
Cf. 3.3.4., 4.3. and 6.3.
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The most important disclosure case in English law remains the Sidaway case.155 It's
importance to the current chapter lies only in respect of the standard of care. The court
considered at some length whether or not to adopt the doctrine of informed consent. Having
decided not to do so, the case followed the same route as that followed in Hills v Potter,
Chatterton v Gerson and Whitehouse v Jordan: it was a matter of determining whether the
surgeon had been negligent in his omission to inform the patient of the inherent risk of spinal
damage resulting from an operation to her neck.
The case was complicated by the fact that the surgeon had died while the case was
being taken through the appeals process and by the fact that the medical records were
inconclusive in respect of what communication had taken place between surgeon and patient.
The court therefore had only the evidence of the plaintiff on the nature and extent of the warning
given.156 In that case medical evidence was useful to the court in establishing factual causation
(even though this was not necessary) and in educating the court in the vagaries of spinal damage
during neck surgery.157
Indeed, as Lord Bridge put it, 'Expert medical evidence will be needed to indicate the
nature and extent of the risks and benefits involved in the treatment ,..'.158 At the time he was
considering the judgement in Canterbury v Spence, in which it had been held that 'Experts are
unnecessary to a showing of the materiality of a risk to a patient's decision on treatment, or to
the reasonably, expectable effect of risk disclosure on the decision.'159 Lord Bridge went on to
note just what is being noted in this section: that, as he put it, 'In English Law, if this doctrine
were adopted, expert medical opinion as to whether a particular risk should or should not have
been disclosed would presumably be inadmissible in evidence.'160 The contrary position is the
one in force in England because the doctrine was not adopted and the Bolam test was upheld.
Lord bridge went on to note that,
'the issue whether non-disclosure in a particular case should be condemned as a breach of
the doctor's duty of care is an issue to be decided on the basis of expert medical evidence,












applying the Bolam test.'161
In Sidaway, the medical witnesses were agreed that the duty of care required a warning,
but they were not in agreement on the extent of the warning required.162 The court was obliged
to implement the Bolam test because it was held to be applicable in disclosure cases as well as
to matters of diagnosis and treatment. Even Lord Scarman, dissenting as he was, agreed that,
'His decision not to warn her of the danger of damage to the spinal chord and of its possible
consequences was one which the medical witnesses were agreed to be in accordance with a
practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of opinion among neuro-surgeons.'163
The court has followed the same route in subsequent analogous cases. In Gold v
Haringey HA,164 the evidence established that a substantial body of responsible doctors would
not have given a warning of the risk of failure of a sterilisation operation. In Gold the court
cited and approved of both Bolam and Sidaway.165 In Sidaway, the materiality of the risk was
considered from the point of view of the reasonable practitioner rather than the reasonable
patient.166 Accordingly, medical evidence carries more weight in assessing the standard of care
than it does in jurisdictions in which the test for materiality is more subjective.
This is clearly not something which would occur in the jurisdictions already covered in
this section, because those jurisdictions do not adopt a test like the Bolam test in disclosure
cases. Indeed, those other jurisdictions, particularly Australia and Canada, adopt a test for the
standard of care in which medical evidence is useful rather than decisive.
We will see that medical evidence will play a less important role in England in cases in
which the plaintiff establishes a breach the standard of care and then has to go on to prove
causation. In the 'erosion cases' the importance of expert evidence resurfaced in the causation
inquiry. Cases in which the duty of care facet has been proven in Bolam terms thereafter
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evidence will be vital in factual causation - in establishing a connection between the omission
and the injury. But what of legal causation?
To appreciate the approach of English courts to legal causation, we will need to look at
cases in which the courts have decided that arguments on the standard of care fall in the
patient's favour. It will also be instructive to consider cases in which the courts used expert
opinion, in conjunction with the Bolam test, in respect of the balancing of clinical risks and
benefits. This is because the test for causation was seen to be a subjective one in Chapter 4. It
would be for the plaintiff to establish that he would not have undergone the treatment had he
known of the risk involved. We will see that in those rare cases that reach that stage of the
inquiry, English courts rely less on medical evidence than they do at earlier stages of the
inquiry. This is because while the test for the standard of care is an objective, medically-based
one, the test for legal causation is a subjective, patient-centered one, which uses medical facts.
Smith v Tunbridge Wells HA167 concerned the negligent failure to warn a patient of the
possibility of impotence and incontinence following the so-called Wells operation.168 It was
found that a responsible body of medical practitioners would have given such a warning -
indeed that to give a warning was the only reasonable course of action.169 On factual causation,
medical evidence was used to establish that the impotence actually suffered was caused by the
Wells operation itself. The test for legal causation was a subjective one: whether or not Mr
Smith would have declined the operation had he known of the risk involved. Morland J said, 'I
am entirely satisfied that if the risk of impotence had been explained to the plaintiff, he would
have refused the operation.'170 To arrive at this conclusion, he considered the plaintiffs age
(28), family disposition (he was married) and the fact that he had already lived with the
condition for eight years. For this, medical evidence was precisely the 'useful guide' for the
courts that it had been in Rogers v Whitaker.111
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A similar logic was put to use by Mr Justice Rougier in McAllister v Lewisham.172
Again negligence was established; it was held that the evidence of the expert witness for the
defence contained an inherent paradox in that the witness made no criticism of the surgeon's
173failure to mention the risk of sensory deficit, yet that risk stood at 100 per cent. Weighing up
the evidence and assessing its internal consistency, the judge was able to hold that 'those who
say that the warnings given ... were inadequate are right and there has not been shown to me on
the evidence any reputable body of responsible opinion to the contrary.'174
Rougier J called the causation inquiry the 'hardest part' because it involves hypothesis
and hindsight. The evidence established that the operation was the factual cause of the injury.
Then, as in any disclosure case, it fell to the plaintiff to establish that with the information, she
would have declined the operation. Mrs McAllister's 'innate honesty' prevented her from
speculating as to what she would have done had she known of the risks, but the court was able
to make a finding in her favour nonetheless.
Indeed, the court considered the medical evidence in relation to Mrs McAllister's
personality (sensible and independent-minded) and lifestyle (her job and the independence it
gave her).17'7 Medical evidence was used to establish that her medical condition was advancing
slowly; that information was used along with the court's assessment of her personality and the
plaintiff's assertion that she would probably have taken a second opinion had she known of the
risk, to hold that this patient would have declined the operation.
When comparing, as we are, this case to those in Canada and Australia, what is notably
absent from the judicial test is an assessment of the reasonable person in the plaintiff's position.
This indicates that the test is that much more subjective in England than it is in Canada, but
remains skeptical of the patient's hindsight. The next case casts this statement in a slightly more
dubious light, because as in the preceding two cases, the court tried to disregard the hindsight of
the patient. However, when trying to assess what a plaintiff would have done had he known of
the risk, the court made greater use of medical evidence and the tendency of patients in similar
situations. This suggests that the court tried to inject a little more objectivity into the test for
172
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legal causation through a more objective assessment of the evidence. This occurs only if the
subjective approach is unconvincing.
Newell and Newell v Goldenbergnb involved a vasectomy operation which led to
recanalisation and, hence, to a fourth pregnancy for the Newells. They alleged that had they
known of the risk of recanalisation, Mrs Newell would have had a sterilisation operation too, so
erring on the side of caution. After considering the views of experts called for both sides,
Mantell J found the defendant negligent on the ground that,
'given knowledge of the risk, the only argument which can be offered against giving a
warning is the concern that the confidence of the patient and his partner might be
undermined with a corresponding increase in anxiety during and following the sexual
act.'177
The judge was taking account of patient-centric factors in this assessment of the
standard of care. The court then moved on to causation. True to the subjective test, the court
would have to be satisfied that the Newells would have taken a different course of action had the
information been given. On the subjective side of the inquiry, Mrs Newell asserted that had
they known of the risk, she would have undergone a sterilisation operation. Mantell J observed
that this statement was made with the benefit of hindsight; indeed that 'the operation on Mrs
• • »178
Newell only took place after these proceedings had been put in train.'
For that reason, the court had to consider a more objective form of inquiry to resolve the
causation issue. The court noted that the surgery on Mrs Newell was contraindicated on
medical grounds and that would have outweighed arguments in favour of a joint sterilisation
which was, according to expert evidence called by both sides, almost unheard of in medical
circles. This case shows that medical evidence can be useful to the court in the inquiry into
causation where too much reliance is placed on the hindsight of the plaintiff and, as argued in
the previous chapter, shows a tendency towards a Canadian-style test at that level.
In Lybert v Warrington HA179 the Court of Appeal180 again had to consider a failed
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sterilisation operation. It was concluded that insufficient warning had been given of the
prospect of failure. Further, the court found that there was an 'inherent likelihood' that with a
proper warning that a sterilisation may fail, the couple would have used other methods of
contraception while they waited for the plaintiff to undergo a hysterectomy.181 Lord Justice
Otton drew this conclusion from the previous history of the plaintiff and from the fact that she
had already undergone three caesarian section operations and had requested a hysterectomy to
take place at the same time as the last of those three caesarian sections. She was advised that
this would not be possible, so consented to a tubal ligation while waiting for a hysterectomy to
be performed as a separate procedure.
This decision shows a return to a more subjective test, with medical evidence useful
only if the plaintiffs testimony lacks credibility - by being based on hindsight, for example. In
this case, there was no such lack of credibility and hence medical evidence of the consequences
of a fourth caesarian section and, of course, of factual causation, was the 'mere useful guide'
that the court found it to be in Rogers v Whitaker.
We will see in the next chapter that expert evidence and the points at which it can be
used, form the basis of any speculation on possible developments in negligence law based on
disclosure. Part of that chapter will comprise this sort of speculation based on what we already
know of the current state of the law and on the decisions in the last four cases considered in this
section.182
5.4.4.2. Scotland
Scottish courts have led rather than emulated those English decisions in which patients proved
successfully that disclosure did not conform to the standard of care demanded by the law and
that this omission caused the injury complained of. Even so, there has been only one such case
and this may have to do with the difference in the test in Bolam from that in Hunter v Hanley.
However, from the argument in Chapter 3, this is unlikely.182 Decisions are made based on
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cases that come before the courts in any jurisdiction. In the law of delict such cases will be
based on the occurrence of injury. In other words, many factors will play a part in explaining
why fewer 'erosion' decisions have been handed down in Scotland: for example, population
size, attitude to litigation, quality of health care and the practice of defensive medicine. It is
impossible to say that this is so simply because of a supposed difference in judicial tests, which
has been argued to be an illusory difference.
Decisions which favour the patient are possible in Scotland. Even taking the test in
Hunter v Hanley at its most stringent, it would be a matter of proving that the omission of the
doctor was such that no other doctor would have made. While this may be difficult to establish,
it is not impossible, as the case of Goorkani v Tayside Health Board}*4 indicated. Medical
evidence lost some of its importance when the inquiry turned to causation. But before we look
at Goorkani, we might consider those cases which preceded it and involved the standard of care
only. That standard is determined by applying the judicial tests in Bolam and in Hunter v
Hanley in which medical evidence is of cardinal importance.185
One must bear in mind that Hunter v Hanleyl*b preceded Bolam and it was the latter
case which reformulated the test set out in Hunter. Unlike the Bolam test,187 in Hunter the test
is not exculpatory; rather it is one according to which negligence is established where a doctor
committed an act or made an omission which no other doctor acting with ordinary skill would
have made. As far as disclosure cases are concerned, Bolam is perhaps more comparable
because that case concerned disclosure of risks, while Hunter v Hanley concerned negligence
simpliciter.
However, it remains the case that in Scotland the test for negligence is taken from these
188 189
two cases. Moyes v Lothian Health Board was a case that turned entirely on its facts. Lord
Caplan commented on and approved of the judgement in Sidaway. In Moyes the pursuer
suffered a stroke which was a risk inherent in an invasive diagnostic procedure known as
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angiography. She alleged that the neurological professor who performed the procedure had
negligently omitted to warn her that her hypersensitivity to the contrast medium led to an
aggravated risk of a stroke.
Medical records and the evidence of hospital staff were used to piece together the
patient's relevant medical history. Counsel for each side led expert opinion evidence from
radiographers with expertise in angiography. Again, medical evidence helped the court
establish the levels of risk applicable to the procedure in question and the fact that
hypersensitivity to iodine does lead to an aggravated risk of neurological disorders, including
stroke. On the facts, the defender had warned of the risk of stroke, but not of the aggravated
risk. However, while the medical evidence established that the pursuer had suffered a stroke, it
failed at proof to establish any previous hypersensitivity and, hence, this was not a possibility of
which the surgeon could have been aware.
Two questions of fact were crucial to the pursuer's case: did she suffer a hypersensitive
reaction and was she given a warning? Because the answer to the former was in the negative,
answering the latter was unnecessary. Interestingly, Lord Caplan went on to contemplate the
position were he to be wrong in this assessment. He considered that there was a duty to warn
and that the omission to do so would constitute negligence. This, he argued, is because giving a
warning would constitute 'proper medical practice'.190 This is because, according to this
judgement, any warnings given are governed by medical criteria.191 Hence, medical evidence is
of crucial importance and determines the issue.
Still considering the hypothetical argument according to which Lord Caplan was
incorrect on the pivotal point of the pursuer's hypersensitivity, he went on to consider causation:
this is as subjective a test as is that in England. His Lordship concluded that Mrs Moyes would
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In Gordon v Wilson,19' too, the court had to contend with the evidence of two opposing
bodies of medical opinion. The pursuer had a benign tumour removed and sought damages for a
failure to diagnose the tumour earlier. She alleged that the delay resulted in nerve damage. The
court held that where there were two bodies of respectable medical opinion, each with an
opposing view, negligence could not be found.193 In this case the medical evidence had to
establish the factual cause of injury and to give opinions on whether the competent general
practitioner would have diagnosed the meningioma earlier, given the presentation of symptoms.
Again, because the test used was that set out in Bolam and Hunter v Hcinley,x9i as opposed to
asking what the reasonable patient would expect, medical evidence was crucial in determining
the standard of care.
Finally, that same test was used in Goorkani v Tayside Health Board.195 On the medical
evidence, the pursuer persuaded the court that the reasonable medical practitioner would have
warned of the risk of sterility from taking a particular immunosuppressive drug for more than
three months. This assessment was based on the established medical facts pertaining to the risk
of sterility.196 The medical evidence thus established factual causation. However, it also
established that the pursuer would have gone blind without the drug; hence it was held that legal
causation was not established because the pursuer would have accepted that risk had he known
of its existence.197 Clearly the test for legal causation is a subjective one and, hence, medical
evidence constitutes a guide for the court which, when placed alongside the pursuer's own
evidence and subjective circumstances, aids the making of a decision by the court.
Unlike the English position, we will see in the next chapter that a patient-based
disclosure law north of the border is less likely, though still possible. This means that the
198 * rconclusions one is able to draw on the basis of the 'erosion' cases may be drawn in respect of
Scots law on the basis of Goorkani. In addition, however, we will be able to draw certain
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comparisons, based on the law of delict, with the position as it is in South Africa.
5.5. Conclusions: theDelict / Tort Matrix
The state of the law in each jurisdiction has been discussed. By way of summary it will be
constructive to consider those facets of the judicial inquiry in which - relative to each particular
jurisdiction - the expert will be most important. For example, in Britain the expert is more
useful in respect of findings on the standard of care than he is in Canada and Australia. In the
causation inquiry, however, the expert is useful in respect of factual rather than legal causation
in all jurisdictions covered.
5.5.1. Duty and Fault
The evidence of medical experts is at its most influential at this point in Britain. Because of the
tests in Bolam and in Hunter v Hanley, as elaborated by the case law already discussed, the
expert will speak to the fault element of the standard of care in the law of torts or delict.
Because of the elevated importance of medical evidence at this point, the exchange of evidence
between the two sides will also have an enhanced importance. 199 In Australia and Canada, on
the other hand, the test is one taken from the point of view of the patient and the medical
evidence is useful to the court merely to inform court and jury of the medical facts. In South
Africa, the use of the volenti defence means that the doctor will have complied with the standard
of care by the fact of having told the patient of the attendant material risk. Medical evidence in
the form of notes will be useful in this.
5.5.2. Materiality Revisited
Materiality is the term linking the standard of care to legal causation. Whether 'material risk' is
defined from the point of view of the patient or the medical practitioner will determine the
weight given to medical evidence at that point of the inquiry. In Britain materiality is construed
from the point of view of the reasonable medical practitioner and evidence of the likely actions
of members of the profession; consequently medical evidence per se carries more weight than it
does elsewhere. Materiality is assessed by an expert: that is, was it, in the opinion of the expert,
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a material risk - as judicially defined - and ought there to have been warning thereof - as
medically defined. This demonstrates the discursive clash between law and medicine more than
it does in Canada and Australia where a patient-centric test for materiality ensures that medical
evidence carries less weight than the evidence of the patient and, of course, the court's
assessment of that evidence.
5.5.3. Injury
The presence of injury is a question of medical fact. Whatever the common law jurisdiction,
medical evidence will be brought (and exchanged between the parties) substantiating the
applicable fact."00 It will also be pertinent to an assessment of quantum should special damages
be held to run to loss of earnings and should general damages be held to include solatium.
Other heads of damages will require expert evidence not only from medical professionals but
from actuaries and members of other professions. Such heads include loss of expectation of life,
impairment of functions and fitness for employment. In such instances, medical evidence
relating to diagnosis and prognosis will be used alongside the evidence of other professionals to
arrive at a compensation figure."01 This is no different to the procedure which follows ordinary
negligence cases.
5.5.4. Causation
In disclosure cases the plaintiff or pursuer will allege that the omission to inform of a
material risk inherent in the procedure caused the injury."0" Factual causation is a question of
fact. However, disclosure cases are simpler than cases of negligence simpliciter such as Wilsher
v Essex in which multiple possible causes were argued in court. Disclosure cases, on the other
hand, are binary matters: either the information was present or it was not. In the absence of
information on the material risk, the court would ask if it was the procedure connected to the
risk which resulted in the injury complained of. The court will then ask whether knowledge of
that risk would have made a difference to the plaintiff.203 In all jurisdictions under discussion,
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courts use a test in which lay evidence is more important than medical evidence. However, as
decisions such as Newell and Newell v Goldenberg indicate, the court will often have to use
medical evidence in order to test the plaintiffs assertions that with the information that was
lacking, they would have refused the medical procedure which factually caused injury or would
have taken steps to minimise the effects of that risk or the chance of it occurring.
5.5.5. Judicial Policy and Risk Management
Policy has been formed; now it has been shown how the courts use expert evidence to apply that
policy by using it to different degrees at different points in the judicial inquiry. This means that
a jurisdiction which has adopted a patient-centric policy, will use expert medical evidence less
where the patient has something to contribute. However, it is interesting to see just how the
courts will use medical evidence and what weight is given to that evidence. This is itself
evidence of the extent to which a given jurisdiction adopts a policy which speaks to the
interpretation of evidence in a way which favours patient or practitioner. Bolam is a rule of
evidence which favours members of the medical profession. It is hence understandable that
adherence to that standard will marginalise the importance of lay evidence in the inquiry into the
standard of care. It is equally understandable that medical evidence will be marginalised where
the Bolam test has been dispensed with.
Legal causation, on the other hand, is a point at which all jurisdictions are more or less
in accord. More subjectivity is injected into the judicial inquiry because the test is essentially
about what the plaintiff would have done in the presence of the information. This can be
gleaned only from the patient. However, should that evidence lack credibility, the court will
have to test that evidence objectively. At that point medical evidence can be useful to the court.
This is because of the hypothetical nature of this part of the inquiry.
This difference and the tendency of British courts to favour the medical profession tends
to lend weight to the argument that British jurisdictions are holding on to the Bolam test
precisely because of the subjective test for causation. By preventing the use of lay evidence
which would allow the case to progress to an inherently subjective test for causation, the court is
able to ensure that the system remains favourable to the medical profession. The advantage of
this approach is the establishment of a benchmark practice in the form of current practices of the
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medical profession, such that all courts would come to the same conclusion given the same set
of facts. This power is entrenched by the fact that the judiciary has discretion to accept or reject




Informed Consent: Quo Vadis?
6.1. Introduction
This chapter will discuss the future of informed consent in Britain. If one considers some of the
extents to which the doctrine has been taken in some American jurisdictions, one can see the
possible extents to which the doctrine may be taken if it were to be adopted in Britain. These
American extremes may serve as cautionary tales for British jurisdictions and may constitute
judicial reasons not to adopt the doctrine of informed consent, because it has been applied to
information about the physician rather than the medical procedure. This, in turn, will constitute
the slippery slope.
If these cases do serve as cautionary tales, one might want to consider possible routes
towards British adoption of the principles underlying the doctrine of informed consent. These
principles are based on 'the patient's right to know'1 which itself presumes the doctor's duty to
tell. This chapter will therefore consider judicial trends in America as well as both judicial and
medical trends in Britain. These medical trends are important because of the courts' reliance on
the Bolam test.
The Bolam test is a test through which the judiciary sanctions responsible medical
practice, even although it retains the power to declare such practices unreasonable. It was
argued in Chapter 4 that the Bolam test may be eroded in the courts in respect of the standards
of disclosure of inherent risks. In Sidaway, it was held that the Bolam standard should also be
applied to disclosure cases,2 with the court remaining the arbiter. The court may, however, find
the evidence of a responsible body of medical witnesses to be unreasonable. It is at that point
that there is scope for the introduction of a disclosure standard based on patients' rights because
the judiciary allows itself to declare certain practices unreasonable even if supported by a
responsible body of medical opinion. In Newell and Newell v Goldenberg,3 for example, the
court found that the body of experts that would not have given a warning of the chance that a
1
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vasectomy might reverse itself, was neither reasonable nor responsible. And the House of Lords
judgement in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority4 serves as authority for the fact that
there may be circumstances in which expert evidence is not to be relied upon.
In disclosure cases there is more room for debate on whether the information actually
given was adequate for the individual patient than there is room for debate in ordinary
negligence cases as to whether due care was exercised responsibly. This is because it is easier
for a judge to assess the patient's information needs and expectations, relative to the doctor's
duty, than it is to assess whether due skill and care was exercised by the doctor or surgeon.5
That this is the case is evident from the argument presented in chapter 4.
The crux of the informed consent issue is how much information is required and who
decides upon that amount.6 In Sidaway Lord Bridge noted that the 'Judge might come to the
conclusion that disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to an informed choice
on the part of the patient that no reasonable prudent medical man would fail to make it.'7 This
made it clear that the court is the arbiter on the standard of care.
Thereafter, it becomes a question of which factors are to be taken into account by the
court and of how much weight is to be given to each factor. These factors include what this
plaintiff may have done had she had the information which was lacking, what the reasonably
competent practitioner would have disclosed and what the reasonable patient would have
expected by way of disclosure. Much of this has to do with materiality and the perspective from
which materiality is assessed.8 It also has to do with assessment on the basis of hindsight, and it
is at this point that the House of Lords' Judgement in Bolitho is important because, as in
disclosure cases, it had to do with hypothetical legal causation and with the authority of expert
evidence.
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6.2. Some American Extremes
It is at the point of materiality that the doctrine has been expanded in some American
jurisdictions and adopted to varying degrees in parts of the Commonwealth. This expansion has
occurred in the 'positive' and in the 'negative' sense. In the positive sense, the judicial
application of the doctrine has expanded to require the provision of even more information, in
particular information about the physician as well as the risks inherent in the treatment. In the
negative sense, the doctrine has expanded to found liability for the disclosure of too much
information.
It is one thing to say that the requirements of informed consent have been expanding in
favour of a more comprehensive disclosure, but another to be able to say just how far this
obligation has extended, or indeed may extend in the future. Courts have held that it is not
reasonable to require disclosure of all information available to the practitioner; but a liability in
tort for excessive disclosure is emerging, suggesting the need for a cap on the requirement of
information-supply.
'Over-information' would in the law of torts or delict have to cause physical or
psychological harm to be actionable. This points to a potential conflict between the duty to
inform and the duty of care. Van Oosten considered the doctrine of informed consent as applied
to liability for 'over-information'. He argued that although in English and South African law
this liability does not [yet] exist,9 on the basis of existing judicial statements it would appear that
the law in those two countries could follow that of Germany.10 He drew on a statement by
Watermeyer J in Richter v Estate Hammann11 that 'it may sometimes even be advisable for a
medical man to keep secret from his patient the form of the treatment he is giving him.' In
Sidaway, Lord Templeman showed this possible slippage towards acknowledging liability for
excessive disclosure when he stated that,
'A patient may make an unbalanced judgement because he is deprived of adequate
information. A patient may also make an unbalanced judgement if he is provided with
9
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too much information and is made aware of possibilities which he is not capable of
assessing because of his lack of medical training, his prejudices or his personality.
Thus the provision of too much information may prejudice the attainment of the
objective of restoring the patient's health.'12
Even although it is possible to argue that telling the patient too much about the medical
procedure in question, caused psychological harm, the defence of therapeutic privilege would
remain available. It is considered, however, that this area of law falls outwith the remit of this
thesis because informed consent is about omission liability - liability for omitting to divulge
certain material information.
Any research into this area of law would require the researcher to consider omissions to
divulge material information which, had it been disclosed, would have resulted in a decision on
the part of the patient against the proposed treatment. What one would be looking for is an
extreme born of the doctrine which would give rise to judicial arguments involving a slippery
slope as justification for not taking on board the legal doctrine in question.
6.2.1. Implications of American Expansion for other Jurisdictions
Slippery slope arguments can be defined as a combination of rule utilitarian ethics with an
empirical claim about the action's effect on inhibitions.13 Applied to the present situation, this
suggests that were the doctrine of informed consent to be adopted in the United Kingdom, there
would be a flood of such claims, and that these claims may be about information on the surgeon
rather than the medical condition. The question is, if other jurisdictions adopt the doctrine, do
they take on board all of its developments in America as fait accompli? At the very least, it
could be argued that any expansion of the application of the doctrine, would serve as a warning
to any jurisdiction contemplating its adoption. For this reason, one would want to ask where the
doctrine has led other jurisdictions; that will make it possible to put any such progression
forward as a reason against adopting the doctrine. For example, how much information about
the physician may be required? Given that, according to the doctrine, a patient is entitled to
information on all material risks inherent in a prospective procedure, recent developments have
12
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begun to require the communication of information about the physician.
This happened in Hidding v Williams.14 The case demonstrated the need to draw a line
between the patient's right to know and the physician's right to privacy.15 Hidding was an
informed consent case which also concerned alcohol abuse by a surgeon. It was established that
there had been violation of the informed consent doctrine through the physician's failure to
advise of significant material risks of the surgery which would have influenced the injured
patient's decision to undergo that surgery.
Having resolved the case on that ground, Gothard J went on somewhat unnecessarily to
discuss Dr Williams' failure to disclose his chronic alcohol abuse. He held that issue to be 'of
equal if not more importance' and said,
'because this condition creates a material risk associated with the surgeon's ability to
perform, which if disclosed would have obliged the patient to have elected another
course of treatment, the fact finder's conclusion that non-disclosure is a violation of the
informed consent doctrine is entirely correct.'16
It was held that failure to disclose this abuse, vitiated the patient's consent even
although there was no evidence that the care itself fell below established standards.17
Nonetheless, it was held that his condition created a material risk, assessed relative to a patient-
centric standard, associated with his ability to perform. The issue forms very much part of the
judgement because Gothard J said that it breached the informed consent doctrine. This is a
dangerous precedent to have set because in future cases it could be taken to apply only to the
information on the physician's health. It is argued that precedent in Britain and the
Commonwealth would, on the basis of prudence and policy, decline to follow this sort of
decision.
Moreover, the reasoning of the court falters when it tackles factual causation because
alcoholism may not always impair performance. In tort the patient would have to establish a
suffer. But he warned that such acts would lessen the inhibition against killing others, and thus should be
prohibited.
14
578 So 2d 1192 (La App 1991).
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causal link between lack of information and the injury suffered. The question is open as to
whether is it sufficient to argue that but for lacking the piece of information about the doctor in
question, the subjective patient would not have had surgery at all. In Hidding Judge Grisbaum
argued that,
'
... the gut question posed is simply this: whether a professed and practising alcoholic
can operate on any patient without breaching his standard of care. In other words, if
there is a resulting injury and the doctor performing the operation is a practising
alcoholic and this alcoholism is not disclosed to the patient prior to the surgery, do we
have liability? Given this factual scenario and considering the record in its entirety, I
say, "Yes." Ergo, this question must be viewed on a case-by-case basis.'18
However, it is not possible to establish causation between the lack of information and
the injury, especially if the injury is a built-in hazard, without passing the objective,19 but for
test. It is argued here that this is an insufficient causal connection to establish tort liability in
Britain, because informed consent has not been adopted as a doctrine descriptive of the standard
of care. Given an injury during surgery in which the surgeon was not at the time under the
influence of alcohol, in order to establish liability the plaintiff would have to that there was a
duty to warn of that alcoholism and that the injury suffered was due to that omission. This set
of facts takes the doctrine further than the informed consent scenario sketched at the beginning
of this thesis.
It is also a basis for the argument that in disclosure cases in some American
jurisdictions, the focus is more specifically on legal and hypothetical causation, through the
definition of materiality. This is a point at which the doctrine may be expanded further, because
with emphasis resting so much on the 'but for' test, the factual relationship between the
omission and the surgery becomes increasingly tenuous. For example, would it be possible to
sue under the doctrine of informed consent following competent surgery which failed to achieve
its desired result on the ground that but for lacking information to do with the surgeon, the
patient would not have had surgery at all? It seems that following Hidding the answer is that it
would. As regards the doctrine of informed consent and according to Hidding, if knowledge of
the surgeon's alcoholism is held to be material, there need not be an injury necessarily factually
connected with alcoholism, for liability to follow. This is because liability would be based on
the doctrine of informed consent rather than on negligence simpliciter.
18
578 So 2d 1192 (La App 1991). A page citation is not available because this case was sourced from LEXIS.
19
However, consider 4.2. on the various American States' tests for causation.
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Because Hidding has been used as an example of a possible extension of the doctrine
and because that case also involved informed consent as this thesis has hitherto understood it,
the next question which needs to be posed has to do with the prevalence of cases and which
have to do with information on the physician as founding liability under the doctrine of
informed consent. That will speak to the degree of caution to be taken by British jurisdictions.
So-called 'physician-specific disclosure' has recently been recognised as a problem.20
It has been argued that the doctrine 'obliges physicians to share the decision-making process
with patients.'21 It is a short step to include in that process any information which could affect
the patient's decision on treatment. The extension here is an extension of the rule in Canterbury
that a doctor's duty is to give adequate information regarding the proposed treatment.22
Applying an objective patient-centric disclosure standard, the matter of materiality is in the
hands of the reasonable patient. From there it is a short step to require physician-specific
disclosure on the ground that the reasonable patient would expect it.
Such disclosure has taken several forms which have been grouped under the heading,
the 'self-interest of the physician'.23 These interests can be related to the physician's economic
interests or indeed health interests such as those relating to substance abuse or indeed HIV
status. This will speak to the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship which itself
forms the basis of liability under informed consent, because the fiduciary relationship requires
raised standards based on good faith in the context of a disparity in individual power.
Heineman cites several examples which are worth noting here for the sake of
completeness.24 In respect of economic interests, it was held in Moore v Regents of the
University of California,25 that the surgeon's profit from the patient's spleen tissue clouded his
judgement, so creating a duty of disclosure when seeking the patient's informed consent. The
interest of the case is this: because the splenectomy generated financial benefit rather than
20
See, for example, Heineman, Richard A. 'Pushing the limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor




Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772, 783.
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Heineman. Ibid. 1089 et seq.
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Ibid. 1091 et seq.
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physical injury, the court concentrated on the context of the doctor-patient relationship. But
because it did not do so overtly, the door was left open to broaden the parameters of required
disclosure. This door is open to requiring the inclusion of any information based on a conflict
of interests bom of the desire to conceal personal information. As has been argued, this
information has been held to apply to the physician's medical circumstances; but it may also
apply to his personal failings.
In 1996 the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed down its judgement in Johnson v
Kokemoor}6 The case concerned several issues such as the use of comparative risk data and the
obligation of referral to a tertiary care centre, but of interest here is information on the
physician's track record. Surgery to clip an aneurysm was a technical success, but still left Ms
Johnson disabled. The plaintiff alleged that Dr Kokemoor 'overstated the need for surgery and
exaggerated his level of experience in performing the type of surgery he proposed.'27 Again this
was a matter of communication in the consultation. Whereas the defendant had performed that
type of surgery only twice, the plaintiff alleged he had said he had done so 'several' times. In
addition he allegedly failed to inform her that he was not 'board-certified' in neurosurgery and
that he was not a sub-specialist in aneurysm surgery. Again, the case also concerned
information on the risk which actually caused the injury suffered, but that did not stop the court
ruling on the information specific to the physician. It was, in fact, the issue which occupied the
appeal to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and can hence be seen as a cautionary tale in itself,
because the issue before the court had to do with the admissibility in evidence of the surgeon's
experience.
On that issue, the court found that information on the surgeon's relative inexperience
was material on the ground that disclosure standards are set by the reasonable patient.
However, as Heineman argued, the decision was not explicit about the fiduciary basis of its
finding.28 This means that a breach of trust becomes represented as negligence under the
doctrine of informed consent. This occurs through the use of the definition of materiality. As
Heineman put it, 'The court's analysis also blurred issues of decision and injury causation.'29
25
793P. 2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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This is a point which was made earlier in the current chapter. Perhaps more importantly, 'the
decision potentially subjects physicians to liability for non-negligent suboptimal care -
notwithstanding the difficulty of determining whether additional experience would have made a
difference.'30
What is clear from these cases is that the doctrine of informed consent in tort law is now
being used to found liability for failure to disclose information on the physician's health and
surgical experience. This began with the adoption of a patient-centric definition of materiality.
Therein lies the cautionary tale and indeed the constitution of the slippery slope.
From this, one can argue that were British jurisdictions to adopt the doctrine, that is
where that slippery slope could lead us. Even if British courts were to adopt the doctrine, it is
arguable that the difference between private and public health care would play a part in the
extremes to which the doctrine could be taken in the United Kingdom. It is argued that because
health care in Britain is largely a public service, it is extremely unlikely that courts would
compel disclosure of the surgeon's track record because that would be antithetical to the ethos
of the National Health Service itself. However, because British jurisdictions have not adopted
the doctrine of informed consent, and with it a test which defines materiality relative to the
patient's values, cases analogous to those discussed above, would at most amount to the loss of
the indication to engage a different surgeon if desired.
6.2.2. Causation and loss of Chance
The question has been alluded to: is there something in the loss of chance doctrine
which will be useful to the plaintiff in the case of an alcoholic surgeon, or indeed in the case of
the surgeon who is HIV positive, as occurred in Faya v Almaraz in Louisiana?31 For example,
loss of the chance to engage a surgeon who is not HIV positive, has a better track record or is
not an alcoholic. In Faya, the court upheld an appeal to hold that the distress and anxiety
caused by the knowledge that the surgeon was HIV positive and could therefore have infected
the appellant, imposed a duty based on the doctrine of informed consent, to disclose that




If the informed consent doctrine is being gradually accepted across the Commonwealth
and its current status in America32 extends to that outlined in Hidding v Williams and Faya v
Almaraz, is it not possible that the loss of chance doctrine could be used to support proof of
causation? If an argument based on the loss of a chance were put forward, it would be
presented in argument on mitigation of damages rather than for the liability issue itself.33 The
loss of chance in Hidding and Faya was the chance to engage an alternative physician.
A parallel can be found in Kay's Tutor v Ayrshire and Arran Health Board.34 It was
held that it was necessary to prove an actual increased risk of harm due to negligence before the
McGhee principle would apply.35 If the act of the defender materially increased the risk of harm
then this may establish causation. In McGhee it was held that failure to provide washing
facilities materially increased the risk of dermatitis and this was sufficient to found liability. It
is recognised that McGhee was not a 'loss of chance' case, but a case involving the question of
material contribution establishing legal causation. This was discussed in 4.3. In the present
context, the question would also be one of causation which would ask, 'but for the loss of the
opportunity to engage an alternative doctor, would this patient have suffered the injury which he
in fact suffered?' In Hotson v East Berkshire Health Authority36 it was considered that there
was a greater than even chance that the injury was inevitable and so on balance of probabilities
material contribution was not established.
In Hotson Lord Mackay said that he considered it 'unwise in the present case to lay
down the rule that a plaintiff could never succeed by proving loss of a chance in a medical
31
620 A 2d 327 (Md 1993).
32
In Louisiana at any rate.
33
Although argued at the point of damages and so not directly applicable to the causation inquiry, in Wilsher v
Essex Health Authority [1988] 1 All ER 871, because there were four possible causes of the actual harm
suffered damages were awarded at a quarter of the sum initially awarded. As regards disclosure cases, consider
Goorkani v Tayside Health Board 1991 SLT 94 (in the present chapter as well as 5.4.4.2.) in which the pursuer
failed to prove causation (and hence failed on the merits) yet was awarded £3,000 for the loss of the chance to
become accustomed to his pending sterility; this indicates that the matter was not simply a question of
quantum, but merits too.
34
1 987 SLT 577.
35
McGhee v National Coal Board 1973 SLT 14, [1973] 1 WLR 1: the Scottish case in which the material
increase in risk test was established. This case concerned contracting dermatitis while working at a brick
factory.
36
[1987] 2 All ER 909 on loss of chance being an issue of causation or of damages.
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negligence case.'37 In the instance of an alcoholic surgeon, the possibility is open to a plaintiff
to argue that not being informed that this surgeon was an alcoholic - and so engaging him on the
basis of lacking that information - materially increased the risk of harm by depriving this patient
of the chance to engage another surgeon.
Lord Mackay went on to say, 'your Lordships cannot affirm the proposition that in no
circumstances can evidence of loss of a chance resulting from the breach of a duty of care found
a successful claim of damages ...'.38 It seems possible that the loss of chance doctrine could
found actions in negligence. Yet in Hotson the question was one of competence in diagnosis
which caused the loss of chance. To make the parallel fit alcoholism, the plaintiff would still
have to prove that alcohol contributed to the injury suffered.39 This is a question of fact. To
make the scenario fit disclosure cases in Britain, courts would need first to adopt a test for
materiality which is favourable to the patient. This, it is argued, is unlikely. Also unlikely is the
court's adoption of loss of chance in medical negligence cases as precedent swings the other
way. However, given the 'erosions' of the Bolam test considered in the last chapter, as well as
the 'emergence of the patient's voice', are we not at the top of the slippery slope?
6.2. Emergence of the Patient's Voice in Britain
The last chapter considered the emergence of the patient's voice in respect of those cases which
were won by plaintiffs in England, through a causation test which is similar to that employed by
the Canadian judiciary.40 The common law is able to take on board academic writings, case law
in other analogous jurisdictions and other legal and quasi legal documents such as conventions
on human rights and patients' charters. Such writings will influence the medical fraternity
insofar as greater recognition is given to the views and needs of the patient; they influence the
judiciary in the same way. They also influence the patient insofar as he may become educated
in respect of these rights, and seek to assert them.
37




Unless one could argue that one had suffered nervous shock as a result of learning that one's surgeon was
HIV positive. This, however, would not be on the basis of the doctrine of informed consent and would require
a traumatic event. The law in the United Kingdom would probably not consider that the post-operative telling
of a patient that that patient's surgeon was HIV positive, constituted such a traumatic event. That this is the
case and that forseeability and remoteness are the tests used is evident from King v Phillips [1953] 1 QB 429,




Judicial views, however, are influenced by the views of the medical profession because
of the Bolam test. This is because the test is a floating benchmark for the courts. Therefore, as
the medical profession recognises the patient's voice to a greater degree, this will become the
standard by which members of the medical profession are judged. In terms of the legal tests for
the standard of care, it is foreseeable that the standards of disclosure expected of the reasonable
medical practitioner will become increasingly weighted in favour of more comprehensive
disclosure.41 This is based on patients' rights. It will be necessary, therefore, also to consider
the views of the medical profession on the doctrine of informed consent.
6.3.1. A Rights Basis for Consent
McLean has argued that disclosure standards are non-technical matters and, as such, the courts'
assessment of the appropriate standards ought to be made with reference to certain claimed
interests.42 On this basis it may be argued that where there is an interest in a particular piece of
(material) information, there may also be a right to receive that information. This right would
exist in law where courts hold that there is a duty to provide the information. The central issue
is whether the patient feels that he or she has the right to that information and whether the courts
can in due course consider that right worthy of legal protection. This is a moral point, rather
than merely a matter of professional practice.
Judges in Castell v DeGreef Rogers v Whitaker and Reibl v Hughes all invoked
patients' rights as the rationale for adopting a more patient oriented consent doctrine, as did
Lord Scarman in Sidaway. In none of these decisions was any document such as a bill of rights
invoked even although that might have been an option; such rights are deemed to exist sui
generis and are not dependent on positive law.
In Britain there are several documents to which argument might have recourse. The
European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine will be discussed shortly.43 In
addition, the National Health Service Patients' Charter of 1992 states that every citizen has the
41
Consider, however, Mason & McCall Smith, Law and Medical Ethics (4th Edition), 247, in which it is




right 'to be given a clear explanation of any treatment proposed, including any risks and
alternatives.'44 The most recent Department of Health Patients' Charter is more explicit.45 This
right has gained recognition by the medical profession. It may also exist as part of the duty of
care by virtue of that recognition in the context of the Bolam test.
6.3.1.1. A Critique of lord Scarman's Argument in Sidaway
Lord Scarman argued that the doctor's duty stems from his patient's right. This is to be
welcomed, yet such a rights-based approach obscures the logic of tort law and the duty of care.
His Lordship seemed to assume instead that the right existed sui generis and gave rise to the
doctor's duty.
However, in the law of torts the duty of the medical practitioner stems from the law of
torts itself and the duty of care. It is correct to argue that a duty presupposes a right, but the
slippage made by Lord Scarman comprised trying to establish a causal connection between right
and duty. Yet the relationship between duty and right is symbiotic rather than causal and the
beginning point of that relationship is the judicial definition of the standard of care within the
professional duty.
Any argument will begin with the existing definitions and tests in the duty of care. One
facet of that standard is the right-of-the-patient-and-the-duty-of-the-practitioner as a single
indivisible unit. Yet this does not mean that the right to information may not be constituted by a
positive right which itself presupposes a duty. At the time of Lord Scarman's judgement, no
such positive expression existed. This is no longer the case - which is perhaps a testament to
Lord Scarman's foresight.
6.3.1.2. The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
The Convention was opened for signature on 4 April 1997. Although the United
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autonomy. Article 5 states the general rule that 'an intervention in the health field may only be
carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it' and that '[t]his
person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the
intervention as well as on its consequences and risks.' There is not, however, any indication as
to what test will be used to establish whether information is 'adequate' or not.
It is argued that the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine will be
influential in British adoption of consent principles based on the doctrine of informed consent.
The Convention is open for signature by, inter alia, Australia, Canada and the USA as non-
member states which 'have participated in its elaboration ,..'.46 Considering that informed
consent is a doctrine of American construction and Canadian and Australian elaboration, it is
likely that what delegates had in mind during the process of formulating Article 5 was the
doctrine as articulated in their own jurisdictions.
The use of the words 'informed' and 'consent' together suggests to common law
jurisdictions that it is the doctrine that is being invoked. To non-common law jurisdictions, no
such invocation need be suggested. Indeed, in the Spanish version of the Convention, the word
'informed' does not appear next to 'consent' because to consent without information is deemed
conceptually impossible.47 As in the French version, the Spanish version of the Convention
stipulates that the patient must give consent after having been informed, but this does not
include the juridical concept of informed consent. However, because England and Scotland are
common law jurisdictions, we must consider the possibility that it is the doctrine which is being
considered in the use of the term 'informed consent' by the Council of Europe.
Paragraph 35 gives some indication of the meaning of 'informed consent'. This
reflects only the opinion of the Steering Committee and does not constitute a binding
instrument. Aside from the Explanatory Report to the Convention, there is no publication




See 33(1); these countries had observer status within the Steering Committee of Bioethics.
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For this information I am sincerely grateful for the comments of and fruitful discussion with Dr J. Corbella
Duch of the Fundacio de Gestio Santaria de L'Hospital de la Santa Crei sant Pau, Hospital Universitari de la
Uab, Barcelona.
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classified and restricted.48 However, because the Convention does not constitute a binding
instrument, the term 'informed consent' would need to be interpreted according to national law.
That said, it remains possible to speculate on the future of informed consent principles in Britain
on the basis of the argument that the common law is influenced by academic writings, the
existing body of case law as well as other national and international codes.
6.3.1.3. BRITISH INCORPORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
While the UK Government has not incorporated all of the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic law,49 the Human Rights Act 1998 received Royal Assent on 9 November
1998. This will come into force early in 2000, once there has been an extensive education
programme for the judiciary.50 The Human Rights Act 1998 does not set up a court dedicated to
the adjudication of cases under its provisions, though it does oblige all courts to adjudicate
matters consistently with the Act.
Of present importance, it does not incorporate the European Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine. However, because the United Kingdom now has a Human Rights Act
akin to the European Convention on Human Rights, it would appear probable that the UK could
ratify and possibly incorporate the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Arguments
might also be made concerning the European Communities Act 1972, which provides that in the
event of conflict, community law prevails over domestic law. Future disclosure cases will be
dealt with in the United Kingdom under domestic law and in the existing courts, but will be
heard in the context of a court system which adjudicates matters relative to human rights.
What is evident is a trend towards the acknowledgement of human rights in the United
Kingdom. One such right has been argued to be that of information in the context of medical
48
Correspondence by the present author with the Directorate of Legal Affairs at the Council of Europe has
confirmed the observer status of these three countries and the fact that their delegates took part in the
elaboration of the convention. This correspondence has also indicated that 'informed consent' will probably be
interpreted according to national law as the Convention does not constitute a binding instrument. See Appendix
B
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treatment. If the above argument on the meaning of informed consent in the Biomedicine
Convention is accepted, the argument would make out a case for the adoption of the doctrine.
This argument may be dependent on speculation about future parliamentary policy relative to
the common law, but what does emerge, does so at the level of influence.
In practice terms, an analogy can be drawn with cases which went through domestic
courts to Strasbourg. For example, Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom51 was won in
Strasbourg by the plaintiffs. The influence of this and similar decisions on the British
legislature was such that the law in Britain was amended to outlaw corporal punishment in
schools. However, statutory change is an improbable route to the adoption of informed consent,
because it is a judicial doctrine. To speculate on how the court would decide such a case, one
should take into account the common law as reflexive, the influence of European law to which
Britain is a signatory and the comparative nature of medical jurisprudence.
Should Britain ratify the Convention, it will become binding. However, it remains
unclear what interpretation will be given to Article 5 on informed consent. This means that
when considering developments in the law of the United Kingdom, it is necessary to continue to
argue in terms of influence. Such influences include that of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine, of the law in America, Canada, Australia and South Africa as
well as of existing trends within medicine as seen in the context of the Bolam test and the
Patients' Charters. These influences, taken together, allow us to predict the arrival of an
increasingly patient-centric standard in disclosure cases.
6.3.2. Erosions of the bolam Standard
It is argued that judicial resistance is to the wholesale doctrine rather than the consent principles
it embodies, as well as to the slippery slope it threatens.52 Yet in the years that have elapsed
30
See John Wadham & Helen Mountfield. Blackstone's Guide to the Human Rights Act 1998. Blackstone.
London. 1999.
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(1982) 4 EHRR 293; corporal punishment in schools.
52 This was stated more firmly by Lord Donaldson in Re T (adult)(refusal of treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649,
663. Such a slippery slope means that once it is found that the duty of care included provision of information
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since the Sidaway judgement was handed down, much positive critique has been given to the
dissenting judgement of Lord Scarman. Indeed, not only have academics supported his
approach, the British Medical Association has adopted it as an ideal mode of practice.
The Bolam standard is eroded by the assertiveness of the court over the weight of expert
evidence. In this way it is eroded by using the Bolam test itself. A physician-based standard
has been used to erode the Bolam test in informed consent cases by arguing that a physician's
negligence is based on a responsible body of medical opinion.53 The test itself remains more or
less intact, but it is now able to support the plaintiffs case. This is because of judicial
sovereignty over expert evidence.
This amounts to a Bolam standard being used to erode the application of the Bolam test
in consent cases because Bolam is a rule of evidence. As current opinion fluctuates so standards
are able to fluctuate to come in line with new developments in medicine. This has been argued
to be the strength of the Bolam test, yet it means in effect that the Bolam test could be used to
adopt the doctrine of informed consent, while perhaps not calling it by that name. Considering
that there is a trend towards fuller disclosure in practice,54 a professional standard assessed
professionally makes for a particularly malleable legal test; it all boils down to the weight to be
given to particular expert evidence. If there is a body of opinion available to the court, then it
must be slotted in to the Bolam test and assessed in terms of reasonableness.
6.2,2.1. The English Judicial Erosions
Having argued that the Bolam test, being a rule of evidence, may be eroded by the judiciary
asserting its power over expert evidence, any argument made on the basis of the erosion of the
Bolam test ought to begin with Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority. This is because
that case had to do with those circumstances in which expert evidence is not to be relied upon as
well as with the fact that it is a House of Lords judgement which had to do with omission
liability in the medical negligence context.
on the risk which eventuated, with a subjective test for causation already in place in tort law, the law would be
set to become as patient-centric as that of Australia.
53
This, of course, depends on the availability of a reasonable body of professional opinion. See Chapter 5 on
the Expert witness, especially 5.3.
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In Bolitho, the House of Lords held that a doctor could be liable in negligence despite
the presence of a body of professional opinion which sanctions that doctor's conduct. The court
found that in a minority of cases that body of professional opinion might not stand up to logical
analysis. This involved overturning the judgement of the Court of Appeal which had held that
the Bolam test required the court to accept that body of evidence. Lord Browne-Wilkinson held,
'the court is not bound to hold that a defendant doctor escapes liability for negligent diagnosis or
treatment just because he leads evidence from a number of medical experts who are genuinely of
opinion that the defendant's treatment or diagnosis accorded with sound medical practice.'55
His Lordship went on to hold, 'It is only where a judge can be satisfied that the body of expert
opinion cannot be logically supported at all that such opinion will not provide the bench mark by
reference to which the defendant's conduct falls to be assessed.'56 He went on to consider
whether the case before him was 'one of those rare cases', to find that it was not.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson specifically stated that he was not 'considering questions of
disclosure of risk.' It is argued, however, that this ruling will apply to disclosure cases because
in Sidaway the House of Lords had held that the same standard is to be applied in both
scenarios. If the same test is to be applied in both scenarios and the House of Lords in Bolitho
elaborated upon how the test is properly to be used, then it should be the case that the Bolitho
judgement will apply to disclosure cases, particularly because they are concerned with both
omission liability and, by extension, hypothetical causation. There is some support for this in
Pearce v United Bristol Health care Trust57 in which Lord Woolf cited the Bolitho judgement
with approval before going on to say,
'... if there is a significant risk which would affect the judgment of a reasonable patient,
then in the normal course it is the responsibility of a doctor to inform the patient of that
significant risk, if the information is needed so that the patient can determine for him or
herself as to what course he or he should adopt.'58
The Court of Appeal in this case was not only using a subjective test for causation, but was also
building on the Sidaway judgement in which it had been held that a 'significant risk' was one in
54
Irwin, S., Fazan, C. & Allfrey, R. Medical Negligence Litigation. 1995. Legal Action Group. London. 22.
Cf. 6.3.2.1.
Bolitho (administratrix of the estate of Bolitho (deceased)) v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 4






Quote taken from LEXIS report.
217
the region of 10%. In the Pearce case, the risk of stillbirth caused by late delivery was
estimated at 0.1 - 0.2% and was not, according to both the experts and Lord Woolf, significant.
However, it remains the case that the term 'significant risk' is used in the same way as is the
definition of 'materiality' in other jurisdictions. That, together with the above argument on the
reading of Bolitho in conjunction with Sidaway and Pearce, indicates that a patient-centric test
is on its way to the United Kingdom.
One can therefore reconsider those disclosure cases which indicated a similar trend in
respect of the erosion of the Bolam test. 'Erosion' in this context means those judicial decisions
which seemed to indicate that the solidity and sanctity of the Bolam test, as favourable to the
patient, was in jeopardy.59 In these cases the plaintiffs proved their cases precisely by using the
Bolam test. Admittedly these decisions were been made by courts inferior to the House of
Lords, yet it is significant that none of them have been appealed. When these cases are viewed
alongside the above interpretation of Bolitho, it is possible to argue that the Bolam test will
continue to be eroded. While they do not set any new precedent, they do indicate that the Bolam
test is now useful to the plaintiff.
In Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority,60 the Queen's Bench applied the Bolam
test in finding for the plaintiff. However, it is simplistic to argue that where the plaintiff won the
case, therefore the Bolam standard has been eroded. Lord Diplock in Sidaway is cited as having
said that 'we are concerned with volunteering unsought information about risks of the proposed
treatment sought ,..'.6i The fact that the information is unsought at the time yet in hindsight is
desirable leaves judicial hands relatively unfettered when it comes to determining what could
reasonably be expected by the court of the surgeon rather than what is reasonably expected by
the patient.
Following this case, Margaret Puxton QC commented that 'the major criticism of the
Bolam test is that it gives too much weight to the opinion of doctors, in effect allowing the
defendant's colleagues to usurp the function of the court in the determination of what amounts
59
These were discussed in 4.4.4. as Smith v Tunbridge Wells HA, McAllister v Lewisham and Newell and
Newell v Goldenberg.
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to negligence.'62 Yet courts continually assert their own competence over this expert
evidence.63 Puxton pointed out that the Bolam principle was covertly 'abandoned' by the court
electing not to accept the expert evidence which said that a warning would not have been given.
In this case it was made clear that a court decides 'what the medical standards should
be, not what they were at the time' which means that 'although he expressly rejected the
argument based on ... Rogers v Whitaker he reached the same result by substituting the court's
view of what was reasonable for the objective test.' 64 Although it may amount to the same
thing, we are not simply talking about preferring patient or practitioner; we are talking about
preferring the court's assessment of both, in terms of the legal test adopted. This appears to be
evidence of a shift in judicial policy away from that adopted in the days of Lord Denning.
In McAllister v Lewisham, in asserting the court's power to assess negligence and
reasonableness, Rougier J quoted a much-cited passage from the judgement of Lord Bridge in
Sidaway in which his Lordship had said that 'the Judge might in certain circumstances come to
the conclusion that disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to an informed
choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make it.'65
Similarly, in Newell and Newell v Goldenberg66 Mantell J held that the body of medical opinion
which would have withheld information was 'neither responsible nor respectable'; hence the
omission was negligent. In other words, there was a body of medical opinion given, but the
court said it was not respectable.
When it is argued that Bolam is used to erode Bolam and so to adopt principles broadly
based on the doctrine of informed consent, what is meant is that the Bolam standard is used to
assert negligence based on a judicial assessment of the reasonable medical practitioner. Again,
this is because the Bolam test is a rule about the weight to be attached to the evidence given.
6~
[1995] 4 Med LR 342. Lord Justice Sachs, quoted in Bucks v Cole [1993] 4 Med LR 393 as saying that ' ...
in so far as the evidence shows the existence of a lacuna [in professional practice and] that lacuna was ... so
unreasonable that as between doctor and patient it cannot be relied upon to excuse the former in an action for
negligence.'
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The argument here is about the extent of the duty of disclosure and the tests used to
assess that extent. Only after that inquiry will the court go on to consider causation. In the law
of torts or delict in Britain, this is a subjective inquiry, though in respect of disclosure cases it
appears to be akin to the apparent-subjective test iterated in Canada insofar as courts try to
exclude the element of hindsight. This in itself suggests a difference between judicial tests in
respect of negligence simpliciter and negligence based on non-disclosure, though not at the level
of the test for the standard of care; the difference becomes apparent in the causation inquiry.
It is contended that the cases discussed above herald the arrival of consent-based
negligence which, as more similar cases are added, will lead to the inevitable conclusion that a
form o/the doctrine of informed consent is adopted by English courts.
From there it is reasonable to argue that with lack of informed consent being a basis
for a finding of negligence, the Bolam test will be a tool to be used against surgeons rather than
part of their own armoury.67 This is because of the above argument, based on the House of
Lords' judgement in Bolitho, that courts have started to make use of the sovereignty which they
have so often asserted they have over expert evidence.
At present English courts assess 'materiality' relative to current medical practice. This
means that as the medical profession acknowledges a greater need for patient autonomy, the
courts will have to take the patient's point of view increasingly into account under the Bolam
test; it is this adaptability to current practices which is often considered the strength of the test.
6.3.2.2. TheMedical Erosions
As medical practice moves in the direction of more comprehensive disclosure in practice, certain
non-disclosures will become unreasonable. It has already been stated that the British Medical
Association puts forward the judgement of Lord Scarman in Sidaway as an ideal for practice. In
addition, the medical profession tends to consider the doctrine of informed consent to be the law
of the United Kingdom. That this is the case is evident from a series of articles in the British
67
Considering these cases, it would appear that it is the judgement of Lord Templeman in Sidaway which is
being used.
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Medical Journal on the topic.68 Many of these papers assume the term to refer to consent based
on information. While this might be the case in medical practice, this thesis has argued
throughout that in law the term refers to the doctrine of informed consent. However, it is
apparent from any of these articles that authors consider the term to be self-evident. It is
certainly the case in the UK that medical practitioners ought to inform their patients and gain
their patients' consent. If the medical profession considers that the law requires an increasingly
patient-centric disclosure standard, then with the Bolam test as an entrenched rule of evidence,
that standard will become required in medical practice and in law.
The General Medical Council recently issued advice for doctors on seeking patients'
consent in the form of a publication entitled Seeking Patients' Consent: the Ethical
Considerations.69 Of present interest is the fact that the Council notes that, 'Patients have the
right to information about their condition and the treatment options available to them. The
amount of information you give each patient will vary, according to factors such as the nature of
the condition, the complexity of the treatment, the risks associated with the treatment or
procedure, and the patient's own wishes'70 Doctors should, therefore, not make assumptions
about patients' views but should ask whether they have any concerns about the treatment or the
risks it may involve.71 The publication also notes that implied consent does not imply
understanding of the risks involved in the proposed treatment. This indicates that the GMC is
advising a practice standard which is broadly similar to the patient-centric legal standard
inherent in the doctrine of informed consent. In fact, that is the general tone of the document
itself.
It has been argued that members of the medical profession do not have control over the
outcome of medical negligence cases. The courts are willing to find practices unreasonable even
if supported in evidence by responsible bodies of opinion. The Bolitho judgement and the
'erosion' cases support this. However, even if the practices of the medical profession continue
to be a primary judicial consideration, it is clear that these practices themselves support the
68
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doctrine of informed consent. If members of the medical profession do not have control of legal
standards, but courts do, and if the courts are themselves looking increasingly to the evidence of
the plaintiff in disclosure cases, then without tampering too much with Bolam, it is possible to
adopt many of the principles of informed consent. This is because of what was argued earlier in
the present chapter about patients' rights, their knowledge of these rights, their concomitant
desire to take more control of their own medical treatment as well as because of the courts' and
the medical profession's recognition of these factors.
6.3.2.3. Informed Consent, quo vadis ?
In the context of changing judicial and medical views and in the context of the influence of
foreign judgements and European law, one might consider the very threat of such a case finding
its way to Strasbourg. This would affect domestic law and it is arguable that domestic courts
may on that basis decide in a plaintiff's favour in the informed consent scenario. But it will not
do so at the expense of the Bolam test. Even if the court were to decide the matter according to
domestic rather than European law, the timing of the case will be crucial because of ongoing
changes within a medical profession whose praxis is held in such judicial esteem.
Given the trend towards more comprehensive information disclosure in medical
practice alongside the 'erosion' cases and the reflexivity of the common law, it is argued that it
may be expedient for domestic courts to preempt a decision in Strasbourg. While the doctrine
of informed consent as articulated elsewhere is unlikely to be adopted per se, the principles it
embodies are gradually becoming the standard by which medical practice is measured by British
courts. This is possible because of the combination of judicial and medical factors and because
the common law is inherently both flexible and comparative; within medical law this
comparison is of a more international nature.
For the judiciary to remain protective of members of the medical profession, it would
need to resist the doctrine yet allow consent principles to develop from within the profession.
This will leave the Bolam test intact and, eventually, would favour the plaintiff. This judicial
process would also remain a balanced one. However, even although it appears from the above
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argument that the Bolam test is one which is able to support the plaintiffs case and is therefore
able to protect patients' rights, one is still brought back to an underlying question which remains
something of a monolith: is it appropriate and desirable that issues such as the adequacy of
information disclosure be left in the hands of the medical profession, even although those hands
are judicially scrutinised? Even if the Bolam test is now able to support the plaintiffs case, will
it always be able to do so without the protection of a judicial test which assesses materiality
from the patient's viewpoint?
It is noteworthy, however, that these 'erosion' cases were decided in English courts.
With the current position in Scotland following Hunter v Hanley,72 which pre-empted Bolam
and has been likened to that test, it is reasonable to put forward the same arguments in respect of
the Court of Session as were put forward in respect of the English courts. However, considering
the use of the law of delict and the volenti defence as exemplified by the South African
judiciary, the question arises as to whether Scotland has another possible route to informed
consent.
6.4. Scotland
The Scottish Court of Session in Moyes affirmed that a failure to warn of risks was always to be
judged by practitioners' standards. What is needed in this context is a set of judicial criteria
which has the approval of the medical community and which also takes patients' rights into
account. This is possible north of the Border because the court in Bolam drew on Hunter v
Hanley and the court in Moyes drew on Sidaway, we can therefore infer that what occurred in
the erosion cases already discussed, could occur in the Court of Session in similar cases.
The law of delict operates in both Scotland and South Africa due to analogous legal
histories in those jurisdictions,73 which begs the question whether there is a more direct route. It
is instructive to consider the operation of the South African law on disclosure in medical
practice in order to pose the question, 'Could it happen here?' - if only to discount that
72~
Consider Griffiths, John R. 'Consent - Scots Law and the Patient's Right to Know.' (1996) 15 Medicine and
Law 1-6.
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possibility.
6.4.1. Judicial Policies: Comparing Scotland and South Africa
To recap, in Richter v Estate Hammann, Watermeyer J had upheld the standard of the
reasonable medical practitioner as the test for the legal standard of care. That remained judicial
policy74 until the appeal judgement in Castell v DeGreef5 in which the court approved of the
decision in Rogers v Whitaker and of the stance of Lord Scarman in the Sidaway.
The judgement in Castell v DeGreefwas based on the South African law of delict and,
on policy grounds, the court allowed the defence of volenti non fit iniuria. Ackerman J also
argued that there existed a line of precedent to the effect that cases which has to do with consent
to medical treatment fall under the volenti defence, which would justify an otherwise wrongful
delictual act.76
Having allowed the defence to proceed, the court held that it succeeded and that the
patient had therefore given her informed consent to the surgery. The addition made in the case
law is this: the test used by the court to establish whether the information on the inherent risk
suffered was material information, was a carbon copy of the test set out in Rogers v Whitaker in
Australia. In other words, a material risk is one to which a person in the plaintiff s position
would be likely to attach significance or one to which a medical practitioner might reasonably
be expected to be aware that the patient would find significant.77
This is a matter of the sequence of the legal argument. If the pleadings are in
negligence then the relevant negligence tests will be brought to bear on the case; in the case of
Scotland this means the test in Hunter v Hanley and Moyes v Lothian Health Board. If, on the
74
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other hand, the pleadings allege that the proper legal category for disclosure cases is in
wrongfulness itself, and that argument is accepted, then consent emerges as a defence.
Accordingly, the doctrine of volenti non fit iniuria became a way of testing the reality of
consent as a matter of fact.
The South African judiciary found in volenti a legal category for consent and risk-
taking. On policy grounds, the Court used it to test whether consent had been given. This
involved a post facto inquiry and allowed the Court to escape the category of negligence. In the
South African context, the wrongfulness is not negligence but comprises the failure to warn of a
material risk. What is important here, from ideological and precedent points of view, is the
ability of a judiciary to adapt a doctrine to fit its own jurisprudential needs - and indeed to adapt
the volenti defence to fit the medical scenario.
6.4.2. Volenti, Negligence and Culpa
If the action is for breach of duty and is an action ex delicto,78 that is not to say that the
action is necessarily in either negligence or assault. If the court holds the duty of care to
encompass consent based on information, in the law of delict it does not follow that this should
be argued in negligence. This is about a failure to carry out the duty of care effectively by
ensuring that the patient is adequately informed so as to have given an understood consent. The
difference is that the delict is constituted by acting without consent where the duty of care
demands consent; and consent is something which is to be tested differently to negligence
simpliciter. The test for the reality of that consent has its basis in the volenti defence.
The volenti defence may appear anomalous in the context of informed consent because
of its relation to contributory negligence, but being volens depends on both knowledge of the
risk involved as well as the acceptance thereof. In assessing whether a patient was or was not
volens, the court then interrogated the adequacy and materiality of the information given, by
reference to its own criteria. This involved not only an adaptation of the test for the standard of
care as expressed in Rogers v Whitaker to make that test compatible with volenti; it also
involved an adaptation of conventional understandings of volenti non fit iniuria so that its
78
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mechanism could be used in the context of consent to the risks inherent in surgery.
This means that despite the fact that in other common law jurisdictions, imperfect
consent may constitute negligence, in South Africa it effectively constitutes wrongfulness. The
use of volenti had two effects other than removing the issue from the realm of negligence, if
temporarily. It placed the disclosure and materiality of risk in a contractual context and it
shifted the evidentiary burden onto the defender who must show that on balance of probabilities
the plaintiff was volens,79 This is done by showing that, in terms of judicial criteria, the plaintiff
had in fact made a 'conscious, deliberate, informed and voluntary decision to run a known risk
[which is] therefore in its nature subjectively determined.'80
It has been argued in Chapter 3 that when the question of causation is confronted under
volenti, it does not involve a policy-guided inquiry into legal causation, because factual and
legal causation are subsumed in this aspect of the law of delict. Causation is established
inferentially and is proven the way res ipsa loquitur proves negligence, such that participating
in surgery objectively amounts to causation of the injury because the duty of care is fulfilled
where a person is deemed to be volens. Considering the use of the law of delict and the volenti
defence in South Africa, the question arises as to whether Scotland has by analogy and systemic
similarity another possible route to informed consent through volenti nonfit iniuria.
6.4.3. Scots Law
There are many cases in Scots law on the voluntary assumption of risk in judicial inquiries into
contributory negligence and causation,81 but none consider the matter of consent to medical
procedures. The issue is consent, the defence of consent and the delict of causing injury while
acting without complete consent where the duty of care demands it.
It is clear from Reibl v Hughes and Rogers v Whitaker that a different test or standard is
needed for issues of consent and for matters in which negligent performance of the medical
P Q R Boberg The Law ofDelict. 1984. Juta. Johannesburg. 767-8.
80
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Tichener v British Railways Board 1984 SC (HL) 34, 1984 SLT 192. In the context of health, in McTear v
Imperial Tobacco Ltd, The Times, September 30, 1996 (Inner House) it was held that the pursuer had
voluntarily assumed the risk of lung cancer by smoking the cigarettes manufactured by the defender.
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procedure is alleged. According to Moyes, the test in Bolam and Hunter v Hanley is to be
applied in Scots law in both scenarios.82 In South Africa, on the other hand, volenti provided an
alternative test which in itself was able to distinguish instances in which injury was caused by
lack of information from instances in which injury was caused by the negligent performance of
the medical procedure in question.
Informed consent cases under volenti give rise to an action in consent itself. In Castell
v DeGreef, the court used a test for materiality taken from Rogers v Whitaker. This injected a
normative facet into the judicial inquiry which is at odds with volenti non fit iniuria, because
volenti is a question of fact which asks whether this patient knew of the particular risk which did
in fact eventuate. Materiality, on the other hand, is a normative test relative to the patient's
views or relative to the practices of the notional reasonable medical practitioner.
There is a difference between assessing the reality of consent in a case before the court
and creating criteria to be used in the future by doctors and lawyers, which is the normative
facet of the matter and involves an assessment of materiality.83 Whatever the test for
materiality, the court will still have to ask whether it was reasonable for the doctor to have failed
to disclose a particular risk. Even although it has been rightly hailed as progressive by those
protective of 'patient autonomy',84 the Castell v DeGreef decision sets out a postfacto decision¬
making mechanism. The criteria used under volenti are assessments of whether the patient had
knowledge of a certain risk. This is of little help to the doctor in the consultation situation when
asking what information might be required.
All disclosure cases turn on whether information is or is not supplied and hence a
definition of 'materiality' is required. As soon materiality is defined and that definition is
judicially applied, the matter becomes normative. But because normativity and volenti appear
mutually exclusive, this makes for somewhat incongruent law.
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The difference between the decisions in Scotland and those in South Africa is seen at
the policy level. In Scotland, policy decisions are made in a manner in which the policy of the
court tends to emerge from the decision itself. In adopting a view on informed consent in which
materiality is assessed from the point of view of the reasonable practitioner, courts have hitherto
adopted a policy favourable to the medical profession, though this is itself in jeopardy. The
South African court, on the other hand, considers policy more overtly and in the opposite
sequence by starting off with a position it deems desirable and then considering a possible legal
peg on which to hang that policy.
Another difference which is evident is in the tendency of the South African courts to
use academic writings and foreign decisions to justify judgements. This makes the South
African law of delict more comparative than the Scots law of delict. A further difference
involves the use of alternative tests for the duty of information and the duty of care in
negligence simpliciter. This occurred in Castell v DeGreef through the use of volenti in consent
cases. In Moyes v Lothian Health Board, in the other hand, the Court of Session held that the
same test - in Hunter v Hanley and Bolam - is to be used on both instances. This means that for
Scottish courts to go the route of the South African judiciary, would require extreme judicial
activism which would go against existing precedent.
Even if Scotland were to see volenti as supplying criteria for consent, it is unlikely that
the Court of Session will adopt what is essentially a contradiction of two legal categories.
Additionally, Scottish courts may be unlikely to follow the South African lead because they do
not tend to begin judgements with a policy decision. This indicates a greater tendency to adhere
to the operation of the common law and the doctrine of stare decisis.
This line of precedent in Scottish common law requires disclosure cases to be litigated
as negligence matters, rather than as wrongfulness matters. To be able to tread the path of the
South African Courts would require the Scottish Judiciary first to see the informed consent
rights even although the plaintiff did not win her case but failed on causation. Even so, the adoption of the test
in Rogers v Whitaker is what rendered the case 'pr°gressive'.
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scenario as an issue of consent and wrongfulness which is not negligence and to separate the
tests for negligence simpliciter from those based on information disclosure. There is no Scottish
precedent for this, but there is precedent to the contrary.
That said, it is arguably possible to change the legal position in Scotland on the basis of
policy. This argument proceeds from the basis that Scottish courts do at times engage in
'judicial activism' which could conceivably lead to a change in judicial orientation from one
favouring the medical professional to one favouring the patient, even although this seems
unlikely.
The Court of Session has indicated that in some instances a desirable policy might be in
evidence which has been supported by another comparable jurisdiction and is therefore worthy
of adoption by the Scottish courts.86 Though this has not yet occurred in medical negligence
cases, it has occurred in the law of obligations. Smith v Bank of Scotland1 concerned the
constructive notice of a husband's misrepresentations and the failure of a bank to warn his wife
of the risk of granting security for her husband's debts, as well as the failure to recommend
independent legal advice. The analogy fits: there was an obligation to provide information, the
omission to do so and the resultant harm.
What is important to the present argument is that the court in Smith considered Barclays
Bank pic v O'Brien 8 which was a ruling in England. The court found the policy underlying that
decision to be a favourable one and imported it to affect a change in the legal doctrine north of
the Border. From this argument, it is not entirely fanciful that the Court of Session should
consider a South African ruling which adopted a policy with which the court agreed and so to
consider the South African precedent to be of sufficient weight to change the legal rule in
Scotland.
85
Castell v DeGreef was a negligence case from beginning to end, but one in which the court made a detour
through wrongfulness, as the court did in Rogers v Whitaker when considering trespass.
86
See Macgregor, L. 'The House of Lords "Applies" O'Brien North of the Border.' (1998) 2 Edinburgh Law
Review 90.
87
1 997 SLT 1061 (HL).
88
[1994] 1 AC 180.
229
This means that the court could consider the matter as one of wrongfulness by drawing
on the law of delict. It would then need to define materiality and it is that element which would
have its basis injudicial policy. This would be the most difficult obstacle because of an existing
policy which is protective of the medical profession and which is in evidence through the case
law from Hunter v Hanley to Goorkani. Such a move would require a departure from existing
policy, but on the basis of Smith v Bank ofScotland, it is argued that such a departure is possible
in law, though perhaps improbable in practice.
On balance it is argued that the Scottish judiciary will more probably follow the English
'erosion' cases because the resultant change in the legal position is slow and incremental and
will not ruffle as many feathers as an approach which is based on such extreme judicial
activism.
6.5. Conclusion
The main concern of this chapter has been to explore the possibilities in disclosure law in the
United Kingdom. It was argued that but for judicial policy, some of the American extremes
highlighted in this chapter could become part of the informed consent case law in those
countries where the doctrine has been adopted. In respect of England and Scotland, the question
is of a different order because those jurisdictions are not yet at the top of the same slippery
slope. This is why one can posit the American extremes as a reason not to adopt the doctrine.
Because British jurisdictions decided not to adopt the doctrine, this chapter sought to
explore possible routes to the piecemeal absorption of consent principles - perhaps those based
on the doctrine of informed consent. The argument which was followed was based on the fact
that the medical profession is adopting an increasingly patient oriented disclosure standard. In
the context of the tests in Bolam and Hunter v Hanley, this means that this standard will become
the legal standard. As such omissions become medically unreasonable, they will become
judicially unreasonable, and hence negligent. The medical profession and the judiciary will be
guided in this increasingly patient-centric assessment, by the existing case law - both domestic
and foreign - and by positive law such as the European Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine.
230
This is all possible in British courts because of the policy that holds medical evidence to
be subject to judicial scrutiny and assessment. The basis for that argument is the decision in
Bolitho, coupled with those in the 'erosion' cases. This argument applies equally to England
and Scotland.
However, because of the operation of the volenti defence and its admissibility as a
defence in South African law, this chapter explored the possibility of its importation into Scots
law. However, because the weight of precedent swings the other way, the law in Scotland will
probably not follow that route despite the argument, based on Smith v Bank ofScotland, that the




7.1. Informed Consent in Law
What has been attempted in this thesis is a deconstruction of a relatively small area of law in
respect of those jurisdictions among which the law is seen as comparative. Not only does the
law on disclosure have to do with the civil law; it has to do for the most part with the law of
negligence. More specific still, it has to do with medical negligence insofar as the allegation
would be that because of the medical practitioner's negligent omission to disclose to the patient
information on a particular risk which eventuated, that patient suffered injury which was
causally linked to that risk. Bearing, as he would, the burden of proof, that patient would have
to satisfy the court that the presence of that piece of information would have broken the chain of
causation between the negligent omission and the injury suffered. This would entail persuading
the court that a different course of action would have been taken, had the absent information
been present. That, as we have seen, depends on the test used by the court which, in turn,
depends on the policy adopted by the courts in each particular jurisdiction.
In analysing the different policy implications of the judgements of the jurisdictions
covered, this thesis has embarked on a deconstruction of the relevant case law, but has sought to
link those cases to cases from other branches of law where relevant. This has been an exercise
in deconstruction of the minutiae of a small area of the common law. One would hesitate to
submit that this deconstruction has been in the sense envisaged by Derrida.1 However, the
subject matter has been approached from a gestalt point of view; the whole is considered to
comprise more than the sum of its parts. The reason for this is the operation of judicial policy,
which at times leads to judicial activism.
For this reason, this thesis has at times integrated links to other areas of the law in order
to support the principles relied upon. This is particularly true in respect of the penultimate
1
In the sense discussed in, Derrida, J. Acts of Literature. London. Routledge, 1992 and Derrida, J. (John D.
Caputo, Ed.) Deconstruction in a nutshell: a conversation with Jacques Derrida. New York. Fordham
University Press. 1997
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chapter. In order to understand that the informed consent scenario or the law on medical
information disclosure is adjudicated according to the law of negligence, one has to exclude the
criminal law on the one hand and, on the other, one has to exclude the law pertaining to
intentional delicts. This speaks to the exclusion of the law on assault. The policy implications
of this categorisation were discussed in the opening chapter.
From there, one was able to delve into the finer points of what the law has to say on
unintentional delicts, as well as their defences - including volenti non fit iniuria. Through this
inquiry it became apparent that the major sticking point is neither in the test for the standard of
care, nor is it in the test for factual or legal causation. Indeed, the most controversial point is the
form of test adopted for materiality, in the case of British jurisdictions, the question is whether
or not the adoption of any test for materiality is appropriate.
It is at the point of materiality that the doctrine is expanding in some American
jurisdictions to include fact scenarios which were perhaps not envisaged by the bench in
Canterbury v Spence. It is at that point that a modified objective test was employed in Canada
in Reibl v Hughes. It is at that point that the South African court in Castell v DeGreef adopted
the Australian decision in Rogers v Whitaker which was itself a modification of the test in Reibl
v Hughes - and indeed Canterbury v Spence.
The test for materiality lies between the standard of care and causation inquiries and is
applicable to both. In terms of the standard of care there would, according to the doctrine, be a
duty to warn of material risks. However, a risk is material if it would affect a decision on
treatment; this is pivotal to the inquiry into legal causation.
In Britain, it is difficult to escape a definition of materiality for long. There is a
gravitation within professional opinion towards more comprehensive disclosure in medical
practice which, it has been argued, will lead to non-disclosure being considered unreasonable by
the medical profession. With the emergence of such a position, the tests in Bolam and in Hunter
v Hanley would not support a medical practitioner who omitted to disclose a particular
(material) risk. In Scotland, a definition of materiality is necessary even if the court were to
follow the South African lead and consider the matter as one of wrongfulness in failing to
procure an informed consent, rather than as a matter of negligence. In law, this is theoretically
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possible on the basis of the principles iterated in Castell v DeGreef and Smith v Bank of
Scotland.
In the United Kingdom, materiality is a medical standard. As such, it need not be
expressly defined as a legal test. This is because the Bolam test is a floating benchmark and is
adaptable to current medical practice. This means that as more comprehensive disclosure
becomes the accepted standard in medical practice, more patient-centric consent principles will
be taken on board by the law. Hence, the law will be able to adopt a form of the doctrine of
informed consent if a responsible body of medical practitioners supports it and if no responsible
body of medical practitioners supports non-disclosure. This is more akin to the wording of the
test in Hunter v Hanley than it is akin to that in the Bolam test.
Nonetheless, one would still be looking for a legal test which is able to be understood
by members of the medical profession. This is because the test itself affects and guides medical
practice. Whichever test is supported by the law, the matter of legal policy and judicial activism
cannot be ignored. If it is essentially defensive medical practices in Britain which usher in the
perceived need for more comprehensive disclosure, one would be forced to reconsider
arguments which hold that defensive medicine is a negative transatlantic import. In the light of
the argument presented in this thesis, defensive disclosure practices would appear to be
supportive of the rights of the patient which are seen to exist sui generis. Judicial sanction of
these practices through the Bolam test would require simply that medical practitioners 'move
with the times'.
7.2. Informed Consent inmedical Practice
Because the doctrine of informed consent is a legal doctrine - albeit adapted to fit the strictures
of the domestic jurisprudence of each jurisdiction covered - it is important that members of the
medical profession understand its tenets in their own jurisdiction. This is so regardless of
whether the doctrine is rejected, accepted or adapted because it is a legal standard with which
members of the medical profession must comply. It is therefore important to consider not so
much which of the tests discussed is more equitable in terms of the allegedly competing
interests of patient and practitioner,2 but which test provides the medical practitioner with
guidelines which are easy to follow. This is a matter of legal certainty which should lead to
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greater certainty in medical practice.
7.2.1. The United States of America
It was argued in Chapter 4 that American jurisdictions differ among one another on the
appropriate test for materiality and that they exhibit the same disunity as that exhibited among
the other jurisdictions covered by this thesis.
7.2.2. Canada's 'Modification'
What the Canadian Supreme Court did in Reibl v Hughes was not to modify the test inherent in
the doctrine as outlined in Canterbury v Spence. What the court did was to modify the existing
subjective test inherent in the law of torts in Canada - specifically in negligence. This in itself
created a judicial test which was different from that employed in negligence simpliciter. The
question is, 'is the test useful to the medical practitioner?'
In requiring the disclosure of material risks and then defining a material risk as one to
which the reasonable patient in the plaintiffs position would attach significance, the court
raised the legal expectation and extended the civil liability of medical practitioner. This is in
itself nothing new because of the raised standard of care inherent in the law of negligence as
applied to the medical practitioner. It is submitted that this test is one which the medical
practitioner will find useful because the medical practitioner can place him-or herself in the
position of the reasonable patient, without making too much of an imaginative leap. It is this
test, which seeks to exclude hindsight, which the Canadian courts have adopted and that by
which the Canadian medical practitioner will have to abide.
7.2.3. Australia's Ambivalence
The matter is more complex in Australia. Again there is a duty to warn of material risks
inherent in the medical procedure to be performed. However, in Rogers v Whitaker the
Australian High Court defined a material risk as one to which the subjective patient would
attach significance or one which the court would expect the reasonable doctor to know would be
significant to the patient.
2
This has been considered throughout this thesis.
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It is argued that this ambivalence makes for a test which is difficult for the medical
professional to use. How, for example, could that practitioner know which side of the test the
court would use? Would it be the first part, the second, or both? The facts of the case might
render these questions irrelevant, but different facts might lead to concern on the part of
members of the medical profession.
Use of the first part of the test would amount to a very high expectation of the doctor;
the law would require a medical practitioner to know in some detail the value system of each
patient. While courts consider this value system at proof, they do so over several days or weeks.
To expect that of the medical practitioner would be to place a heavy burden on the profession as
a whole. Use of the second part of the test reinforces the first and, it is argued, has the same
effect because in practice the subjective standard is employed first and then turned into an
objective expectation of the doctor.
7.2.4. The South African Similarity
The position in South Africa was complicated by the use of the defence of volenti non fit iniuria
in Castel v DeGreef. However, the test for materiality is the compelling point in the judgement
for the reasons stated in this thesis.3 On that point, the test in Rogers v Whitaker was adopted
verbatim and hence the same argument advanced in respect of the Australian position, may be
advanced in respect of the South African position: that as a legal guideline, the test is not as
useful to the medical practitioner as the Canadian test.
7.2.5. The British Tradition
In Britain the test is that set out in Bolam and in Hunter v Hanley, as supported by Sidaway and
Moyes v Lothian Health Board. It is the medical professional standard. Without saying it in so
many words, the court tested materiality of information relative to the opinions of reasonable
and responsible members of the medical profession.4 This makes the test in the United
Kingdom the easiest to use by members of the medical profession.
3 Cf. inter alia 3.3.
4
Though Lord Scarman did discuss this to some extent in Sidaway. Cf. 3.3.4.
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Many arguments have been advanced in this thesis and elsewhere which place a value
judgement on the use of the Bolam test. It has been castigated as paternalistic and as archaic.
However, it was argued in Chapters 5 and 6 that it is precisely the fact that the test constitutes a
floating benchmark that is the strength of the test. While British jurisdictions will continue to
resist judicial importation of the doctrine of informed consent for the reasons outlined in this
thesis, the judiciaries will be unable to resist the importation of the principles inherent in the
doctrine where members of the medical profession support those principles, or consider them
part of UK law.
This is a position which is backed up by the recent case law. The Sidaway case remains
the benchmark case on informed consent, along with its support of the Bolam test. However, it
is evident from subsequent judgements handed down by courts inferior to the House of Lords,
that the Bolam test is proving useful to plaintiffs and pursuers on the matter of negligence.
Smith v Tunbridge Wells, Newell and Newell v Goldenberg, McAllister v Lewisham and
Goorkani v Tayside Health Board support the view that medical practitioners may be held liable
in negligence despite - or indeed because of - the Bolam test. In these cases plaintiffs did face
the additional hurdle of proof of causation. At that point, the law began to resemble that in
Canada by taking the views of patients into account in respect of what action would have been
take had they known of the risk which eventuated.
What remains important is the fact that the court has always asserted its authority to
decide on reasonableness - and indeed on the probable actions of the reasonable patient - when
considering both liability in negligence and causation. That this is the case is evident from the
House of Lords judgement in the Bolitho case, in which the House reiterated its authority to
decide matters using the legal application of a reasonableness test. Even although Bolitho was
not an informed consent case, the judgement is important from the point of view of the court's
use of that authority and the application of the Bolam test to the causation inquiry. For the
purposes of this thesis, this is important because it is symptomatic of the court's ability to
adjudicate informed consent matters on the basis of reasonableness which in itself may lead to
the Bolam test proving useful to the patient. This relatively new use of the Bolam test marks a
difference in the behaviour of the courts towards the doctor-patient relationship. Whereas
before the cases mentioned in the above paragraph, the Bolam test was seen as protective of
members of the medical profession, it may now be seen as the floating benchmark it has been
argued to be in this thesis. This, coupled with the assertion in the Bolitho judgement, of the
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court's authority to so adjudicate, heralds a move in medical jurisprudence towards more
account being taken of patients' views, while at the same time not adopting the doctrine of
informed consent per se.
This is a form of judicial activism quite unlike that demonstrated in Canada, Australia
and South Africa in which the doctrine was adopted or adapted, though other forms of judicial
activism remain open to the courts. It was argued in Chapter 6 that a form of judicial activism
other than the use of the Bolam test as a floating benchmark, may be open to Scots law. The
judgement in Smith v Bank of Scotland serves as evidence of the possibility of importation of a
set of legal principles on information disclosure, from another jurisdiction. Whether or not this
will ever happen is a moot point, though the possibility remains open.
7.2. Conclusion
All that is required of medical practitioners is that they 'move with the times'.5 As a legal
principle, this is no different among the jurisdictions covered here. If, by moving with the times
and accepting the principles which underlie the doctrine of informed consent, medical
practitioners adopt essentially defensive practices, then so be it. These practices can be justified
from the point of view of the protection of patients' rights to information and can be supported
by the tests in Bolam and Hunter v Hanley.
One can therefore argue that if medical practitioners simply keep up to date with current
practices in respect of disclosure of information to patients, viewed both domestically and
globally, then informed consent is on its way here. It is on its way without the court having to
create a test which is different in respect of negligence simpliciter, from that which is applicable
to disclosure cases. This is because in negligence simpliciter the medical practitioner is
expected to keep up to date with the practices and techniques of his colleagues.
In the final analysis, even although this thesis has argued in favour of the Bolam test,
the conclusion remains the same as many other works on the subject which favour a patient-
centered approach to information disclosure in the medical context. It .is still a question of
5
That this is the case is evident from Roe v Minister of Health [1954] 2 All ER 131 in which it was held that
the court is not permitted to look back with a 'retrospectoscope'. This judicial witticism argued that the court
must not look at an accident which occurred in 1947 through '1954 spectacles'.
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whether we, as a society represented by the judiciary, are willing to leave such matters in the
hands of the medical profession, even although they seem to be adopting a more patient-oriented
approach in practice. The pendulum has in the last few years begun to swing in favour of the
patient, and has done so precisely through the Bolam test. However, leaving the Bolam test in
its present form and position of authority provides no guarantee - other than continuous
assertions of judicial dominance over the application of the test - that the pendulum will not
swing back to its former position. Perhaps by that time, however, judiciary and medical
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patientisble,throughhem dicalprofession,ts rveorown'bestinterests" asheorheperceivesthem.1" HoiliEnglishandAmericancourtsuspa ientutonomy,espe¬ ciallywitheg.iidInc onalrif11callIeiit,butthel gieeoldiss minationolinhumationispoi tfdivergence.IAmerica,ad ctor'sdutyrequiredbycourtsindisp essthatolre sonablediscl sureregardingth probableconsequentesndda g rsf llingwi hinhkno ledge."Con¬ sentbasedonsuchdi closurecanbeaidtoh veb ni f rmed,athetlegieeolrl silosuirequitediaestionorthecourt.( aunpleteconsent,howev r,iim ossiblewithouti f rmation,1-andtheterm'in u edconsent' wouldappearredundantoself-justifying.HutwItill-consentwillremaincompulsory11f rmedicalprocedures,ftisnotinformed,th nisnottrueco s nt.Il wever.thdutytoi f missubjecttocertainexceptions"suchs'neces ity'."w ichalwaysopentotin'hysicianandi assessedFnglandW lesaccordingt theHi'bintesta dinScotlandaccordingtlluiilnrIhuil y."'talsoappliestothc nceptfthciapeulicprivileg .17whichssedas counterargumentidisclosurecases,b ti con tantlyb ingrodedyh courtsbecau eisnotdesignedbraisedft rthventanildur nglitigationtexcuseaversight,b trathertoexcuset ep ysicianincaseswhere,objectivelyassessed,disclo urewou da nd let rioustotheemotionalstatefthp i nt. Inlie(ihlull:rcfuuiloinilinilinu iiiail),"'LordDona dsonMRstatedthatlawrequiresthatnadultp tientwhoi m ntallya dphysically I)itkin'sopinote5,u211 11M»//i.misMiinhiiii376I*2d,,2(166)(Supreme( ourtfKnow).(>ilieilorimolconsentar .Imwoci,p ssible.sinhasi plied,tacitorpr orgene alconsentImpliedconsent,t o.l tpiiresfulliorknow dge(SyvilLloyd-Morris'TheA fConsent'(|66|)II,\Vir/.,nrJounuil-126(26Ma chI*) )!))andcoversircumstancesof'necessity |XInRrSf.hlult:nfii'.il'/nml nifiihif uiii)||663|Fa n123.|| 62|AllI;R71,|1662)IIMIR66.howe\ei.thepatientwasopctaieduponwithoiitrc nsenthint res solh rtinhoiihiltI 1Isamplesiein igeniy.thatittheoulvoiuscopen(towhi ht eatientcouldanswerihitlieoishewouldh.isewauleds condopinion),thatt eresochancelrm(thissunlikehI"htheasel itually.huttmyopinionhatahssici.mshouldeobligedithert leleithpatientois condopi ionrsimplyath tereoisk)Iheici|uiienuntslotad fenceolneissiiyosucceedarhatthpatienti unconscious,hasnotpieviouslyxpressedan\objectionohef ftr atmentproposedahatwtdoneisthminimumreipiiiedtosavel fe."1655SC2<»iat66,inwliichthejudgedirect djutythatestswh hert eredbeenmuIiadeparturefioinnoi iala dsualpracticesofgen ralpractitionerssuldreasonablyhedescribedas'g snegligence.Deviation.therefore,i tts lfanindica ionolnegligentc. Ithasbeenarguedthattphysicianhasrightofnon-disclosurevis-a-visthp t ntwhitishasetlontheamountofknowledgea dun erstandingabouttheg neraln turefthpioccdurewhichtpati ntsc pableolg ining.Accordingly,d ctorseedotwarnfe\erydavihksattendantosuigiclpiocedures( tthonee dfthscale)or(athother)fpiocc'duieswhicthp.utiii larpatientinc pableolunderstanding.Ihisalsosubjectohjeitivet stingin(lanada:eeI)i«k nsopcote5t256.,sIi.n6S((A).11')«»2|IllRath$.\,«/.(1602)6IIMIR6((A).
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capableofexercisingchoicemustc ns nifm dic ltreatmentofhiis
tohelawful'.Asare ultofv lidcon ent,certa npossibilities(su h tortiousliability)areexcluded.Thusoft elawc ntractins ch casesisr r ,yetpos ible,atleintheory.1''However,i'tg at majorityofcases,thdutyowed.towardshepati ntist m whethertherexis sacontractn t..|bec usi ).ariso fth dutyofcare'.2" Anactionfortrespassagain tthep rsonrfoba teryisImti possibility.21Thisit epreferredoptioninAmer ca,i w ichlacko informedcons ntgivesristationitrespa s,the ebyconfl tinge tortsfmedicalnegligenceandmed caltrespass.Inbugla ,how v r,i washeldin7'e-2thatsurg onoper ingwithoutanyco s nttll commitsbatteryagainshispatient,2'buthatimperfeccons nc uld amounttonegligence. F'romthecaselawislearth tanactionnneg igentistdomi ant causeofaction.Iinvolvedepaiturefrontge erala dppr ved medicalpractice2'1andisbas0 1thingsida inots id."I11lie blr Hughes2''itwaspointedoutbyt eSupr meCourfanadth tt courts'tendencyi situationsofnoil-rinsuffic entdisclosure27of inherentrisksstocon idernegligencerath rthbatt ry,ex pti circumstancesoffraudrmisrepresentation.2"Accordingly,theheal h carerwillnotincurl abili ynegligencunlessitsesta lish dth thor sheowedalegaldutyfc rthep tientandw sinbr cofth tduty, andthatsconsequencetpati ntsuffereddamag .In deq tdisclo¬ sureth shaobet eca seoftpl intiffsinjuries.Becau edamagis anecessaryclementofthc im,burd nofpr ofrestswithth 1'AccordingtlintHjC*rIx ris924AI)438at53,theissucanoftehec usidei din contractoindelict,hutremainsadutytx rcisetheappr p ia ec r .SelsoIXinirUr llurfuUAUSTSASC.1769at90.2"II.LordMut aliViSl«rrt.c(1957)15 21ChiUleiti'ii'Genoa&another( 981)QB432.(1981)Allilt257.inw thItt ecomvp oflotterywasconsid red.Bris svJhelthateneg ig ntfailurtdiscloseinherris wouldn t,itself,vitiateconsent.Thwasfollow dinIti l*r/' fe-aaotl i11|9H3(3A llil . 716at28,[19 4]WI.R64Iat5.3nilin.Sid,nisi)'opritote4 22(1988|Pant52,|AllER6 .3. 23Accordingt .•l/Mniry-Oiirr.i/SReference(S6oj1980)[I 8 |Qll715(CA).I9 l|Al PR1057,onecannotnsenttbatt ryThiw supheldinCollinrIli/osL[I984|WlR 1172,( 984].3AllPR.374.Thispaper,however,iscons d ingllinf rmecons ntr.rt ttha generalnoil-consent,althoughthc teg riesd ttimesoverlap. 21ChirkI'AfarLfiin.11111983)IllPR4 6. 23Danielsi-Bnrfiehlopc tnote1977I2'-( 981)114)lR(3.1) 27DisclosurerequirementsfrontCanad ancaselawarh s dthpr gnosiftpatient, accessiblealternativesdben fit ,suc esandfail rr ,knowffectsa dri k ,materiality thepatient'smeaofinquiryandthp ysician'srecom endatioIfick nocitno5a 254-5. Inl.i,thyfAllowctill(1985)53OR2d)4a .MiKinl.lvJoftheOntinIlig Courtcommented'infor edconsent'asanaly ediliei 'lt*I/rry i r.s ingth i'j |usih acase,theplaintiffcouldo lykn wthe"factrfactsu nw i.hheallegeegli entc" whenhediscoversthatresultsofthproced repe f rm dweilill r ntfrom\hatt surgeonhadlethpatienttobelieviw ldhandth tpointc uldossiblyass rt misrepresentation'.
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plaintifftoshowtb.itb lliers tebeenwar edofhriskwhich eventuated,orshwouldothaveundergonehetreatmentnd thereforewouldn tavsuff redthi juryfwhichhorshe complains. Ihetwocomponentpartsfthinf r ed-consentissuweres c¬ cinctlystatedi(amadabyIloyt|AiKuifHiI'M eMiillin:2'1wastherisk onewhichoug ttohavebeendisclosedtpa ientand,fowould areasonableperson,fterh vi gb efu lyinf rmedfhrisk,h ve consentedtohprocedure?IAus ralia,iDani lspBinftcltl,3"he plaintiffallegedthatpriortohop rationthedefen a t'f il dobtain theplaintiff'sinformedconsentti '.Thplai iffallegedhath dbeeninformedofthriskinvolved,hwoulotha ethperation.Ilowcver,iefailedtodis harget atburdenfp oofndisclaim accordinglyfaile .Similatly,nCan daKitchent>McMitllen" erialjudgeconcludedthatit isc eev nifthriskw reovbe ndisclosed,thplaintiffwouldt llh vegiv nisinf rmedconsent,becauses rgerywasneces ary. 1hestandardofheleg ldutyfc revis-a-visinformationintheUnitedKingdomisaphysician-basedIthab enrejectediCa a andAustraliabutotelsewhereithCommonw alth,ndib ingerodedinthU itKi gd m*2anilS uthAfrica.Thel olontprinciple, asoutlinedwithapprovaliSiila y,'m ybf rmul tedasruleatdoctorisn tegligentifhactsccordancewithp acticea optedt thetimeasproperbyes onsibleb dyfr spectablem dicalopin¬ ion'.*1Inshort,t elawimposesadu yfcare:b tthtandardofcarei amatterofmedicaljudg ment.InM yesLo hianHea thliaanl," suppottingtheabovetwocas s,thCourtfSes onlSc la dld that'itw snotthelawthateinformedconsentfpati nti ll circumstancestobebtained.Ra h r,ywarningobgivet patientwastobg vernedymedicalcrit riau lessicouldbest b¬ lishedasn cessaryi relianceotheg ralduttoshowcare.'If t,I)imn.JstatedinS ilatray*'hate'doctrineofinf m dco sentno placeinhnglishlaw'.ScottishandF.nglishourtsarereluctantoh ld medicalprofessionalsr pon ible,a dreutft pw thdevel pm ntsinAustraliaandCana a,swelli ht eP t ntsCh rterof1992."* Ihereisadiffe enceh reb twe nconsentingtotreatmentdrefus¬ ingtDickens,how ver,ar uesthatwiththexc ptionofthel wf 2>(l'JSh)M)|)|R(hh|nnt112(NowBruns ickC urtofApp .il)v"()piitnote19. M(19,S'))r>2|)IRliltIHI(NewBruns ickCourtfAppeal). InS"i,/.nr.j)\onlyu)iplockacceptedth/Jo/iimprinciplewi houtmollification.A lt oilierlawlords,hileactoptinginpr nciple,ieferi damorepati t-orienteds .uMiNa iJopiilnoteI 11|I'tuiiJS|.ul'».l 'ni|IMidR\(at»«».pn<»idCapian.''ins|jQBI'M((A)at5I7 -C.| 'W||AllF.RIOIHatMtfO/i-i.PBalen'ConsenttoMedu.iltreatment'(|9'M)Î8S liiilois/ rrrrr.i/121-3(IIFebruaryInun
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battery,'thdecisionodeclinetreatme tinill refro thisi
toacceptreatment'.*7li ti yview,whilehsalientpo ntl matteriswhe heranydecisionleg.udingne m ntad quately informed,tsdoubtfulwhethertgroliscIn urefi rmation requiredwouldhasighincasesherethp tientref s sr m nt thebasisofinsuffici ntformationandr skassoc atedw thno - treatmentventuates;orhac usation(it r slremotene sda ¬ age)insuchcaswouldheeasilyprov d.*"Ili eitth si w, lliingliiiiiii1/W le*"twash dbytheSaskatchewnCourtfAppealt inordertenableapatientgivinform dconsentsurg ry, additiontodisclosinghematerialrisksfsurgeryurgeonu t explaintohepati ntconsequencesfleavi gthilm nun r ted, aswellthalternativem ansoftreatmentdt rrisks.Ihiindicat thatinbothsitu tionsedutyprese t,nottobliga ionf equalextent. InWhilevinner'"tO taiolig tC urtofJusticeex end dR bl Hughestos mede reinholdingotonlyhamat rialriskasw l unusualrisksshouldhedisclo eb tt athereanov rlape w n thesewocategori s.Withhadvantageofhindsight,pl ntllould hemoreasilyabltsserth toshw uldnh vundergonet procedure.Accordingly,thedecis onlSu mC u t(amadain Ifiipp'Le/>j>"assertsthaissuewhetherreasonablepersonnt plaintiff'sositionwouldhavedec in racceptedtre tme t,giv theinformationavailabletti ndexcludinghadvantageof hindsight. Rogersi'IIliitakcr'demonstratedam vtowardsorobjectivet ing oftheinformed-consentssunAustralia,although,ol wf.ngla d. thesubjectiveestharaditionallybeenemployed.1-Icast rned whethert eamountofinfor a iond ctoh disclosedmpli d withthestandardofcarehichouldreasonablyhexpectim. Thecourteldthanotificationshouldaveb ng v fnei I-I000riskinthecaseoftp ti ntque tion(developingsympa¬ theticopthalmiaduringeyesurgery).Signific tly,thef ncer l ed /fii/iim,butthecourtrejectedatli nceydist ng ishingbe w n diagnosisortreatmentandinformation;l ohthevid ncef acceptablemedicalpractics rveson ysusefulgu dtohurts, *7Dickensopitnote5fofit. *8Itlias,however,e nldinAmericaC.VMn(h ulsDicke sopcitnota2!->) tlr.itifapatientn ficn stlesi etorefustt alincnt.h elisksociat dw thn treatmentshouldhexplained. Vl(1087)37DLRtill62I(SaskatchewanConnApp l) (1981)2031It( d2(>'l(Ontariolip iCourtlJustice) " (1081)112DfIt3d)67,whichassupportedinhiblrIb y/io(I'IMII3 at13(infactl. skinOldwasothebe chi tcases)andvme dobjectivedlo m test. ''IlieSupr meCourtfthAustraliahasdopt dlitsubjectiveapp oatin( n Suiteolouth.fitsr ii/iiitnilfVri . u(l'IS(t).VIA It313a5M:11sliolbe nths ll /' n (I'l'lllj2MedIt1113OA)anIrlioy.i .I,s.m./i i/e-pt .tf(I' Mi)Med'r,
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whoseprer gativeitremainstde rminehappropriatestand rdf carewithregardtodiscl surefnformation,k tplaintiff' success ully' aiguedthatllol,tinpri tiplcshouldn tapp iedentailsh t cntulswo lddeferthemtdiialexpeitsi m dicaln gligencec es, anilthatepiintaryjudgewscon ctithecircumstancesofthiss notdeferringtheviewsfthosem dicalpractitionershogave evidencethat ywouldnothavwarnedthplaintiff.Ithcontext advirendinfo mationgi etop ts,wh revercourasse tt iwn piimacyovermedicalpracti e,therefore,thell l, instandardb g eroded. Incasesofallegedm dicaln gligencethplaintiffc notk ow yfactconcerningthallegedbreachofdutyn lrsheh satl tsome infbimalionthatesurgeondidn tcaccordancewtht esta dard ofcarelequir dfsurg ons.'*Anhorshecano lytt isinf ma¬ tionliomthermedicalprofessiona s.Iatip intthexpertmedical vvitnessesbecomeimp rtantna ymatter.Ithisr ga d,thN wSouth Wales(iourtlAppealhadnlillier11li scntlDi trictIlospital"dopted minepatientce tredpproachthanSithu ny.'lirCourth lthatme i¬ calopiniona dst dardracticesrim o tant,li tgui elineth couit;asinRogersrWltihikei. IheStil,tie,tycaseconc rnedpati ntwhoasool fc ancef aboutonepercentthaspi ald m gemi htresultfr mnopera ionnherneck.1lr.itchanceventuat d.TIlousofLordsconfirmedth llohiiiitestwi regardtodiscl surefnherentrisks.Id d,ow ver,ul thatmedicalopinionwasnotdecis vendre i edthrighterrule ildisclosurewasbviouslynec ssarytoninformeddeci ionbythe patient,lordbridgeindicat dthatci cumstancesmightriswh rth courtmightrejectthestandardfacc ptedm dicalp tice,therebyindicatingafurthererosiofHo tiii.lrdfempl t anagreeddai thatecourtwoulddetermineh thertd ctor'blunder d'i notdiscl singinformatio .IhecourtinC, n onWils&others,'* conxideiingSnhtiroyandMeyer,attachedparticularweightthspeech ofIrilllridgc.whi hasmadenresponsetcommentsfLa kinCJC inReiblrHughesi whicht elatt rdistingui edtinform d-consent casefromca sinvolvingthquestiowhethertd chadarriedouthisprofessionalactiviti sbyapplicablerofessionals a dards. I ordScaiman.dissentingnSitl, e,iyft rco sideringCii ibnryv Sjience.theleadingU itedSta sauthorityotsubject,asw llR ibl eHughes,wouldhavfount ed ctrinefinf rmedco sentbth lawinIingland.lestated:17 " but'rl)eill,I,(l'» )2)DinC|312.it-1.3. (I'IS'))7NSWI333.citedin)i i t( ieieuAIt'llnl.iv v'1.itt'll[cRiplntoKnowAConip.H.itiveView'(I't'D)21.bi ;/.'-.Innlit.titl lt lit|U( .' 11>'>2|SII(Nt1S)I'b'"Dp.iinote7 '' |I'IX3|ACS7I(It1.,1K X|l,j|'!Jv3|All(.13.11.
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runsouthAfricai.awjournai
'MyLords,Ithinkt eCiintcrhiiryproposit o srelied:log. ltrutwhichtomuc judicialrelianceom dic ljudg nttendsobscure.Inamedi aleglige cec s wherethissutadviceandinformationgiventohpatie tathreatm n proposed,theavailableo tion ,andtherisk,tcou tisconcernedprima lyw tha patient'srights.Thdoctor'u yarisesfr mhispatient'srights.' Siditioayadoptedpaternalisticandphysician-orienteda proach,an alignedinformedcons twithpr fessionalduty;yitdn tleavth issuenthha dsofthemedicalprof ssionl ne.Ilol m,ishoulhe noted,wasonlyadecisi nffir tinstance,a dwhathabecomethe Hi'Iihiitestwasparofthesumming-uptalayjury.18int,thoughdivided onitsadequacy,hIlousofL rdss pport dinSiditieay. LordScarinaninidatoayw sftheviewth tllolamlestwas dilutionoftheverybasisofthprinciplfcon ent:p tienautonomy. InRogersi>11hitaher,f rinsta ce,therwasalsoevidencefromsi larly reputablem dicalpractitionersthat ywouldhavewarn dofthe 1:14000risk.However,accordingtIainSCloldrein,'(it|isoe syt confusethecalibreothewitnessiththcalibroft eopin onhe professesthold',anscourthavedevel pedrulesbywhichexpert opinionisassessed:fthopinio sfgr uplphysic ansarecle tl unreasonable,th tis,t atuchviewswo ldn tbeheldyanyreasonable bodyfdoctors,theycanbedisregarded.1'' Commonpractice,however,stillplaysitmostcon picuousrin actionsbasedonallegemedicalnegligence.5"IliCourtfSess on ScotlandinMayesI'Lol/ii tiHe l hoard'*consideredptvarying betweenpractitionersandaffirmedth tfailureowoliskswas alwaystobejudgedypractitioners' s andards.Thequestionatwh t constitutesnegligenceisanswer dthroughapplicatiofliol i . whichisbeingeenasincr a i glyinappropriate.Thaltern tiv ,gai ing popularityintheCommonwealth,isthetandardfwhattherea onable patientinthparticularpatient'spos tionw uldnttknow,ass(la¬ testseouinCa adaiRcilrHughes.*2 AccordingtheLawReformCommissi nfCan dai198(1,54 ll materialorelevantfactswhichcouldinfluencthpatie t'sdecisio whethertound rgotreatm ntshouldhdisclosed.Hite tforma eri¬ alityistobeobjective,butitecomesubjectivthex entthat Itisconsideredt onrcltaictbeapplicableintoca enearlyfoudecadafli decision.Seclaintloldrei'llolom—Pr blemsArisi g()ntl"Ancestor"W isb p11'''11} IdNcwlJ1237(lbSeptember1001) 4'Opcitnote18a315( 0SeptemberI'I'M). 5n i'AustralianR JCrossSociety-otheis(1901)00AlIfbilaO. 51( 901)1SITHI.| 090|Met!R163. 52Itwasbeldtb tecourortilejurym yassesswllatliicasona lep ti ntwouldliave wantedtoknow.Ic ntrast,llri isbcour sma nt iap ofessi alst dardofa .wl irblia tbedraw ackofplacingt onniclip werimi r tyo iniona dnottak ngintacc unt non-medical,patient-orient dfactors.IbiswconfirmedinII7l tee7inner(1081)12u>1R (3d)260OntarioIliglCourtfJustice),accor ngtwhi hthecourtliabesa isfi dto whatthereasonablepatie tinthsamsituationwouldhavdonerwanted. 55ConsenttoMisticalCon•I.awRef rmCommi si nlCan da,10811Kibypsitnote2 at7I
INIORMIDtONSIN1liAStAUI:' II I?6.47 physicianknowst epati tandco s quenceexpecta ionsfth physicianater is d. 1'lu-reathicepossiblestandardswh chcanbadopted,uiremains aquestionofwhoseinterestsrb grepres ntedina yf mft ing elected.Ihmedical-professionalstan ardwascc ptedbyEngl h coiutsinItolamandSid eay.Thesubjec ive-patientstand rd,a co ing
towhicheaspe ifictientwouldhavt testtwh therrs wouldhavemadecertainde isiogivethdisclosurefks,h sb criticizedforbe ngpro ethinds ghtathwhimsfun eason¬ ablepatient,mibec useiwouldnoprac icallypo s bleth ndlel patientsidenticallydw hviewtofairn su ersubjectivet. Iheobjectivet stismorpracticallyoperable.Idi p s sfth problemfhindsightbyaskingh wtheverageprude tsoninth plaintiff'ssituationwouldhavedec de ,giv nthcircumsta ces.I l o dispenseswiththproblemfholdingapractitionerlia lef rth whimsicalcoursesfact onh repa ientsnderthsubj c ivetest. Iheplaintiffsapparentdesifoknowledgecomesincr asinglyn ola asindicativeofwhatthphysicians ouldobjectivelyhkn wft patient'sinformationaln eds.Accountistbkenfheparticular patient'sosition,bjectivelyass ssed.If,f rexampl ,thp ti ntindi¬ cateslearconce nfc rtainatu endge eralinquisi iv ness,s occurredinRogersr11hitah r,treasonablep ysicianouldbexpect d lokn wthathershewouldanttbi f rm dfys chisk.Int is instance,washeldhatbecau eMrWhit k rh showngen ral concernregardingdamageth'good' yurinsurg ry,thre so ¬ ablesurgeonoughttoh vappr ciatedth t(becausel yr on cannotapprecia ethevagariesofsympath ticpthalmia)thart cular patientwouldhavewantedtb ar edfs chrisk.Und rth objectivetestisreasonablecontendth tphysicianoughttkn w thateseriousnessfinher ntcons qu ncesdi ctlyp oportionalt thepatient'sdesirefoinformation.Evslightr sk,giventhobvious interestandint stsofthepati nt,iswarnableun ertobj ctived apparent-subjectivetests.51Similaily,hcourtiR ihli/Ittghcsh ldh t objectivelyappraised,thatient'sp ticularsi uationdecre esthf ofthep ysician'srecommendations.55 Intherequiremento'asktlighquestions'iE lishl w,honus ofinquiiysplacedonthp ti nt,antobligationod ctorisly ' liiil'lcIlightssupran<7(oJ|Immolated.imodifiedobject vele tF rcaus tionb appliedinnformconsentca s.AlU>Iaski(JCti tedl .it|t] iadopt onfobj ctive standarddoe*notme ntliabeis ufc sa ioni c mpletelytbeba sfsurg on. Meitlsbecausemedicalevi enceestablishestbr asonablenessfrec mm dedoperation doesnotmeantb tareasonablep rson111tbeati tpo itionwouldnecessarilygr et it .'̂Ibid
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increasedthaofaninquisitivepa ient.*1'Acc rdingtIllicit," . adoctorneedstoskhqu ti n"istlevelfcapacitydemonstrat dby thepati ntcommensuratewi hthgr vityoft edecisitheakenin givingorrefusinc nsent?"O lyifthansw rs'no' s ouldpaternalistic principlesheinvoked;y tthepr bl mw lremainthBolnista dard employedinansw ringthequ stion:capacityofthpati nttunder¬ standi professionallyassessedndthatprofe sionalasses me tisth judgedaccor ingtoBohnn. AccordingtheCanadianlawReformCommission,thestof comprehensionshouldheapparent-subjective,withthonunt physiciantotakereasonablestepswithregardtohparticularp i ntt ensureunderstanding.Miller*8notesthatsi ce1688thliii ishMed c l Association,t o,haschangeditemphasisndoctor-patientrel ti ns frompaternalismtpartn ship.Paternalism(ihfo moft eBp/,ti test)isunderincr a ingpressureitheU itKingdom.Thisfuith r evidentfromtheNationalHealthServicPatients'Ch rt roI'J'M,''' whichstatesth tev rycitizenhastherig t'rogivencl arexplana ion ofanytreatmentproposed,includi giiuyrisksanalternatives'.''" Buttherearerendswhichwouldapp arthg inginthoth t direction.InRcS"1thebegin ingsofaslipperyloreevid tfromthe non-consensualabortionperform doSdu i ghysterectomy.Iis indicatedthatsatle stheoreticallypossiblt acompetenwom n's decisionouldbedisregarded,th reby011tfaolidecr a ingpatient autonomy. Whathasbecomeapparentisth t,nres ectofBo imt t,thereis adifferencebetw entr atm ntandinform tio .Bec useasgeneralrul thejudiciarylacksmedicalexpertise,Bohwisnlyabltberointh courtsinrespectofthstandardsfdisclosurinherentri kth ta herequiredofphysiciansbtlaw.InSitLiimy,iastpresu dthat thestandardsapplicableodiagn sisaniltreatmentsh ulbthes ms thoseappliedtdisclosure.''-Similarly,inRogers11hil kcith sdifference wasacknowledged/'3Whatem rgesisaisol ti nfthadvisorydu y fromdiagnosisandtreat ent,a distth tp i twhichtBe/,mi standardibeingerodedtvaryindegr esacrosthCommonw l h. Iijlcnopcitnote36a121.Certainly,im stc sesinvolvinginad qu twar ing,tire plaintifTfailedtoasks cificquestio s.Wlierelioshtlo sksuchque tions,horshi entitledtoafulansw r,washeldinthreejurisdictio siSi,/,,imp,/tqc'II'/nu s,a dHi 'l f//injur. 77llalenopcitnote36122. F11Miller'PcnialofIlea tliC rmiInformedtau s niiI'uglhhandA ientw' (1992)8.hiicrrnm/c oua/j/aiman,/Mi i iinc37.''Milleropsitnote58(,'f IhePatientsCharter1*102,'/;myemphasis.hisisagre dwitbyMIle n7/,,hmui (April1993)883;quotedbyllalenopcinote3r,.sw llthMediilIId mhiinni theUnitedKingdom. '*1RcS(iiilnlt:ii'/iisa/,,tui' /ini/r r, t,ui l110*7.3Jlam33.|I992|AlIlk6/1't'2 IIMIR69.11 ,8l|Cjll|9.\( A).115 3.I'lSAllkI1 I8.11IU2 Is,'I'mellhl.ihi(1992)16AlIt,35at0\ .
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I would like to inform you that no book setting out the rationale of each clause of the
Convention on human rights and biomedicine has been published. The document containing
the preparatory work of the Convention is still classified as restricted, so that we cannot
distribute it.
Canada, Australia and the United States have observer status within the Steering
Committee of Bioethics (CDBI) which has drafted the Convention. Consequently, these
countries took part into the process of the elaboration of the Convention.
The concept of "informed consent" must be interpreted according to national law. The
explanatory report gives some informations about its meaning (paragraph 35). Drafted under
the responsability of the Secretariat, it reflects the opinion of the Committee but is not a
binding instrument.
Concerning your last question, please refer to chapter XI of the Convention, which
aeais with this issue.
I hope that above information will help you in your work.
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